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Abstract
Studies of economic insecurity often neglect children. This dissertation examines
the eﬀects of parental economic insecurity on children’s development. In Chapter
2, I investigate the causal relationship between parental economic insecurity and
non-cognitive skills of 2 to 5 years olds. I draw data from Statistics Canada Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth from 2000 to 2005, and employ
OLS and individual ﬁxed eﬀects estimation. I ﬁnd that when parents worry about
money, their children are more likely to be hyperactive and anxious. The eﬀects on
children are comparable to a divorce shock. I propose the intergenerational eﬀects
are transmitted through direct mirroring of parents’ anxiety, and indirect eﬀects of
parenting styles. I demonstrate parents are more likely to use negative parenting
styles and less likely to use positive strategies when they worry about money. In
Chapter 3, I explore the causal relationship between parental economic insecurity
and child weight gain. I use the natural experiment of China State-Owned Enter-
prise Reform that laid oﬀ 34 millions workers in the state sector and employ the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology with individual ﬁxed eﬀects with panel data
from the China Health and Nutrition Survey. Compared to the non-state sector,
boys whose parents work for the state sector experience weight gain signiﬁcantly.
The results persist among families that never lost jobs, emphasizing the eﬀects of
anticipation of job loss, rather than the actual job loss. Quantile regressions sug-
gest that overweight boys are likely to gain more weight. In Chapter 4, I investi-
gate the eﬀects of large negative income shocks on dietary intakes within Chinese
families. I study families with both girls and boys, and examine the changes in in-
takes of boys versus girls, fathers versus mothers, and parents versus children. Us-
ing the macronutrient daily intake standard, I ﬁnd that signiﬁcant carbohydrate
intakes and overall energy intakes rise in response to negative income shocks. The
food allocation is in the order of fathers, sons, daughters and mothers. The results
highlight the intra-household inequality in Chinese families.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The dissertation consists of three essays investigating parental economic insecurity
and child outcomes in Canada and China.
A large body of literature suggests economic insecurity causes mental and physi-
cal health problems. Little research has been done on intergenerational eﬀects of
economic insecurity on children in the families. My thesis ﬁlls the gap and sug-
gests that economic anxiety not only is harmful to adults who are suﬀering from it,
but has negative eﬀects on children’s development. I also investigate the channel
through which parental economic insecurity passes onto children.
My ﬁrst essay explores the relationship between economic insecurity and children’s
inattentive/hyperactive and anxious behaviours in Canada. Using data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY), 47% of house-
holds with young children worry about whether they have enough money to sup-
port their families.
Results suggest that hyperactivity and anxiety are positively associated with parental
economic insecurity. The size of the association between parental economic insecu-
rity and children’s inattentive/hyperactive behaviours are comparable to divorce
shocks. Boys exhibit more inattentive/hyperactive behaviours than girls, but girls
are more sensitive to changes in parental economic insecurity.
A potential channel through which parental economic insecurity aﬀects children is
their parenting behaviour. Less positive interaction and consistent parenting, more
irrational and punitive parenting strategies are apparent when parents experience
economic insecurity.
In the second essay, I explore the causal relationship between parental economic
insecurity and children’s weight gain using the natural experiment of massive lay-
oﬀs of 34 million employees in the Chinese state sector in the late 1990s due to
unanticipated state-owned enterprise reform, which marked the end of the “iron
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rice bowl” or guarantee of employment security.
Using the provincial and year-level layoﬀ rates and income loss from the layoﬀs, I
estimate its eﬀects on children’s body mass measures adjusting for age and gender
growth standards. A continuous diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation with individual
ﬁxed eﬀects indicates that if the expected economic loss from layoﬀ increases by 10
percentage points, a 10-year-old boy increases his body mass measure distribution
from the median to the 86th percentile.
The results persist even for boys whose parents kept their jobs, indicating the im-
portance of anxiety about potential loss, as well as the experience of actual loss.
Quantile regressions then demonstrate that economic insecurity has greater eﬀects
on boys at a higher distribution of waist-to-height ratio, which suggests that over-
weight children are more severely aﬀected by parental economic insecurity. Girls’
weight outcomes are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the layoﬀs, suggesting a gender
diﬀerence in response to parental economic insecurity. After accounting for the in-
tergenerational eﬀects, this essay shows higher public health costs associated with
economic insecurity than previous studies have suggested.
The third essay investigates within family the eﬀects of parental income shocks
on individual’s dietary intake. Drawing on large-scale panel data from the China
Health and Nutrition Survey from 1991 to 2011, I examine the macronutrient in-
takes of 2 to 17-year-old siblings of mixed-sex and their parents in 3,244 families.
Gender disparity in carbohydrate intakes accounts for 15 percentage points in child
sample, 30 percentage points in adolescents, and 50 percentage points between par-
ents using the Dietary Reference Intakes standards. The essay further shows that
when families experience negative income shocks, food is allocated in the order
of fathers, sons, daughters and mothers. Gender inequality of intra-household re-
source allocation is heightened in the event of large income losses.
2
Chapter 2
Parental economic insecurity and children’s non-cognitive
skills. A panel study of 2 to 5 year-olds in Canada
2.1 Introduction
Many families with young children in Canada experience economic insecurity, de-
spite having both parents working full-time in the paid labour market. For exam-
ple, micro-data from the National Longitudinal of Children and Youth (NLSCY)
indicate that 47 percent of children live in families that worry about not having
enough money. This paper explores how parental economic insecurity aﬀects non-
cognitive outcomes of their 2 to 5 year old children.
2.1.1 Motivation
It is well recognized that economic deprivation has a negative impact on children’s
well-being. Children in low-income families tend to have poorer health and test
scores (Dahl & Lochner, 2012), and are more likely to drop out of school and expe-
rience teenage pregnancy (Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, 1997). These economics papers
focus on income and poverty.
However, Gershoﬀ, Aber, Raver and Lennon (2007) argue that it is important
to look beyond income when studying child development. They include material
hardship (food insecurity, residential instability, inadequacy of medical care, and
months of ﬁnancial troubles) in addition to income, and ﬁnd that both income and
material hardship inﬂuence children’s cognitive skills. This inﬂuence is mediated
through parent investment in children, parental stress and positive parenting be-
haviour. Gershoﬀ et al. allege that income eﬀects estimated in the earlier economic
literature were confounded by material hardship.
In this paper, we propose that family income and material hardship are not the
only ’economic’ variables that aﬀect children. Our goal is to demonstrate that after
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controlling for income, economic insecurity experienced by parents also inﬂuences
children’s development.
2.1.2 Economic insecurity
Low current income is correlated with, but is distinct from worries about future
income. Recent studies have found that the risk of unemployment reduces life sat-
isfaction more than the ﬁnancial loss caused by unemployment (Di Tella et al.,
2003). Economic insecurity can be deﬁned as “the anxiety produced by a lack of
economic safety, i.e. by an inability to obtain protection against subjectively sig-
niﬁcant potential economic losses” (Osberg, 1998). Economic insecurity is thus due
to an unprotected signiﬁcant possible future economic loss that threatens people’s
future economic state. Osberg (2009) identiﬁed the common causes of economic
insecurity as: unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, and old age.
Previous literature has linked adult health with economic insecurity. Rohde et al
(2016), using Australian data, found that economic insecurity aﬀects both mental
health and physical health, and people are susceptible regardless of their income
level. Watson, Osberg and Phipps (2016) drew upon the natural experiment of
Canadian unemployment insurance beneﬁts cut and found that this policy changed
increased BMI by 3.2 points. Staudigel (2016) linked economic insecurity to anx-
iety, food intake and weight. These studies focused on the impact of economic in-
security on adult health, but, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have exam-
ined the possible implications of parental economic insecurity for child well-being.
Our analysis focuses on two non-cognitive outcomes of Canadian children in very
early childhood (i.e., aged 2 to 5 years), an extremely important stage of life. Given
the cumulative nature of human development, early life experiences are the founda-
tion for all future development (e.g., Cunha and Heckman, 2010). Pragmatically,
our choice also ensures data consistency. We use the Early Childhood Develop-
ment (ECD) cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth
(NLSCY), which only follows children up to the age of ﬁve.
Speciﬁcally, we study associations between parental economic insecurity and: 1)
an inattention/hyperactive score and; 2) an emotion/anxiety score. Not only are
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these important indicators of the child’s current well-being, but Cunha and Heck-
man (2010) emphasize the dynamic complementarities between cognitive and non-
cognitive development. For example, it is hard to learn the alphabet if you can’t
sit still or are overly anxious at pre-school.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data,
sections 3 and 4 discuss methodology and results, respectively. Section 5 examines
parenting behaviour as a potential pathway from parental economic insecurity to
child outcomes. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Data description
2.2.1 NLSCY
We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY)
conducted by Statistics Canada. The NLSCY is a long-term panel study that fol-
lows Canadian children in the 10 provinces from birth to adulthood, providing a
comprehensive picture of their social and family environment, emotional status, be-
havioural development and well-being, learning patterns and later labour market
outcomes. The survey began in 1994 (cycle 1) and was conducted every two years
until 2008 (cycle 8). Because the key measure for this paper (parental economic in-
security) is introduced in cycle 4, our sample is constructed using data from 2000,
2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008.
The data we use are from the Early Childhood Development (ECD) component of
the NLSCY. The ’ Person Most Knowledgeable’ (PMK) about the child answered
the survey questions (92% of PMK’s are the biological mother). The ECD com-
prises observations from old ECD cohorts, and a new cohort for each cycle. Chil-
dren from the ECD components are followed until they are 5 years old. To valid
the PMK-reported measures, we limit the sample to the same PMK over time for
each child.
Our analysis uses two samples: a cross-sectional sample and a longitudinal sam-
ple. The cross-sectional sample is constructed by pooling the 5 cycles together,
providing 3,9711 observations in total. When pooling the cross sections, we treat
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each cycle as a separate draw from the same population, generating new cross-
sectional weights from the original cross-sectional weight that adjust for the sample
size of each cycle. The calculation involves two steps: 1) sum the individual cross-
sectional weights within each survey cycle; 2) divide the individual cross-sectional
weight by the total for that cycle. In this way, cross-sectional survey weights are
normalized to sum to one in each cycle. Standard errors are adjusted to account
for the fact that the same child can appear more than once in the data.
The longitudinal sample consists of ﬁve panels that follow the same child from age
2 or 3 to age 4 or 5. The longitudinal sample size consists of 27,156 children in
26,969 families. Longitudinal weights are employed to account for attrition across
cycles.
2.2.2 Measure of economic insecurity
Our measure of economic insecurity in the NLSCY is asked directly of the PMK:
“Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree
with the following statement: You worry about whether the money you have will
be enough to support your family?” We assign the value 4 to the answer “strongly
agree”, and 1 to “strongly disagree.” Thus, a high numeric value is associated with
a high level of economic insecurity. Table 2.1 shows the distribution of parental
economic insecurity for our cross-sectional sample. PMKs who agree or strongly
agree that they worry about money account for 48% of the sample, which suggests
that almost half of the population is at least somewhat worried about whether
they will have enough money to support their families. The mean is 2.5 and the
standard deviation is 0.93. From a longitudinal point of view, 30 percent of the
children experience changes in the level of parents being “worried about money”.
2.2.3 Indices of non-cognitive skills
We use two measures of children’s non-cognitive skills: an inattentive/hyperactive
score, and an emotion/anxiety score. The inattention/hyperactive measure is a 12-
point index that is derived from parental responses to a series of questions about
age-speciﬁc behaviours of the child, such: whether the child can sit still, concen-
trate or settle for more than a few moments; is inattentive and easily distracted;
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has diﬃculty waiting his or her turn, etc (see Appendix I for detail). Higher values
of the index correspond to more inattentive/hyperactive behaviours.
The anxiety score is a 12-point index based on parental responses to questions
about the child’s emotions/anxiety, such as: whether the child is sad, unhappy,
fearful or nervous, worried, tense or has trouble enjoying him/herself. A higher
score associates with a higher degree of emotional disorder (again, see Appendix 1
for details).
2.2.4 Control variables
The most important control variable is income. Past literature has documented
that income deprivation negatively aﬀects children’s development (Dahl & Lochner,
2005). In this paper, we argue that even controlling for income, the anxiety and
worry of parents about current economic needs or potential future economic dif-
ﬁculties may still aﬀect children’s development. We measure family income us-
ing real log equivalent annual household income before taxes after transfers. This
is household income divided by the square root of household size. This equiva-
lence scale is widely used in OECD publications. It means that the amount of in-
come needed by a four-person family is twice that needed by one person (given the
economies of scale available to multi-person families).
Child, PMK and household characteristics are also included. The child controls
include age, health, schooling exposure and birth-order/number of siblings. Speciﬁ-
cally, we use a set of dummy variables for age with ’age 2’ as the base. PMKs were
asked, “In general, would you say this child’s health is excellent, very good, good,
fair or poor?” Since very few children have fair or poor health, we aggregate these
categories, keep “excellent health” as the base and include the rest categories as
dummy variables.
Education falls under provincial jurisdiction in Canada. Thus, variations across
provinces in school starting ages, for example, can result in children of the same
age being in school in some provinces but not others (see Chen, Fortin and Phipps,
2015). Thus, we include a set of dummies to indicate the child’s schooling level
– Junior Kindergarten (only in Ontario), Kindergarten (called Grade Primary in
Nova Scotia) and Grade 1, keeping ’not yet in school’ as the base.
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Hanushek (1992) reported that birth order and family size aﬀect children’s educa-
tional attainment due to the variations of resource allocation within a family so, in
this paper, we control for being a ﬁrst-born child as well as for the number of the
child’s siblings.
For PMK’s, we control for education, family structure and immigrant status. Specif-
ically, we control for PMK’s highest degree obtained, using secondary schooling or
less as the base and including a dummy variable for a college/university degree
and above. In terms of family structure, ’always-married family’ is the base with
dummies for lone-parent and step-parent families. A step-parent family is deﬁned
as the child living with “biological mother and step father, or biological father and
step mother.” Lone-parent family is deﬁned as the child living with “one parent
only.” We exclude observations if the child lives with adoptive parent(s), foster
parents, or does not live with a parent. These three categories combined account
for less than 1% of the sample. Finally, we control for PMK immigrant status.
The province of residence, and the year of survey are also controlled. We dropped
observations from the territories because territories are not surveyed across all cy-
cles. Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics of the outcome variables, measure of
economic insecurity, and the control variables.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Pooled OLS estimation
To investigate the relationships between children’s outcomes and parental eco-
nomic insecurity, we begin by pooling the years from 2000 to 2008 and conduct
OLS estimations. In this pooled sample, a child can appear more than once. The
baseline speciﬁcation is described as below:
Yi = α + β1EconInsecurityi + β2Xi + i (2.1)
where is the outcome (hyperactivity or anxiety) for child i, “worry about money” is
treated as a continuous variable in one speciﬁcation and as a set of separate dum-
mies in a second speciﬁcation. X is a vector of control variables, which includes
family structure, logarithm equivalent income, number of siblings, ﬁrst-born child
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dummy, survey year, immigrant status, PMK education, children’s health and age.
We cluster the standard error at the household level to control for the same child
appearing more than once in the sample. All analyses are carried out separately
for girls and boys.
2.3.2 Individual ﬁxed eﬀects
In the OLS model, associations are identiﬁed by comparing child outcomes for oth-
erwise observably identical children whose parents report diﬀerent levels of insecu-
rity (i.e., we compare cross-sectional observations which can include the same child
more than once and/or a sibling). We cluster standard errors to account for the
non-independence of such observations.
Of course, the OLS models cannot control for unobservable diﬀerences across chil-
dren (e.g., genetic endowments). Thus, we also estimate individual ﬁxed eﬀects
models exploiting the panel structure of the data to remove unchanging unobserv-
able diﬀerences between children. In the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation, we compare the
same child’s outcomes over time, and how he/she is aﬀected by changes in parental
worries about money. The model is structured as:
Yit = α + β1EconInsecurityit + β2Xit + λi + it (2.2)
where t stands for years, and represents the permanent unobservable characteris-
tics of child i. In this ﬁxed eﬀects model, we exclude time-invariant characteristics,
such as immigration status, parental education and province. Thus, we estimate
children’s well-being on changes in parent’s money worries, household income, chil-
dren’s health, family composition, and number of siblings.
2.4 Descriptive Results
Table 2.3 presents mean statistics for our two measures of children’s non-cognitive
development. The average inattentive/hyperactive (I/H) score for all children is
3.54 (of a possible 12), and the standard deviation is 2.38. As a preliminary indica-
tion of the relationship between parental economic insecurity and child outcomes,
for children whose parents “strongly agree” that they are worried about money, the
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average I/H score is higher (3.86); whereas, for children whose parents “strongly
disagree” that they are worried about money, the average I/H score is statistically
signiﬁcantly lower (3.23).
The average emotion/anxiety (E/A) score for the full sample is 1.44 (out of a max-
imum 12), and the standard deviation is 1.59. Again, the E/A score is statistically
signiﬁcantly higher for children whose parents are more worried about money, from
1.32 when the parent is not worried to 1.58 when the parent is very worried.
2.5 Estimation Results
2.5.1 Inattentive/Hyperactive Behaviour Score
Table 2.4 reports both the linear probability and ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for the
inattentive/hyperactive behaviour score. Parental “worries about money” is sig-
niﬁcant and positive in both OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for boys and for girls.
Speciﬁcation 1 uses the continuous measure for “worry about money.” On aver-
age, a 1-point increase in being worried about money (on a 4-point scale) leads
to a 0.20 point increase in the I/H score for girls, and a 0.16 point increase for
boys (see Columns 1 and 6). In speciﬁcation 2 (Table 2.4 columns 2 and 6), we
break down worried about money into dummies, using “worry about money: dis-
agree” as the base. For both girls and boys, the “strongly agree” and “agree” are
highly signiﬁcant and positive. Compared with “worry about money: disagree”,
“Strongly worry about money” increases in the I/H score by 0.31 point for girls,
and 0.40-point increase for boys. For girls, the “strongly disagree” with “worry
about money” has negative eﬀects on I/H score. If we compare the diﬀerences be-
tween children in the lowest and highest categories of economic insecurity, the I/H
score in “strongly worry about money” families is 0.52-point higher for girls and
0.40-point higher for boys, or 22% and 17% standard deviation higher after con-
trolling for the observables.
In the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates, the association between parental money worries and
child inattention/hyperactivity remains statistically signiﬁcant for boys in both
speciﬁcation (see Table 2.4 Columns 7, and 8). The estimates in speciﬁcation 1
show that a 1-point increase in parental worries about money leads to the increase
10
in I/H score by 0.062 point for boys. The estimates in speciﬁcation 2 demonstrates
that when parents strongly worry about money, the I/H score increases by 0.15
point compared with the same boy’s I/H score when parents do not worry about
money. The diﬀerence between highest and lowest categories suggest a 0.15-point
increase in I/H, which is an 8% standard deviation diﬀerence. This result suggests
that after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across children, boys’ hyperac-
tivity increases with parental money worries, while girls’ I/H scores are not signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀected.
To better understand whether the magnitude of these eﬀects is of potential policy
relevance, we compare the “worried about money” with “PMK has a college or uni-
versity degree” (relative to the base secondary education or less) in the OLS model
(see Table 2.4 Columns 1 and 5). A 1-point increase in being worried about money
(using the continuous measure) increases the inattentive/hyperactive behaviour
score by 0.20 for gilrs and 0.16 for boys, while PMK having a university education
decreases hyperactivity by 0.17. and 0.24 for boys. If we think that mother edu-
cation is a key correlate of child behaviour, this suggests that parental economic
insecurity has comparable eﬀects in children: a 1-point increase in “worry about
money” on a 4-point scale could oﬀset the eﬀects of mother’s university education
in children’s upbringing.
2.5.2 Emotion/Anxiety Score
Table 2.5 reports both the OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for the emotion/ anx-
iety score. First, the continuous “worry about money” variable is signiﬁcant and
positive for both genders (see Table 2.5 Columns 1 and 5). A 1-point increase in
parental economic insecurity is associated with a 0.14-point increase in anxiety
for girls, and a 0.08-point increase for boys, which is equivalent to a 9% of stan-
dard deviation increases for girls, and a 5% standard deviation increase for boys.
Speciﬁcation 2 reports the estimates using categorical measures of worry about
money (see Columns 2 and 6). Comparing to “disagree with worry about money”,
“strongly worry about money” increases anxiety level by 0.19 point in girls and
0.23 point in boys, or 12% and 14% increase in standard deviation respectively.
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Each level of worry about money for girls are signiﬁcant at a 1% level, with a neg-
ative eﬀect associated with “Worry about money: strongly disagree” and a positive
eﬀect associated with “Worry about money: strongly agree”. The diﬀerence in girls’
anxiety scores between the highest and lowest level of economic insecurity is 0.34
point (i.e. 21% standard deviation).
In the ﬁxed eﬀect estimations, “worry about money” is signiﬁcantly associated with
a higher anxiety level for girls, though not for boys. For the continuous speciﬁ-
cation, a 1-point increase in “worry about money” increases girls’ anxiety score
by 0.055 point on average. In the categorical speciﬁcation, “strongly worry about
money” increases anxiety score by 0.15 point in girls, compare to the base “worry
about money: disagree”. It indicates a 10% standard deviation increase in girls’
anxiety score.1
Again, to put the magnitude of the economic insecurity estimate in context, we
compare it with the size of the divorce coeﬃcient captured by the lone-parent vari-
able in the ﬁxed eﬀects model (see Table 2.5 Column 3 and 4). Compared to an
always-married family, a child whose parents divorce between the ages of 2/3 and
4/5 has an anxiety level that is 0.30 points higher. Changing from “Worry about
money: disagree” to “Worry about money: strongly agree” is associated with an
increase in the emotion/anxiety scale of 0.15 point. In other words, if economic in-
security changes from 2 to 4, the detrimental eﬀect on girls’ anxiety is 50% of the
eﬀect associated with divorce.2
1The ﬁxed eﬀects estimates show that income increases children’s anxiety score. It is possi-
ble that income increases parents’ anticipation towards children which result in higher anxiety
in children. It is also possible that the negative association with income is picking up the longer
working hours necessary for parents to earn higher incomes and one implication of greater work-
ing time - parents spending less time with children. The latter hypothesis is supported by the
negative coeﬃcient of income in the estimation of the positive interaction parenting score (see
Section 2.6).
2For both hyperactivity and anxiety scores, we test that the gender diﬀerences are signiﬁcant
by pooling boys and girls together and include gender interaction with “worry about money”.
The estimates show that parental economic insecurity aﬀects boys’ hyperactivity score more than
girls’, and girls’ anxiety score more than boys’.
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2.6 Possible channels from parental economic insecurity to child
outcomes
From the previous section, we observe a negative relationship between children’s
non-cognitive skills and parental economic insecurity. The question subsequently
arises: why are children aﬀected by parental economic insecurity? We propose that
two channels aﬀect children: a direct channel and an indirect channel. The direct
channel is emotional mirroring, which is the subconscious imitation of another per-
son’s emotion (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Young children learn to behave and feel
by mimicry of the parents. If parents are tense, then children will mirror the tense-
ness. The indirect channel is through poor parenting behaviours associated with
economic stress. Exposure to stress hormones can change brain structure, aﬀecting
cognition (Lupian et al, 2009). Parents under economic stress are more likely to
make poor parenting decisions.
Since the direct channel is not directly measurable, we examine parenting behaviours.
The NLSCY provides various parenting style indices designed by Dr. M. Boyle at
McMaster University and Dr. Ken Dodge at Vanderbilt University, including in-
eﬀective parenting, irrational parenting, consistent parenting and positive interac-
tion. We use positive interaction and consistent parenting to represent “positive”
parenting behaviours, and we employ ineﬀective parenting and irrational parenting
to be proxies for “negative” parenting.
Each of the four parenting indicators is derived using a set of questions (detailed
question composition of the indices can be found in Appendix 1). The consistent
parenting style is constructed from questions about whether PMKs enforce rules,
and if the child can get out of punishment. A high score indicates more consistent
parenting. The positive interaction score is derived from questions such as if PMK
praises the child, laughs with them and plays games with the child. The ineﬀec-
tive parenting score uses questions about if PMKs have diﬃculty managing their
children, get annoyed and angry with their children. The irrational parenting style
score is from questions such as if the PMK yells at the child or uses physical pun-
ishment. High values of the ﬁrst two parenting scores, and low values of the last
two parenting scores represent “positive” parenting.
To estimate the eﬀects of economic insecurity on parenting styles, we substitute
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the dependent variables in Equations 2.1 ad 2.2 for the parenting indicators. Ta-
ble 2.6 reports the estimates of the association between parent reports of worry-
ing about money and the “positive” parenting index. The continuous measure of
“Worry about money” is signiﬁcant and negative for both positive interaction score
and consistent parenting score in the OLS estimation, meaning economic insecu-
rity reduces the level of “positive” parenting. Speciﬁcation 2 reports categorical
measure of “worry about money”. It shows that as parents are less worried about
money, they spend more times in positively interacting with their children and us-
ing more consistent parenting styles. The ﬁxed eﬀects estimation also indicates a
negative association between consistent parenting score for girls and parental eco-
nomic insecurity after controlling for the unobservables.
Table 2.7 shows the regressions for “negative” parenting style. The continuous mea-
sure of parental economic insecurity (1 to 4) is signiﬁcant and positive in all OLS
and FE regressions indicating positive association between “worry about money”
and both the ineﬃcient parenting score and irrational parenting scores”. In spec-
iﬁcation 2, “worry about money: strongly agree” is associated with high scores of
both ineﬃcient parenting and irrational parenting. “Worry about money: strongly
disagree” is correlated with low scores of both negative parenting indicators. It
demonstrates that “negative” parenting strategies are more frequently adopted
when a higher level of economic insecurity is present (e.g., a parent may yell more
when stressed about money). If we compare the eﬀects on “positive” with “nega-
tive” parenting indicators, parental economic insecurity increases “negative” parent-
ing more than it decreases “positive” parenting.
Those results strongly indicate that when parents worry about money, they spend
less time with their children, and are less able to enforce the rules. They are also
more likely to be angry with their children, and to use physical punishment. Thus,
we regard it as plausible that parental economic insecurity inﬂuences children at
least in part through parenting behaviours.
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2.7 Further results
One of the most important events that could aﬀect children’s outcomes is divorce.
In the main estimation, we include both lone-parent families and married fami-
lies. There are three potential explanations: 1) Economic insecurity causes family
dissolution and thus aﬀecting child outcomes; 2) Family dissolution aﬀects both
economic insecurity and child outcomes; 3) Economic insecurity directly aﬀects
child outcomes. Therefore, to remove the confounding eﬀects from divorce, we re-
estimate Equations 2.1 and 2.2 in two samples: 1) children in lone-parent families
(14% of the full sample) and 2) children whose parents are always married (84% of
the original sample).
Table 2.8 shows the estimates of hyperactivity and anxiety using lone-parent only.
The estimates indicate that economic insecurity remains statistically signiﬁcant for
girls in the OLS estimation, but not in the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation. The eﬀects on
boys’ hyperactivity becomes insigniﬁcant for lone-parent families. “Worry about
money” measures are signiﬁcant on emotional disorder/anxiety scores, especially
in ﬁxed eﬀects estimation for girls and the OLS estimation for boys. The anxiety
score increases more signiﬁcantly with “worry about money” for both continuous
measure and the categorical measure than the full sample estimates.
Table 2.9 shows the estimates of hyperactivity and anxiety scores using always-
married families only. Compared to the full sample estimation, girls’ hyperactivity
estimates are similar to the full sample estimation, while boys’ hyperactivity esti-
mates are more signiﬁcant than the full sample estimation. The anxiety scores for
both genders are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the full sample estimation.
The results indicate that girls in lone-parent families are more likely to be anx-
ious, and boys in always-married families are more likely to be hyperactive than
the population average. It means that without the changes in parents’ marital sta-
tus, the economic insecurity still increases girls’ anxiety and boys’ hyperactivity.
Thus, it is plausible to draw the conclusion that parental economic insecurity hin-
ders the development of children’s non-cognitive skills.
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2.8 Conclusion
This paper studies connections between parental economic insecurity and outcomes
for 2 to 5 year-old Canadian children. Results for both OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects mod-
els suggest that inattentive/hyperactive behaviours and emotional/anxious be-
haviours are positively associated with parents being ’worried about having enough
money to meet family needs.’ We illustrate that a plausible channel from parental
economic insecurity to children’s outcomes is through the parenting behaviours.
Less “positive” and more “negative” parenting strategies are reported when parents
experience economic insecurity.
Future research can focus on attempting to quantify the “direct” and “indirect”
channel of parental economic insecurity on children. A cross-country comparison
between the United States and Canada using National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth may allow for more variation in policy, which may improve/worsen economic
security for parents.
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Table 2.1: Distribution of “You worry about whether the money you have will be
enough to support your family?” Answered by PMKs of girls and boys at age 2 to
5. Year 2000 to 2008.
Worry about money Distribution
Strongly disagree 0.17
Disagree 0.36
Agree 0.33
Strongly agree 0.15
Total 1
Source: NLSCY, pooled cross-sections.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES N Mean Std. Dev.
Hyperactivity (0-12) 39711 3.54 2.38
Anxiety (0-12) 39711 1.44 1.59
Worry about money (1-4) 39711 2.46 0.94
Positive interaction (0-20) 39448 15.87 2.50
Ineﬀective parenting (0-28) 38803 8.61 3.36
Consistent parenting (0-20) 38227 15.32 3.12
Irrational parenting (0-16) 39301 4.56 2.41
Total HH income (2008$) 39711 81395 64408
Log equiv income 39711 10.39 0.66
Household size 39711 4.21 1.21
Number of children 39711 2.18 0.98
Boy 39711 0.51 0.50
Child age 39711 3.52 1.12
PMK is immigrant 39711 0.16 0.37
PMK health (1-4) 39711 3.05 0.89
Child health (1-4) 39711 3.53 0.70
PMK <secondary edu 39279 0.11 0.31
PMK secondary 39279 0.19 0.39
PMK some post-secondary 39279 0.14 0.35
PMK college or university 39279 0.56 0.50
Not in school/daycare 39711 0.27 0.44
Daycare 39711 0.55 0.50
Junior kindergarten 39711 0.07 0.25
Primary (NS) 39711 0.11 0.31
Grade 1 39711 0.00 0.03
Male PMK 39711 0.07 0.26
First-born 39711 0.44 0.50
PMK always married/common-law 39711 0.84 0.36
Two-parent family 39711 0.86 0.34
Lone-parent family 39711 0.14 0.34
Lone mother 39711 0.13 0.34
Step-family 39711 0.02 0.14
PMK is bio-mother 39711 0.92 0.27
PMK is bio-father 39711 0.07 0.25
PMK is either bio father or mother 39711 0.01 0.09
Rural 39711 0.12 0.32
Year 2000 39711 0.09 0.29
Year 2002 39711 0.26 0.44
Year 2004 39711 0.26 0.44
Year 2006 39711 0.16 0.37
Year 2008 39711 0.22 0.41
Source: NLSCY. Sample of analysis.
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Table 2.3: Mean inattention/hyperactivity and emotion/anxiety scores for 2 to 5
year-old Canadian children, by level of parental economic insecurity, year 2000 to
2008.
Outcome Hyperactivity Anxiety
Mean Std. Err [95% Conf. Interval] Mean Std. Err [95% Conf. Interval]
Not at all worry about money 3.23 0.05 3.13 3.33 1.32 0.03 1.26 1.38
Not worry about money 3.39 0.03 3.33 3.46 1.36 0.02 1.32 1.41
Worry about money 3.70 0.04 3.63 3.78 1.52 0.03 1.47 1.57
Strongly worry about money 3.86 0.05 3.75 3.96 1.58 0.04 1.50 1.65
Source: NLSCY
Table 2.4: OLS and ﬁxed eﬀect estimates of inattentive/hyperactivity score. Chil-
dren from age 2 to 5. Year 2000 to 2008.
Girl Boy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
Worry about money (1-4) 0.201*** 0.0450 0.160*** 0.0623*
(0.0335) (0.0317) (0.0346) (0.0326)
Worry about money=4 0.308*** 0.102 0.396*** 0.153*
(0.0929) (0.0833) (0.0928) (0.0858)
Worry about money=3 0.311*** 0.0728 0.258*** 0.119*
(0.0711) (0.0613) (0.0740) (0.0612)
Worry about money=1 -0.210*** -0.0163 -0.0163 0.00275
(0.0791) (0.0699) (0.0889) (0.0709)
PMK has a college or university degree -0.166** -0.162** -0.241*** -0.242***
(0.0656) (0.0653) (0.0682) (0.0681)
Observations 19,200 19,200 19,408 19,408 20,079 20,079 20,303 20,303
R-squared 0.054 0.055 0.005 0.005 0.049 0.050 0.003 0.003
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Number of persruk 13,245 13,245 13,923 13,923
Source: NLSCY. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: “Worry about money=1” indicates “Worry about money: strongly disagree”, and “Worry about money=4’
indicates “Worry about money: strongly agree”. Time-variant controls include log equivalent income, child’s health,
PMK’s health, lone-parent, and step-family. Time-invariant controls include child age, ﬁrst-born, child schooling,
number of children, PMK and child relationship, PMK’s health, PMK is an immigrant, PMK’s education, rural,
province of residence and survey year.
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Table 2.5: OLS and ﬁxed eﬀect estimates of emotion/anxiety score. Children from
age 2 to 5. Year 2000 to 2008.
Girl Boy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
Worry about money (1-4) 0.138*** 0.0554** 0.0804*** -0.00411
(0.0236) (0.0230) (0.0221) (0.0237)
Worry about money=4 0.193*** 0.153** 0.232*** -0.0544
(0.0667) (0.0629) (0.0632) (0.0614)
Worry about money=3 0.231*** 0.0595 0.105** 0.0460
(0.0519) (0.0440) (0.0447) (0.0429)
Worry about money=1 -0.148*** -0.0124 0.00828 -0.0112
(0.0517) (0.0498) (0.0548) (0.0537)
Lone-parent family 0.0226 0.0373 0.298*** 0.297*** 0.0800 0.0709 0.422*** 0.430***
(0.0781) (0.0779) (0.111) (0.111) (0.0718) (0.0722) (0.110) (0.110)
Observations 19,200 19,200 19,408 19,408 20,079 20,079 20,303 20,303
R-squared 0.050 0.051 0.012 0.012 0.047 0.047 0.017 0.017
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Number of persruk 13,245 13,245 13,923 13,923
Source: NLSCY. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: “Worry about money=1” indicates “Worry about money: strongly disagree”, and “Worry about money=4’
indicates “Worry about money: strongly agree”. Time-variant controls include log equivalent income, child’s health,
PMK’s health, lone-parent, and step-family. Time-invariant controls include child age, ﬁrst-born, child schooling,
number of children, PMK and child relationship, PMK’s health, PMK is an immigrant, PMK’s education, rural,
province of residence and survey year.
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Table 2.6: OLS and ﬁxed eﬀect estimates of positive interaction and consistent
parenting. Children from age 2 to 5. Year 2000 to 2008.
Positive Interaction
Girl Boy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
Worry about money (1-4) -0.0973*** -0.00497 -0.0974*** 0.00445
(0.0361) (0.0386) (0.0338) (0.0375)
Worry about money=4 -0.0499 0.0316 -0.0723 0.0127
(0.109) (0.103) (0.0917) (0.100)
Worry about money=3 -0.135* -0.0760 -0.113 -0.0152
(0.0720) (0.0729) (0.0704) (0.0704)
Worry about money=1 0.209*** 0.00138 0.209** -0.0130
(0.0797) (0.0918) (0.0843) (0.0824)
PMK has college or university degree 0.0741 0.0694 0.244*** 0.239***
(0.0662) (0.0661) (0.0662) (0.0662)
Lone-parent family 0.0215 0.000179 -1.311*** -1.317*** -0.0205 -0.0372 -1.333*** -1.334***
(0.108) (0.109) (0.161) (0.161) (0.111) (0.111) (0.164) (0.164)
Observations 19,092 19,092 19,298 19,298 19,928 19,928 20,150 20,150
R-squared 0.187 0.188 0.053 0.053 0.189 0.190 0.055 0.055
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Number of persruk 13,174 13,174 13,835 13,835
Consistent Parenting
Girl Boy
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
VARIABLES OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
Worry about money (1-4) -0.250*** -0.111** -0.0805* -0.0108
(0.0497) (0.0438) (0.0438) (0.0429)
Worry about money=4 -0.458*** -0.204* -0.0798 0.0578
(0.147) (0.120) (0.126) (0.113)
Worry about money=3 -0.275*** -0.115 -0.183** -0.0401
(0.0931) (0.0826) (0.0917) (0.0802)
Worry about money=1 0.273** 0.125 0.0875 0.0731
(0.107) (0.0944) (0.104) (0.0917)
PMK has college or university degree 0.415*** 0.413*** 0.457*** 0.454***
(0.0928) (0.0925) (0.0830) (0.0832)
Lone-parent family -0.00565 -0.0122 0.651*** 0.650*** 0.0380 0.0241 0.267 0.256
(0.154) (0.155) (0.212) (0.212) (0.159) (0.161) (0.201) (0.202)
Observations 18,463 18,463 18,666 18,666 19,346 19,346 19,561 19,561
R-squared 0.095 0.095 0.006 0.006 0.089 0.090 0.006 0.006
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Number of persruk 12,904 12,904 13,548 13,548
Source: NLSCY. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: “Worry about money=1” indicates “Worry about money: strongly disagree”, and “Worry about money=4’
indicates “Worry about money: strongly agree”. Time-variant controls include log equivalent income, child’s health,
PMK’s health, lone-parent, and step-family. Time-invariant controls include child age, ﬁrst-born, child schooling,
number of children, PMK and child relationship, PMK’s health, PMK is an immigrant, PMK’s education, rural,
province of residence and survey year.
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Table 2.7: OLS and ﬁxed eﬀect estimates of ineﬀective parenting and irrational
parenting. Children from age 2 to 5. Year 2000 to 2008.
Ineﬃcient Parenting
Girl Boy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
Worry about money (1-4) 0.359*** 0.207*** 0.352*** 0.0970**
(0.0511) (0.0468) (0.0490) (0.0469)
Worry about money=4 0.603*** 0.444*** 0.653*** 0.0795
(0.144) (0.128) (0.140) (0.128)
Worry about money=3 0.579*** 0.229*** 0.448*** 0.0443
(0.106) (0.0887) (0.103) (0.0870)
Worry about money=1 -0.306** -0.163 -0.333*** -0.245**
(0.121) (0.102) (0.115) (0.0977)
PMK has college or university degree 0.240** 0.247** 0.0634 0.0661
(0.0983) (0.0979) (0.0944) (0.0943)
Lone-parent family -0.0456 -0.0218 -0.534** -0.534** -0.270* -0.262 -0.196 -0.181
(0.156) (0.157) (0.237) (0.237) (0.159) (0.159) (0.218) (0.218)
Observations 18,768 18,768 18,971 18,971 19,615 19,615 19,832 19,832
R-squared 0.041 0.043 0.010 0.010 0.033 0.033 0.005 0.006
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Number of persruk 13,028 13,028 13,680 13,680
Irrational Parenting
Girl Boy
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
VARIABLES OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
Worry about money (1-4) 0.133*** 0.176*** 0.180*** 0.147***
(0.0299) (0.0466) (0.0303) (0.0461)
Worry about money=4 0.157* 0.189 0.293*** 0.113
(0.0852) (0.125) (0.0827) (0.122)
Worry about money=3 0.229*** 0.0849 0.183*** 0.151*
(0.0652) (0.0862) (0.0604) (0.0860)
Worry about money=1 -0.166** -0.389*** -0.247*** -0.326***
(0.0741) (0.0986) (0.0711) (0.101)
PMK has college or university degree -0.0737 -0.0692 -0.105* -0.103*
(0.0618) (0.0617) (0.0562) (0.0562)
Lone-parent family -0.177* -0.158 -1.415*** -1.414*** -0.185** -0.175* -1.247*** -1.224***
(0.101) (0.102) (0.193) (0.192) (0.0935) (0.0935) (0.198) (0.198)
Observations 19,006 19,006 19,213 19,213 19,866 19,866 20,088 20,088
R-squared 0.305 0.305 0.035 0.036 0.306 0.306 0.038 0.039
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Number of persruk 13,136 13,136 13,808 13,808
Source: NLSCY. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: “Worry about money=1” indicates “Worry about money: strongly disagree”, and “Worry about money=4’
indicates “Worry about money: strongly agree”. Time-variant controls include log equivalent income, child’s health,
PMK’s health, lone-parent, and step-family. Time-invariant controls include child age, ﬁrst-born, child schooling,
number of children, PMK and child relationship, PMK’s health, PMK is an immigrant, PMK’s education, rural,
province of residence and survey year.
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Table 2.8: OLS and ﬁxed eﬀect estimates of hyperactivity and anxiety scores.
Children from age 2 to 5 in lone-parent families. Year 2000 to 2008.
Hyperactivity
Girl Boy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
Worry about money (1-4) 0.221*** 0.0588 0.0994 0.117
(0.0829) (0.0938) (0.0982) (0.102)
Worry about money=4 0.392* 0.126 0.263 0.217
(0.208) (0.220) (0.215) (0.243)
Worry about money=3 0.256 0.138 0.0395 0.0862
(0.201) (0.202) (0.202) (0.211)
Worry about money=1 -0.335 -0.0450 0.0569 -0.162
(0.314) (0.331) (0.355) (0.358)
Observations 2,814 2,814 2,843 2,843 2,858 2,858 2,892 2,892
R-squared 0.114 0.115 0.018 0.018 0.084 0.085 0.015 0.015
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Number of persruk 2,221 2,221 2,248 2,248
Anxiety
Girl Boy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
Worry about money (1-4) 0.1000* 0.150** 0.139** -0.0513
(0.0580) (0.0622) (0.0625) (0.0891)
Worry about money=4 0.0784 0.280* 0.285** -0.105
(0.152) (0.151) (0.134) (0.192)
Worry about money=3 0.150 0.0791 0.157 0.0353
(0.126) (0.142) (0.117) (0.167)
Worry about money=1 -0.390** -0.192 -0.116 0.0298
(0.175) (0.202) (0.221) (0.289)
Observations 2,814 2,814 2,843 2,843 2,858 2,858 2,892 2,892
R-squared 0.109 0.112 0.017 0.018 0.109 0.109 0.032 0.033
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Number of persruk 2,221 2,221 2,248 2,248
Source: NLSCY. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: “Worry about money=1” indicates “Worry about money: strongly disagree”, and “Worry about money=4’
indicates “Worry about money: strongly agree”. Time-variant controls include log equivalent income, child’s health,
PMK’s health, lone-parent, and step-family. Time-invariant controls include child age, ﬁrst-born, child schooling,
number of children, PMK and child relationship, PMK’s health, PMK is an immigrant, PMK’s education, rural,
province of residence and survey year.
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Table 2.9: OLS and ﬁxed eﬀect estimates of hyperactivity and anxiety scores.
Children from age 2 to 5 with married parents. Year 2000 to 2008.
Hyperactivity
Girl Boy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
Worry about money (1-4) 0.211*** 0.0492 0.163*** 0.0503
(0.0364) (0.0350) (0.0375) (0.0356)
Worry about money=4 0.306*** 0.144 0.424*** 0.173*
(0.106) (0.0953) (0.105) (0.0980)
Worry about money=3 0.337*** 0.0635 0.275*** 0.0864
(0.0762) (0.0669) (0.0797) (0.0663)
Worry about money=1 -0.206** -0.00243 0.00584 0.0348
(0.0813) (0.0738) (0.0928) (0.0729)
Observations 16,104 16,104 16,278 16,278 16,920 16,920 17,107 17,107
R-squared 0.045 0.046 0.003 0.003 0.044 0.045 0.003 0.003
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Number of persruk 11,118 11,118 11,731 11,731
Anxiety
Girl Boy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
Worry about money (1-4) 0.140*** 0.0490* 0.0755*** -0.00276
(0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0237) (0.0250)
Worry about money=4 0.195*** 0.161** 0.243*** -0.0611
(0.0745) (0.0724) (0.0718) (0.0684)
Worry about money=3 0.243*** 0.0590 0.0974** 0.0296
(0.0561) (0.0483) (0.0486) (0.0454)
Worry about money=1 -0.127** 0.00896 0.0205 -0.0215
(0.0537) (0.0525) (0.0568) (0.0553)
Observations 16,104 16,104 16,278 16,278 16,920 16,920 17,107 17,107
R-squared 0.045 0.046 0.013 0.014 0.043 0.044 0.015 0.015
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Number of persruk 11,118 11,118 11,731 11,731
Source: NLSCY. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: “Worry about money=1” indicates “Worry about money: strongly disagree”, and “Worry about money=4’
indicates “Worry about money: strongly agree”. Time-variant controls include log equivalent income, child’s health,
PMK’s health, lone-parent, and step-family. Time-invariant controls include child age, ﬁrst-born, child schooling,
number of children, PMK and child relationship, PMK’s health, PMK is an immigrant, PMK’s education, rural,
province of residence and survey year.
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Chapter 3
Fatter Kids and the Shattered “Iron Rice Bowl”:
Intergenerational Eﬀects of Economic Insecurity During
Chinese State-Owned Enterprise Reform
3.1 Introduction
Economic insecurity, or the perception of “a signiﬁcant and unavoidable downside
economic risk” in the future (Osberg, 1998 and 2015a), is an expectation of future
economic losses which results from past and present experiences. It is not only a
leading cause of family dissolution (Larson et al., 1994), but also contributes to
deterioration of health (Tsutsumi et al., 2001; Rohde et al., 2016; Watson, Osberg
& Phipps, 2016; Rohde, Tang & Osberg, 2017).
Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1999), Clark and Grey (1997), Hacker et al. (2010)
have argued that economic insecurity has been on a gradual rise since the 1970s in
countries all around the world, but in few cases has economic insecurity surged as
dramatically and inﬂuentially as in China during the late 1990s. Because of state-
owned enterprise (SOE) reform, 34 million workers from the state sector were laid
oﬀ between 1995 and 2001, thereby heightening the insecurity of the 51 million
continuing SOE employees. The magnitude and speed of these changes occurred at
historically unprecedented rates.
Layoﬀs from state-owned enterprise reform were particularly harsh on state sector
workers because: (1) the state sector in China had never witnessed employment
uncertainty before this layoﬀ policy, making the workers especially unprepared.
Therefore, the job losses were unanticipated and involuntary; (2) the social safety
net was under-developed in China. Little social assistance or job-search assistance
was provided to the laid-oﬀ workers; (3) laid-oﬀ workers were mostly older, un-
skilled, and female, which added to the challenges of re-employment. These disad-
vantages made the economic insecurity to which they were subjected particularly
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signiﬁcant.
One of the most common outcomes for health is body mass indicator (BMI). Among
other causes, it has been well-established that greater economic insecurity increases
weight gain in adults (Smith 2009; Watson et al., 2016; and Rohde et al., 2016).
The innovation of this study is to examine the intergenerational eﬀects of such
insecurity and the eﬀects of greater parental economic insecurity in a developing
country (China) on children and adolescents.
Cole et.al. (2000) document that the prevalence of obesity has increased dramat-
ically in developed countries. In developing countries, malnutrition and infectious
diseases are declining, while obesity, cardiovascular diseases, and Type 2 diabetes
are rising (WHO, 2000). In 2011, 30% of Chinese adults and 11% of Chinese chil-
dren were overweight (Yan et al., 2012).
Child obesity not only leads to adult obesity (Abraham et al., 1971; Guo et al.,
1994; Sorensen & Sonne-Holm, 1988) but also chronic diseases, such as impaired
glucose metabolism, hypertension, coronary arteries (Kavey, et al., 2003). Child
obesity is particularly linked to the development of Type 2 diabetes at a younger
age (WHO 2000) and can also adversely inﬂuence psychological wellbeing later in
life (Friedman and Brownell, 1995)
To account for rates of maturation and growth, I use the most prominent refer-
ences including the World Health Organization (WHO) growth standard, and the
United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) standards to
adjust BMI and weight for age and gender speciﬁc measures. I also include the
waist-to-height ratio to complement BMI measures following suggestions in the
medical literature (Mokha et al., 2010; Schneider et al., 2010; Yan et al. 2007;
and Burkhauser & Cawley, 2008). The waist-to-height ratio distinguishes body
fat from bones and muscles, and diﬀerentiates abdominal fat from skin fat. Yan
et al. (2007) note the racial neutrality of the waist-to-height ratio and that it is an
accurate measure for Chinese children.
I estimate the eﬀects on the BMI measures and waist-to-height ratio using the ex-
pected economic loss at Chinese provincial- and year-levels (i.e., treatment with
diﬀerent intensities). A continuous diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model compares the lay-
oﬀ eﬀects in the state sector (treatment group by changes in layoﬀ policy) and the
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non-state sector (control group, not directly aﬀected by changes in the state sector
layoﬀ policy). The results show a signiﬁcantly greater weight gain in boys whose
parents work in the state sector when the expected economic loss is high. The re-
sults persist for boys of parents working in the state sector even if neither parent
actually experienced a layoﬀ. It suggests that anxiety about the future (i.e., eco-
nomic insecurity) is at least a major reason for weight gain in children. I examine
the diﬀerential impacts of economic insecurity – the probability of job loss and ﬁ-
nancial loss of layoﬀ. The probability of job loss has more signiﬁcant negative ef-
fects on child weight gain than the severity of ﬁnancial loss of layoﬀ.
The non-constant eﬀects of parental economic insecurity on children’s weight gains
are examined using quantile regressions. The rational is to test if parental insecu-
rity has larger impacts on children’s weight gain for those who are already over-
weight, versus making children who are underweight and become normal weight.
The results suggest more severe eﬀects of weight gain in heavier children caused by
parental economic insecurity. This means the threat posed by weight gain in chil-
dren is greater because the weight gain is more signiﬁcant in children above normal
weight.
3.2 China State-Owned Enterprise Reform
During Mao Zedong’s era, China was a planned economy. Jobs were assigned ac-
cording to quotas decided by government and job candidates had little freedom to
choose their employment. Lifelong employment of urban workers was provided by
the government with beneﬁts that include child care, health care, housing and pen-
sions (Lee, 2000). State sector employment, therefore, was considered an “iron rice
bowl”, with no economic insecurity.
Ineﬃciency in resource allocation and the lack of work incentives shattered the
“iron rice bowl” (Lin, Cai & Li, 1998). In 1995, China enacted a new labour law
that allowed the dismissal of no-fault workers. A new word, Xia Gang (Layoﬀ),
was thus invoked and used in the China Labour Statistics Yearbook. In 1997, lay-
oﬀs were further intensiﬁed by extending the new labour law to large-scale state-
owned enterprises. From 1995 to 2001, state-owned sector employment dropped
from 113 million to 67 million, a 40% decrease. According to the China Urban
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Labour Survey, these layoﬀs caused the unemployment rate to surge to more than
10%, and labour force participation to decline by up to 8.9% in representative
cities. The state-owned enterprise reform introduced employment uncertainty for
the ﬁrst time since the establishment of the Communist Government in 1949 (Giles,
Park & Cai, 2006).
3.2.1 Social support
Living subsidies for laid-oﬀ workers were initially provided by the original employ-
ers (i.e., the state-owned enterprises). In the late 1990s, protection against job loss
gradually shifted to unemployment insurance. In general, social insurance pro-
grams in China in the late 1990s were severely underdeveloped; hence provided
little protection against unexpected job loss. Unemployment insurance (UI) system
was introduced in China in 1986. Beneﬁt levels were set by the local government
at a range between minimum living standards (Dibao) and the minimum wage
rate. Compared to developed countries, UI in China provides a much lower income
replacement rate. For example, in 2005, the UI beneﬁts paid as a percentage of av-
erage urban on-work wages was only 14.7% (Giles, Park & Cai, 2006).
The duration of beneﬁts depends on the UI contributions, and may last up to 24
months. To qualify for UI, workers must meet the following conditions: 1) have
contributed to UI for at least a year; 2) are terminated involuntarily, 3) are willing
to work. By the early 2000s, it only covered 40% of urban workers (Giles, Park
& Cai, 2006). With the low coverage and low replacement rate, laid-oﬀ workers
had to rely on personal savings and private support from relatives. The structural
change in the economy increased the diﬃculties for laid-oﬀ workers to ﬁnd new
jobs without the support of adequate job training program. The re-employment
rate of the laid-oﬀ workers from the state sector was only 29.1% after one year,
and 36.9% after ﬁve years (Giles, Park & Cai, 2006).
The remaining state employees were also aﬀected by the reform, experiencing wage
and pension arrears and beneﬁts reductions including decreased health insurance
coverage and housing beneﬁts. These on-job economic losses along with the now
greater potential for outright job loss meant a signiﬁcant increase in anxiety and
economic insecurity for continuing state workers. In other words, the impact of the
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new layoﬀ policy was not limited to those actually laid-oﬀ in the state sector.
3.3 Mechanism of Health Eﬀects of Economic Insecurity
3.3.1 Overeating and Economic Insecurity
The causal relationship between adult weight gain and economic insecurity has
recently been established in economic literature. Oﬀer et al. (2010) use macro-
level data from 11 developed countries over ten years and suggest the obesity epi-
demic is mainly contributed by social insecurity. Where socioeconomic supports
do not provide much protection against economic losses, people tend to respond
more to fast food “shock” because of the economic stress. When the possibility of
economic loss is well-insured by social programs, even though there is abundant
calorie rich food, people tend to not overeat and obesity prevalence is signiﬁcantly
lower. Smith, Stoddard and Barnes (2009) use 12 years panel data from the United
States National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, and ﬁnd that a one-percentage-
point rise in the probability of becoming unemployed increases adult weight gain
by 0.6 pounds, and the social safety net decreases the negative eﬀect of economic
insecurity. Using the Canadian Community Health Survey data, Watson, Osberg
and Phipps (2016) exploit the unemployment insurance beneﬁt cuts in the 1990s as
an exogenous “natural experiment” variation in economic insecurity, and establish
the causal relationship between economic insecurity and the BMI gain in adults.
Rohde, Tang and Osberg (2017) use the Household, Income and Labour Dynam-
ics in Australia (HILDA) Survey and ﬁnd that the economic insecurity and adult
obesity form a self-sustaining vicious cycle.
Literature in psychology and neuroscience has linked stress to overeating (Greeno
and Wing, 1994). Stress induces people to turn to “comfort food” that is high in
calorie and fat (Dallman et al., 2003). Smith (2009) suggests there is a biochem-
ical mechanism of stress which can cause overeating. Like other animals, humans
compensate for food uncertainty by overeating and storing body fat. The ability
to store body fat is a survival instinct when the risk of starvation is present, and
over-eating has been genetically “hard-wired” as a response to anxiety about future
food availability. Although the risk of starvation is minimal for most contemporary
29
humans in aﬄuent societies, stress and anxiety still come from economic uncer-
tainties. In the presence of economic hazards, genes inﬂuence human behaviour
and humans respond by overeating as a form of “self-medication” for stress—as the
phrase “comfort foods” might suggest. In the Chinese context, it is worth noting
that parents in the state sector have higher income than those in the non-state sec-
tor (see Table 3.3. Therefore, parents are economically able to purchase calorie rich
food.
The innovation of this study is the intergenerational transmission mechanism. The
possible channels include, inter alia: 1) economic insecurity increases precaution-
ary savings of the family, thus reducing the monetary investment in the child. 2)
Future uncertainty increases parents work hours to compensate for potential eco-
nomic losses, thus reducing the time investment of the child and the positive inter-
action with the child. 3) Eating healthy takes time and energy. Economic insecu-
rity generates mental stress for the parents. If a parent is stressed and make poor
nutritious choices, it is diﬃcult for the parent to deny the child from accessing the
“junk food”. 4) Under economic stress, parents are less likely to be able to enforce
rules that keep their children eating healthy food. Other irrational parenting deci-
sions may also occur as a result of economic anxiety.
3.3.2 Theoretical framework of intergenerational economic insecurity
I use three measures of economic insecurity: the probability of job loss, the ﬁnan-
cial loss from job loss, and expected economic loss from the fear of job loss. The
three measures are deﬁned as follow:
Prob(Layoff) = P (3.1)
E(FinancialLoss) = E[ΔY |Layoff ] = Δ (3.2)
E(EconomicLoss) = Prob(Layoff) · E(FinancialLoss) = P ·Δ (3.3)
The economic insecurity at time t is based on the current and past experience:
Insecurityt = f(Pt−1Δt−1, PtΔt) (3.4)
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Heckman (2007) outlines how parental investment aﬀects children’s capabilities.
These parental eﬀects on children have focused mostly on positive investments,
such as nutrition and care. In this chapter, I include the negative impact of parental
economic insecurity on children’s human capital formation, using Heckman (2007)’s
model as the guideline. A child’s capability production, θ at time t+1, is deter-
mined by the following factors: an initial endowment, θ0 (e.g., genetic condition);
parents’ capabilities (e.g., parents’ IQ, income, and education), h; parents’ invest-
ment at period t, It. The level of investment is then determined by the economic
insecurity at time t, Insecurityt. The simpliﬁed production function for three peri-
ods of human capital formation is
θt+1 = f(h, θ0, It(Insecurityt|Pt−1Δt−1, PtΔt) (3.5)
where ∂θt+1
∂It
> 0 ,and ∂It
∂Insecurityt
< 0. The ﬁrst condition suggests that greater in-
vestment from parents promotes higher human capital formation of the child. The
second condition assumes that a high degree of economic insecurity is associated
with a low investment.
Three groups experience diﬀerent changes in economic insecurity PtΔt. Group 1
is identiﬁed as the non-state sector, experiencing no change in expected layoﬀ and
ﬁnancial loss from layoﬀ, thus δInsecurity = 0 . Group 2 can be the state sector in
mildly aﬀected province, where there is low expected economic loss, δInsecurity =
low. Group 3 represents the state sector in the province that is aﬀected severely by
the layoﬀ policy, and high economic loss is expected, δInsecurity = high .
The eﬀect of parental economic insecurity on a child’s outcome is denoted by α1 =
∂θ
∂Insecurity
. The diﬀerential eﬀect of the probability of job loss is captured by β1 =
∂θt+1
∂P
, and the severity of ﬁnancial loss from layoﬀ is β2 = ∂θt+1∂δ . The empirical
strategy to estimate α1, β1, and β2 is explored in section 6.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 China Health and Nutrition Survey
This chapter uses data from the China Nutrition and Health Survey (CHNS) con-
ducted by the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill and the Chinese Center
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for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC). The CHNS is the only large-scale
longitudinal household level survey in China (Popkin et al., 2010); it consists of
9 panels from 1989 to 2011 of more than 4000 households and 15,000 individu-
als. The data are collected at the community, household, and individual levels,
and includes detailed information on economic, health, sociological, and demo-
graphic circumstances. Households are selected in both rural and urban areas in
eight provinces: Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou, and
Guangxi with multistage, random cluster design, stratiﬁed by income.
All household members are interviewed during the survey, and children younger
than 10-years-old are assisted by their parents. One to six children in one family
can be observed in the sample. On average, there are two children per family in
the CHNS sample1. Special eﬀorts are made to interview during the early morning
or on weekends to avoid missing children who attend boarding school or migrant
workers. The attrition rate at the household level is 10% from the previous cycle,
and 31% from 1989 to 2006 (Popkin et al., 2010). Anthropometric measures, such
as height and weight, are taken on site by the CHNS interviewers who had seven
days of training by the collaborating teams. Children are measured without shoes
and with light clothes to the nearest 0.1 cm and 0.1 kg respectively during the in-
terview (Yan et al., 2012).
The CHNS has several features that make it particularly suitable for the study.
First, the longitudinal structure provides a comparison of the outcomes of the
same child before, during and after the state-owned enterprise reform period. Sec-
ond, the large sample size enables analysis based on provincial heterogeneity as
well as diﬀerences between state and non-state enterprises. Third, the CHNS has
data not only on a single household member, but also on parents, spouses, and
children based on the person-speciﬁc interviews, making it ideal for examining
the spill-over eﬀects of economic insecurity. Fourth, the CHNS interview questions
cover not only labour market outcomes, such as employment status, sectors, and
earnings of both parents, but also the health outcomes of the child, and other de-
mographic characteristics of the family. The extensive and in-depth information
enables the inclusion of almost all control variables used in the related literature.
1The one child policy does not generally apply in rural areas (Hesketh, Lu & Xing, 2005).
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A supplementary dataset on layoﬀs is also used and comes from China Labour
Statistics Yearbook produced by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. It
reports the number of laid-oﬀ workers at year-end as well as the number of state-
sector employees at the year-end by province from 1995 to 2005. These two vari-
ables allow estimates of the layoﬀ rate across provinces and over time. It also re-
ports the oﬀ-post (laid-oﬀ) state sector workers’ living subsidies and the on-post
(on the job) state-owned enterprise workers’ average wage by province; from this
the ﬁnancial loss from layoﬀ can be calculated.
3.4.2 Longitudinal Sample
The sample for this study is children and adolescents 4 to 18 years-old in every
cycle who entered the survey in 1989, 1991 and 1993 (pre-reform cycles). The birth
cohort of the sample is 1979 to 1993 and is observed in 1997, 2000, and 2004. There
are 1,730 children and adolescents in the longitudinal sample and 2,636 observa-
tions in the pooled cross-sectional sample. Table 3.1 shows the number of same
children observed in the panel in each year. Table 3.2 presents the age and year
structure of the sample. Attrition comes mainly from the age limit of 18 years.
Only “always married couples” are included for two reasons. First, the divorce
rate during the survey period is extremely low (2%). Second, household disso-
lution itself can cause enormous mental and ﬁnancial stress on family members,
which would confound the estimated eﬀects being examined. I also exclude fam-
ilies with negative income. The CHNS noted many households with negative net
income from their business, especially those raising livestock. The nature of such
businesses involves substantial initial investment, and the return may take years to
happen. Therefore, the negative income does not necessarily reﬂect the economic
condition of the family. Mothers who are above 60 years old and fathers above 70
years old are excluded from the sample (2 observations).
3.4.3 Deﬁnitions of Weight Measures
In this study, the two prominent international references for children’s BMI mea-
sures are used. The ﬁrst outcome variable in the study is the body mass index
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(BMI) Z-score using the World Health Organization (WHO) child growth stan-
dards for 0 to 5 year-olds (World Health Organization, 2006) and WHO growth
reference for 5 to 19 year-olds (Onis et al., 2007). The WHO growth standards col-
lect data for healthy infants and young children from Brazil, Ghana, India, Nor-
way, Oman and the United States, and the WHO growth references use the Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) data, merged with a growth standard
cross-sectional sample. Using the Box-Cox-power-exponential (BCPE) method and
LMS methods (Cole and Green, 1992), the WHO constructs BMI for age, adjust-
ing for skewness and kurtosis (see Figure 2 for growth charts). The BMI Z-score is
calculated using the following equation.
BMIZit =
BMIit − ¯BMIWHO
σBMIWHO
(3.6)
where for child i in year t. The BMI Z-score measures how many standard de-
viations the child’s BMI is from the gender and age speciﬁc median deﬁned by
WHO standards. Diﬀerent from a uniﬁed BMI cutoﬀ for all adults, the standard
of BMI varies according to children’s age and gender. According to the WHO stan-
dard, the median BMI is 15.2 for 5-year-old girls and 21.7 for 18-year-old-boys. By
adopting the BMI Z-score, the outcome variable reﬂects the diﬀerent standards at
each growth stage of children. Observations that are over 5 standard deviations
from the median are excluded in the sample according to WHO recommended out-
lier cutoﬀs.
The second variable is a weight-for-age Z-score using the United States Centers
Disease Control 2000 Growth Reference with LMS method (Kuczmarski et al.
2000). The weight-for-age Z-score is generated in a similar manner to the BMI Z-
score. It measures how many standard deviations the child’s weight (in kg) is from
the median of the age and gender speciﬁc group:
WFAZit =
Weightit − ¯WeightCDC
σWeightCDC
(3.7)
The mean of weight-for-age Z-score in the CHNS sample is -1.11. The state sector
is -0.67, while the non-state sector is -1.18. The diﬀerence between the two sectors
suggests that the state sector is the “better-oﬀ” group in the sample. Therefore,
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weight gains in the state sector are less likely to imply children with malnutrition
moving out of their underweight classiﬁcation. Rather it suggests gaining weight
by already well-fed children.
The ﬁrst two outcome variables capture the diﬀerent perspectives of weight gain
with the leading international standards. Although BMI-related measures are fre-
quently used in estimating the risk of obesity on morbidity risks, it has some ma-
jor limitations. First, they do not distinguish fat from non-fat mass, such as mus-
cle and bones, which would mistakenly classify an athlete with large muscle mass
in the overweight category. Second, they do not inform the fat distribution in the
body: If the fat is distributed in the abdominal area (i.e., if it is visceral fat) rather
than underneath the skin (i.e., if it is subcutaneous fat), then it links to elevated
cardiovascular risks (Schneider et al., 2010; Kuczmarski et al., 2000). Third, they
are not speciﬁcally generated according to the Chinese population, nor are they
adjusted for the recent trend of increase in child obesity. Negative health eﬀects of
obesity are found in the Asian population with a lower BMI (World Health Orga-
nization, 2000). Studies suggest that morbidity increases when BMI is greater than
23 in an Asian population (Ko et al., 1999; Deurenberg et al., 2002) instead of the
cut-oﬀ of 25 used in adult Europids.
A growing medical literature (Mokha et al., 2010; Schneider et al., 2010; Yan et al.
2007; and Burkhauser & Cawley, 2008) argues that abdominal obesity is a more
accurate indicator of health risks than BMI, and the waist-to-height ratio provides
an accurate measure of evaluating child and adolescent obesity. In the normal
weight group, children with central obesity (high waist circumference) are more
likely to have adverse levels of LDL cholesterol, HDL cholesterol, triglycerides, and
insulin; while children in overweight and obese groups without central obesity are
less likely to have morbidity risks such as Type 2 diabetes mellitus, hypertension
or metabolic syndrome than those with central obesity (Mokha et al., 2010)
To complement the other measures, I use waist-to-height ratio (WHtR) as the
third outcome variable. It is deﬁned as waist circumference divided by height,
measured in the same unit. The advantages of the waist-to-height measure in-
clude its wide availability, accuracy and non-age- and race-dependency (Yan, 2007;
Mokha, 2010). It not only provides information on body fat and fat distribution,
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but also is comparable as it is age, gender, and race neutral. The kernel density
distributions of the three outcome variables are presented in Figure 3. The distri-
butions show a positive skewness, which corresponds to the previous literature that
lower mean in the BMI is associated with Asian population (World Health Organi-
zation, 2000).
3.4.4 Economic insecurity and exogeneity of layoﬀ policy
“Individuals feel economically insecure when they perceive a signiﬁcant downside
economic risk, which they are unable to adequately insure against or avoid or ig-
nore” (Osberg, 1998 & 2015). In this study, change in expected economic loss in
the state sector is the reason for greater economic insecurity, which can be thought
about in three ways: ﬁrst, the possibility of being laid oﬀ (layoﬀ rate), where
LayoffRatept =
Number of laid-oﬀ workers in state sectorpt
Number of state sector workerspt
(3.8)
i.e., the layoﬀ rate is measured by the number of laid oﬀ workers divided by the
total number of state sector workers in the province p and year t; second, the ﬁ-
nancial loss if laid oﬀ:
FinancialLosspt = 1−
Average living subsidies of laid-oﬀ workerspt
Average wage rate of on-the-job workers in state sectorpt
(3.9)
i.e., the average percentage income drop for laid-oﬀ workers in province p and year
t; and third, the expected economic loss:
E(EconomicLoss)pt = LayoffRatept · FinancialLosspt (3.10)
i.e., the product of probability of layoﬀ and ﬁnancial loss in the event of job loss in
province p and year t.
The state sector reform has impacts of diﬀerent intensity across province and year,
which suggests that the measures of economic insecurity also vary by province and
year. Figure 4 shows the map of sample provinces with expected economic loss
peak years. Figure 5 presents the average layoﬀ rate, of layoﬀ in the state sector
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by year and province. They demonstrate that the expected loss, probability of job
loss (layoﬀ rate), and the ﬁnancial loss of laid-oﬀ workers vary across provinces and
over time. For example, Liaoning in North Eastern China demonstrates a peak
layoﬀ rate of 16% and a ﬁnancial loss of 84% after layoﬀs in 2000; this generates
a 12% expected economic loss for all state-owned enterprise workers. Shandong
has its lowest layoﬀ rate of 2.4% in 2000, accompanied by a 78% ﬁnancial loss in
the case of layoﬀs, thus a 2%(=2.4%·78%) expected economic loss for state-owned
enterprise workers. The diﬀerences in timing and province in the layoﬀ rate and
ﬁnancial loss provide exogenous variation in parental economic insecurity.
In the estimations, I use the most recent three years’ average layoﬀ rate and ﬁnan-
cial loss by province for three reasons. First, as the current economic situation is
pending, parents tend to form their economic expectations using information from
the past. Second, unlike psychological measures, weight gain is a cumulative pro-
cess, which takes a long-term change in habits to observe. Third, the 3-year aver-
age allows the intergenerational eﬀects to be transmitted from parents to children.
The average of the most recent two years and the lagged layoﬀ rate are also tested;
the results are highly consistent.
Person-speciﬁc layoﬀ status could be correlated with individual characteristics (for
example, female older employees with lower skills are more likely to be laid oﬀ).
To eliminate the unobserved person-speciﬁc eﬀects, I use the layoﬀ policy for state
sector employees in a given province and year, which is exogenous with respect to
child outcomes. In China, the Hukou, or the national household registration binds
families to their birth place. Little across-province mobility is allowed to maintain
the eligibility of children’s schooling, social beneﬁts, job opportunities, and local
beneﬁts. Second, the layoﬀ policy is associated with provinces with a high heavy-
industry concentration. These industry arrangements were formed prior to the re-
form based on the strategic location, such as mineral deposits and gas ﬁelds. Even
with the deterioration in job stability, income and beneﬁts in the state sector, state
sector workers still have little incentive to move to the non-state sector. The aver-
age income and health care in the state sector is signiﬁcantly higher, even after the
state-sector reform. Thus, individuals are unlikely to respond to the risk of layoﬀ
by voluntary job quitting.
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3.4.5 State sector and non-state sector
The treatment group in the study is children in families where parents are in the
state sector, and the control group is the non-state sector.2 The key variable to
identify the state sector and non-state sector is the question:
In what type of work unit do you work?
1 state enterprise or institute
2 small collective
3 large collective
4 joint venture
5 individual or private
6 other
7 unknown
If either parent answered “1 state enterprise or institute”, then the child is iden-
tiﬁed in the state sector, i.e., treatment group. If either parent answered “2 small
collective” or “3 large collective”, then the child is considered to be in the collective
sector. The rest of the children are in the control group, i.e., the non-state sector.
Though not all state-sector families are laid oﬀ, all the state-sector employees ex-
perience a change in their degree of economic insecurity due to the increased chances
of being laid oﬀ. Therefore, the treatment of greater economic insecurity is in-
ﬂicted on all state sector workers. I identify the state sector (State=1) as the chil-
dren whose parent or parents worked in the state sector in 1989 or the next avail-
able pre-reform cycle in 1991 and 1993.3 Classiﬁcation of children in the state
sector is at the household level. In the sample 10% of the fathers, and 6% of the
mothers worked in the state sector before the reform. In total the state sector ac-
counted for 12% of children.
The non-state sector is deﬁned as children both of whose parents worked in the
non-state sector in 1989, or the next available pre-reform waves in 1991 and 1993.
These children should not experience a direct eﬀect from the layoﬀ policy in the
2See Appendix for the oﬃcial deﬁnition of the state sector and non-state sector.
3Children are identiﬁed in the state sector if one parent worked in the state sector, while the
other parent worked in the non-state sector.
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state sector. The collective sector (enterprises run by the provincial or local gov-
ernment) is excluded from the analysis because it is a hybrid sector, bridging the
private and the state sectors.
3.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.3 describes the outcome variable, average layoﬀ rate, ﬁnancial loss, equiva-
lent income, family characteristics, province and the year structure in the state sec-
tor compared to the non-state sector. The average BMI Z-score in the state sector
is -0.37, compared to -0.57 in the state sector. The negative mean coincides with
previous ﬁndings that Asian population has lower BMI than international stan-
dards generated by other ethnicities (Ko et al., 1999; Deurenberg et al., 2000). The
BMI Z-score has a similar standard deviation across the state and non-state sector,
suggesting a relatively homogeneous distribution around the mean.
The CHNS constructed the annual sum of all sources of income adjusted for CPI
from nine sources, including business, farming, ﬁshing, gardening, livestock, non-
retirement wages, retirement income, subsidies and other income. The equivalent
income is generated by using the household net income divided by the square root
of the household size (The Luxembourg Income Study Equivalent Scale). The aver-
age equivalent income is 10,807 in 2009 yuan in the state sector, compared to 7,534
in the non-state sector. The standard deviation is higher in the non-state sector.
This indicates a lower income level but a higher income inequality in the non-state
sector.
There are 1,730 children in the longitudinal sample, or 2,636 observations in pooled
cross-sectional sample. The average child is 12.7 years-old, the father is 41, and the
mother is 39 in both sectors. The average number of children in the family is 2.1
in the non-state sector, and 1.4 in the state sector. The larger family size is due
to the proportion of rural population in the sample, the One Child Policy having
been implemented less stringently in rural areas (Hesketh, Lu & Xing, 2005). In
the non-state sector, 11% of fathers have no schooling (base), while 17% have high
school and above. In the state sector, 5% of fathers have no schooling, and 56%
have high school degree and above. The remainders is in primary schooling and
middle schooling categories. The mother’s education is lower than the father’s in
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both sectors, but the state sector is higher than the non-state sector.
Rural residents consist of 83% of the non-state sector, and 39% of the state sector.
At the provincial level, the state and the non-state sector are evenly distributed
except for a higher state sector composition in Liaoning province, where state-
owned mining and manufacturing are prominent industries historically. In the
pooled cross-sectional sample, cycles of 1997, 2000, and 2004 contribute to 48%
(N=1,389), 42% (N=994) and 10% (N=253) of the sample respectively.
Compared to the control group (i.e., the non-state sector), the treatment group
(i.e., the state sector) has higher equivalent income, child’s BMI Z-score, parents’
education, and urban ratio. These pre-policy diﬀerences, as well as the time-invariant
unobservable (e.g., ability), are controlled by the individual ﬁxed eﬀects of the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology (Angrist & Pischke, 2008).
Apart from individual characteristics, the real GDP per capita by province and
year is also used to control for province-speciﬁc trends. Robustness checks are done
using the secondary enrollment rate, the CPI, the birth rate, population, urban
disposable income, average living expenditure, and the saving rate. The key results
of the estimation are highly consistent.
3.6 Identiﬁcation: The Impact of Layoﬀ Policy on Child Weight Gain
3.6.1 Continuous diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
To evaluate the causal eﬀects of parental economic insecurity on child outcomes,
I adopt a continuous diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework with individual ﬁxed ef-
fects. The idea underlying the identiﬁcation strategy is to compare not only the
diﬀerences between the state sector and the non-state sector, but also variations in
outcomes that result from diﬀerent degrees of treatment, i.e. expected income loss
deﬁned as layoﬀ rate multiplied by the income fall for laid-oﬀ workers.
The baseline continuous diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence regression model is as follows:
Yipt = αi + α1Stateip · LayoffRatept · FinancialLosspt
+ α2LayoffRatept · FinancialLosspt +Witθ + eipt (3.11)
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in which Yipt is the BMI Z-score, weight for age Z score, and waist to height ra-
tio for child i in year t. Stateip identiﬁes the treatment group. LayoffRatept is
the layoﬀ rate for province p in year t, which measures the possibility of being laid
oﬀ. FinancialLosspt is the average ﬁnancial loss of laid-oﬀ state sector workers for
province p and year t, which measures the percentage of economic downfall in the
event of a layoﬀ. LayoffRatept · FinancialLosspt captures the possibility of job
loss times the severity of ﬁnancial loss of layoﬀ, which is the expected economic
loss. The vector of covariates, Wit, includes log equivalent income and number
of children in the family. The coeﬃcient α2 is the average diﬀerence in outcomes
across the province and is the same for both the treatment and the control groups.
The coeﬃcient of interest, α1, is the extra layoﬀ rate eﬀects that only aﬀects the
treatment group, i.e., the state sector. The hypothesis is that provinces featuring a
high layoﬀ rate have high BMI Z-scores in the state sector. Hence, α1 is expected
to be statistically signiﬁcant with a positive sign. αi is the permanent unobservable
person-speciﬁc characteristics. By using individual ﬁxed eﬀects, the unobserved
time-invariant characteristics are diﬀerenced out, and the average eﬀects remain
in the estimation. All regressions are estimated separately for girls and boys. The
standard errors are clustered at the provincial level.
The second speciﬁcation decomposes economic insecurity (i.e. expected economic
loss) by separating the possibility of job loss and the severity of ﬁnancial loss if
laid oﬀ:
Yipt = βi + β1Stateip · LayoffRatept + β2Stateip · FinancialLosspt
+ β3LayoffRatept + β4FinancialLosspt +Witϑ+ ipt (3.12)
The variables of interest are Stateip · LayoffRatept(changes in layoﬀ rate in state
sector by province), and Stateip ·FinancialLosspt (changes in ﬁnancial loss in state
sector if laid oﬀ). The coeﬃcients β1 and β2 are expected to be positive, which
suggests that a high economic loss is associated with a high weight gain.
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3.6.2 Parallel trend
The panel diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence identiﬁcation assumes that the outcomes in the
treatment group (i.e., the state sector) and the control groups (i.e., the non-state
sector) would have been the same in the absence of treatment (i.e., follow paral-
lel trends). Figure 6 presents child outcome variables for treatment and control
groups over time. For the non-state and the state sector, the BMI Z-score, the
weight-for-age Z-score, and the waist-to-height ratio exhibit the same trends before
the reform in 1993, diverge during the reform in 1997 and 2000, and converge after
the reform in 2004. Note that for outcome variables, the data are available from
1989 to 2004, while the layoﬀ rate is only available from 1995 to 2005. Therefore,
the parallel trend can be generated using a broader time span, while the regression
analyses are done using the data from 1997 to 2004.
3.7 Main Results
To illustrate the magnitude of the coeﬃcients, I will use a 10-percentage-point dif-
ference in expected economic loss between the most aﬀected province Liaoning in
2000 (12% expected economic loss), and the least aﬀected province Shandong in
1997 (2% expected economic loss). From the coeﬃcient of LayoffRate · State
(the additional eﬀects on state sector from the non-state sector), the numeric ex-
amples show if layoﬀs increase by 10 percentage points, how many standard devi-
ations will aﬀect the outcome variables. Also, I will use a more intuitive example:
if a 10-year-old child was at the 50th percentile of the weight measures, then a 10-
percentage-point increase in expected economic loss would move the child to which
percentile.
Table 3.4 presents the individual ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of the continuous diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence model of children’s BMI Z-score, weight for age Z-score, and waist to
height ratio for girls and boys respectively. In speciﬁcation 1, the variable of inter-
est is FinancialLoss·LayoffRate·State. A positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient sug-
gests that the layoﬀ policy by province and year increases weight gain in children
from the state sector more than those from the non-state sector. The interaction
of FinancialLoss · LayoffRate captures the overall eﬀects of layoﬀs in both the
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state and the non-state sector. In Speciﬁcation 2, I evaluate the diﬀerential eﬀect
of economic loss by decomposing economic insecurity into LayoffRate · State and
FinancialLoss · State, which captures the possibility of job loss and the severity of
ﬁnancial loss.
According to columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 3.4, FinancialLoss · LayoffRate ·
State is positive and signiﬁcant for boys, suggesting that the reform signiﬁcantly
increases boys’ BMI Z-score, weight-for-age Z-score, and waist-to-height ratio in
the state sector relative to the non-state sector. In terms of the magnitude, when
expected economic loss by layoﬀ policy increases by 10 percentage points, the BMI
Z-score increases by 1.32 units (=13.2*10%), equivalent to a 1.22 standard devia-
tion (= 1.32/StandardDevationbmiZ) increase in BMI Z-score distribution in the
sample. If a 10-year-old boy who starts at 50th percentile of the BMI Z-score, the
layoﬀ eﬀects would increase his BMI Z-score to 86th percentile. Similarly, a 10 per-
centage increase in expected economic loss increases boy’s weight-for-age Z-score
by 0.9 units, or 0.84 standard deviations. The eﬀect is equivalent to a rise of a 10-
year-old boy from the 50th percentile to the 77th percentile of the weight-for-age
Z-score distribution. The waist-to-height ratio increases by 0.05 units, or 1.16 stan-
dard deviations, which would move a median 10-year-old boy to 90th percentile in
waist-to-height distribution.
The three outcome variables in weight provide multi-dimensional but consistent
results in children’s weight gain in the state sector when there is an increase in ex-
pected economic loss in the state sector. The BMI Z-score, weight-for-age Z-score
and waist-to-height ratio are all positive and signiﬁcant for boys, but not girls.
This suggests that compared to the non-state sector, boys in the state sector in-
crease weight because of the change in layoﬀ policy in the state-owned enterprise
reform.4
Speciﬁcation 2 of Table 3.4 shows estimates of the probability of job loss (LayoffRate·
State) and the severity of ﬁnancial loss (FinancialLoss · State). The results sug-
gest that the layoﬀ rate is positive and signiﬁcant for boys’ BMI Z-score, weight for
age Z-score, and waist-to-height ratio, while the FinancialLoss · State is positive
and signiﬁcant for weight-for-age Z-score. The estimates show that the probability
4The gender diﬀerence is signiﬁcant for all three outcome variables by including gender inter-
action with FinancialLoss · LayoffRate · State in pooled-girls-and-boys sample.
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of job loss has a higher impact than the severity of ﬁnancial loss.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the happiness literature. Di Tella, MacCulloch and
Oswald (2001) show that to remain the same level of life satisfaction, people would
trade a 2-percentage-point increase in the inﬂation rate (equivalent to ﬁnancial
loss) with a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate (the probabil-
ity of job loss). Helliwell and Huang (2014) estimate the non-monetary cost of un-
employment on subjective well-being is 15 times larger than the ﬁnancial loss from
unemployment itself. This chapter also suggests that child health outcomes are
more prone to be aﬀected by probability of job loss than ﬁnancial loss from unem-
ployment.
3.8 Further Results
3.8.1 Estimation on no actual job loss sample
The main results above show that weight gain in boys is associated with parental
economic insecurity. I extend the hypothesis further to weight gain in children
without parental employment change. Economic insecurity is found not only in the
event of job loss, but also in the “anticipation” of job loss. By limiting the sample
to children whose parents always have the same job, the hypothesis supports the
purpose of this study, which is estimating the eﬀects of economic insecurity rather
than the eﬀects of layoﬀ alone.
Economic insecurity is about the anxiety regarding anticipated events. I re-estimate
the ‘perceived’ job loss separately from ‘actual’ job loss. Although a severe lay-
oﬀ policy can still cause laid-oﬀ workers increased diﬃculties with re-employment,
once state-owned workers are laid oﬀ, the feared event has happened, so uncer-
tainty has been resolved. To separate the confounding factor, I further limit the
sample to children whose parents always have jobs at the time of the interview and
who haven’t changed their jobs since the last survey (1206 children are excluded).
By limiting the ‘always having a job’ sample and employing the same continuous
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model, the results provide ‘perceived’ eﬀects on job loss.
Table 3.5 presents the results of the “never lost job” sample. Column 1 shows the
Financial
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Loss · LayoffRate · State is still signiﬁcant and positive for boys. The magni-
tude of the coeﬃcient is reduced from 13.15 in the full sample estimation to 6.13
in the never lost job sample. If the expected economic loss increases by 10 percent-
age points, the BMI Z-score increases by 0.61 points, or 0.58 standard deviations.
The eﬀect would increase a 10-year-old boy from the 50th percentile to the 72nd
percentile. The waist-to-height ratio becomes signiﬁcant for girls. An increase in
10-percentage-point in expected economic loss, the waist-to-height ratio increases
by 0.068, or 1.66 standard deviations. Such eﬀect increases a 10-year-old girl at
50th percentile to 90th percentile at waist-to-height distribution.
Speciﬁcation 2 of Table 3.5 presents estimates of the diﬀerential eﬀects of eco-
nomic insecurity. Boys’ BMI Z-score increases as does FinancialLoss · State and
LayoffRate · State. This indicates that the intergenerational eﬀects of economic
insecurity come from both the probability of job loss and the severity of ﬁnancial
loss of unemployment. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.5 suggests that waist-to-
height ratio increases with the ﬁnancial loss for boys, and increases with layoﬀ rate
for girls.
3.8.2 Quantile regression on pooled cross-sectional sample
I further question whether parental economic insecurity results in higher weight
gain in children who already have higher BMIs than their peers. This hypothe-
sis implies a negative consequence on children’s health, if supported. The OLS
results estimate the average eﬀects, while the weight gain caused by economic in-
security is not necessarily linear. Rohde et al., (2016) use quantile regressions on
Australia panel data and ﬁnd that the eﬀects of economic insecurity on weight gain
are higher in the overweight population, which implies that repeated stress has a
cumulatively worse impact. To investigate the diﬀerent impacts on children with
a diﬀerent level of weight, I employ a quantile regression on pooled cross-sectional
sample. By using a pooled sample, observations that appeared once in the longitu-
dinal dataset are also included. The model of estimation is as follows:
Yip = γ0 + γ1Stateip · LayoffRatep · FinancialLossp
+ γ2LayoffRatep · FinancialLosspt + Ziδ + ξipt (3.13)
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where Yip is BMI Z-score, weight-for-age Z-score, and waist-to-height ratio for child
i in province p in the pooled sample. State, FinancialLoss, and LayoﬀRate are de-
ﬁned the same as in the baseline estimation. I further control for children’s age,
age squared, and age cubed to capture not only the increase, but also the diﬀer-
ent growth rate (curvature) of the children. The age and education of father and
mother, the rural dummy, and the province of residence are added to control for
observed characteristics. The primary objective of this model is to test if γ1, the
coeﬃcient of Stateip · LayoffRatep · FinancialLossp increases with children’s
weight measures, i.e. if the higher γ1 is associated with a higher weight quantile.
Table 3.6 presents the estimates of quantile regressions for a pooled cross-sectional
sample of boys at the 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, 0.9 and 0.95 quantile. For boys’ waist-
to-height ratio, the estimates of Stateip ·LayoffRatep ·FinancialLossp are positive
and signiﬁcant at q=0.5 (γ1 = 0.2), q=0.8 (γ1 = 0.4), and q=0.95 (γ1 = 0.59). The
quantile regressions suggest that when children are at the top of the distribution
of waist-to-height ratio (already too fat), a stronger layoﬀ policy increases their
waistline even more. Their girl counterparts do not present signiﬁcant eﬀects of
Stateip · LayoffRatep · FinancialLossp in the quantile estimation (see Table 3.7).
Figure 7 shows the plot of the coeﬃcient of Stateip ·LayoffRatep · FinancialLossp
across all quantiles. Compared to OLS, the coeﬃcient of Stateip · LayoffRatep ·
FinancialLossp at the bottom distribution is below the 95% CI in the OLS for
boys’ BMI Z-score, while the top distribution is above the 95% CI in the OLS for
boys’ waist-to-height ratio. The patterns for girls are less distinct than for boys.
The quantile regressions suggest that the eﬀects of economic stress are not linear
for boys, as it makes the thin boy thinner and adds more weight to already obese
boys. As being too thin or too fat are both problematic for health, the results here
pose a more serious problem than the OLS estimation suggests.
In general, the quantile regressions show that the eﬀects of parental economic in-
security (i.e., layoﬀ eﬀects) on weight gain are not linear. The results suggest a
larger weight gain is found by the layoﬀ policy in the state sector for heavier chil-
dren. This supports the hypothesis that the health eﬀects of parental economic
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insecurity on weight gain are more statistically signiﬁcant, and have a higher mag-
nitude, at the higher ends of the BMI Z-score, the weight-for-age Z-score, or waist-
to-height ratio.
The results provide strong evidence that the layoﬀ policy contributes to obesity
rather than eliminating underweight from malnutrition: the children in the lower
quantiles of weight are not aﬀected, while the eﬀects weight-gaining become stronger
as the increase in weight quantiles.
3.8.3 Rural and urban sample
As a robustness check, I separate rural and urban sample for continuous diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence estimation. Table 3.8 shows the estimates. In the urban sample, there
are 377 children in the urban sample, of which 133 children’s parents work in the
state sector. The results show that girls’ waist-for-height ratio is positive and sig-
niﬁcant for Stateip · LayoffRatep · FinancialLossp. In the rural sample, there are
1328 children in the longitudinal sample, and 88 children among which belong to
the state sector. The results suggest that BMI Z-score increases signiﬁcantly with
Stateip · LayoffRatep · FinancialLossp for both boys and girls. The weight-for-age
Z score and waist-to-height ratio are signiﬁcantly positive for boys. It shows that
rural sample is more signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the layoﬀs, but the smaller eﬀects in
the urban sample are potentially due to the small sample size. In general, it rein-
forces the previous results that a severe layoﬀ policy increases in children’s weight
measures.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter is the ﬁrst one to examine intergenerational eﬀects of parental eco-
nomic insecurity on children’s weight gain. Using the natural experiment of the
large-scale layoﬀs during the China’s state-owned enterprise reform in the late
1990s, I calculate the expected economic loss using layoﬀ rates and average ﬁnan-
cial loss in the state sector at provincial- and year-levels. Compared to children in
the non-state sector (control group), children in the state sector (treatment group)
experience diﬀerent levels of expected economic loss due to changes in layoﬀ policy
(treatment of diﬀerent intensity). Exploiting this exogenous variation in parental
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economic insecurity, I use a continuous diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology to ex-
amine the weight-related outcomes.
To adjust for age and gender speciﬁc growth standards, I use the BMI Z-score
(WHO standard), and the weight-for-age Z-score (CDC standard). A non-racial
dependent outcome, waist-to-height ratio, is also used to account for the body fat
distribution, and is a more reliable indicator of health risks than weight alone. Us-
ing the longitudinal data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS),
individual ﬁxed eﬀects are used to control for time-invariant observable and unob-
servable characteristics.
Compared to the non-state sector, there are considerable increases in the BMI Z-
score, weight-for-age Z-score, and waist-to-height ratio in boys in the state sector
in the response to the expected economic loss in the state sector. If the expected
economic loss increases by 10 percentage points (the diﬀerence between the high-
est and the lowest treatment eﬀects of layoﬀ policy at provincial- and year-levels)
the BMI Z-score increases by 1.22 standard deviations, the weight-for-age Z-score
increases by 0.84 standard deviations, and the waist to height ratio increases by
1.16 standard deviations for boys. In other words, if parental economic insecu-
rity increases by 10 percentage points, then a boy from median weight distribu-
tion would move to the 86th percentile in the BMI Z-score, the 77th percentile
in the weight-for-age Z-score, and the 90th percentile in the waist-to-height ratio.
The layoﬀ rate and ﬁnancial loss from the layoﬀs are used to examine the diﬀeren-
tial impact of economic insecurity. The layoﬀ rate (i.e., the probability of job loss)
plays a greater role than the ﬁnancial loss in the determination of children’s weight
change.
After limiting the sample for parents always having jobs, the BMI Z-score is still
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the layoﬀ policy for boys in the state sector. Girls’ waist-
to-height ratio also signiﬁcantly increases with the parental economic insecurity.
If the expected economic loss increases by 10 percentage points, even without any
parental job change or job loss, boys’ BMI Z-score is expected to increase by 0.58
standard deviations, or a 22 percentile increase, and girls’ waist-to-height-ratio is
expected to increase by 1.66 standard deviations, or a 40 percentile increase.
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By employing quantile regressions, I test the hypothesis that parental economic in-
security does not aﬀect all children equally. Weight gain resulting from parental
economic insecurity is especially high for boys who already have a higher weight.
It suggests that parental economic insecurity induces “fat children to become fat-
ter”, which adds signiﬁcantly higher social costs to health expenditure than previ-
ously estimated using the OLS model.
This study highlights that layoﬀs have severe consequences on children in the fami-
lies. When performing economic reform, policy-makers should take the intergenera-
tional health eﬀect into considerations for the cost-beneﬁt analysis, as child obesity
signiﬁcantly increases public health costs. Parental job loss has signiﬁcant negative
impact on child obesity, which suggests that a much higher public health cost is as-
sociated with unemployment than previous studies suggested. In the event where
job losses have already occurred a social safety net is important to reduce the neg-
ative impact on children. Adequate unemployment insurance beneﬁts, eﬀective job
training programs, and accessible social assistance can eﬀectively protect families
against expected economic loss, thus reducing the negative eﬀects on children.
Also, the increased child obesity calls for social and school programs to promote
children’s daily physical activities and educate parents and children themselves for
better nutrition choices.
The ﬁndings show that boys’ weight gain is aﬀected by parental economic insecu-
rity more than girls. There are several potential explanations: First, boys in China
face higher parental pressure, especially due to the unbalanced gender ratio in the
marriage market. Chinese culture has long-rooted boy preference (Almond, Edlund
& Milligan, 2013) and the One Child Policy aggravated gender selection (Eben-
stein, 2010). Prior to the state sector reform, the gender ratio was 106 males to
100 females (Johansson & Nygren, 1991), which resulted in a more competitive
marriage market for men. Das Gupta et al. (2010) shows that Chinese men with
higher education are less likely to be single. It is plausible that boys experience in-
creased pressure to gain higher socioeconomic status, especially when parents face
economic downturns. Chinese women’s education, on the other hand, is not corre-
lated with the marriage rate, so the pressure on women to gain high socioeconomic
status is less.
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Second, sons in China share more responsibilities in taking care of elderly parents
than daughters (Zhou, 2014). With the under-developed ﬁnancial market, protec-
tion against economic insecurity still relies on borrowing capacity of family mem-
bers (Cai et al., 2013). In events of economic insecurity, such as unemployment,
sickness, old age, and widowhood (death of husband/father) (Osberg, 2015a), sons
share the risks of ﬁnancial downturn and the cost of supporting parents. Daugh-
ters, on the contrary, are considered “married oﬀ” to other households once they
reach adulthood. Therefore, it is likely that parents pass on their economic anxi-
ety to sons more than daughters, and sons are more likely to assume that economic
responsibilities.
Third, the notion of body image may also explain such diﬀerences: girls may pre-
fer a slim body image, while teenage boys value a bulkier body (Demarest & Allen,
2000). Girls tend to be more concerned about being overweight, and associate dis-
satisfaction of body image with lower self-esteem. Such ﬁndings are not applicable
to boys (Furnham, Badmin & Sneade, 2002). In the presence of parental economic
insecurity, boys tend to gain weight.
Fourth, girls may react to a change in the family environment change diﬀerently
from boys (Bezirganian & Cohen, 1992). An epigenetic study shows that girls tend
to internalize stress (Essex et al., 2003) and parental economic insecurity may in-
duce mental health challenges, such as anxiety or depression. The CHNS dataset
does not provide a subjective measure or indicator of mental health. This is one of
the limitations of this study, and future research will be enhanced if measures of
mental health for parents and children are included.
In this chapter, the average ﬁnancial loss of laid-oﬀ workers is calculated from the
average living subsidies of laid-oﬀ workers compared to the average wage of on-
post state sector workers in the province at the same period of time. This provides
the closest approximation in the average income fall that a laid-oﬀ worker expe-
riences, given data available. Giles, Park and Cai (2006) indicate that the state-
owned enterprise reform also reduces the wage of the remaining state sector work-
ers. The proportionate ﬁnancial loss of laid-oﬀ workers is calculated using the wage
level of the remaining state sector workers. Therefore, the ﬁnancial loss may be
underestimated. Another limitation comes from the lack of reputable overweight
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standard speciﬁcally for current Chinese children in existing literature. Although
the BMI Z-score, and the weight-for-age Z-score provide an age-gender-speciﬁc ref-
erence for weight gain using international samples but they do not accurately iden-
tify the thresholds for overweight or obese for Chinese children. Future research
can be done when such thresholds are established.
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Table 3.1: Number of observations by number of appearance in the longitudinal
sample and survey year.
Occurrences Year
1997 2000 2004 Total
1 659 285 26 970
2 584 563 81 1,228
3 146 146 146 438
Total 1,389 994 253 2,636
Note: CHNS sample of families with children from 1997 to 2004. The column shows the
number of times the same children in the study, and the row shows the survey cycles.
For example, in 2000, 1205 children have shown in the survey for the second time, 251
children for the ﬁrst time. In the longitudinal sample, and there are 1023 children in the
sample that we observe twice, and 578 children we observe three times from 1997 to 2004.
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Table 3.2: Age and year structure of longitudinal sample
Age 1997 2000 2004 Total
4 30 0 0 30
5 39 0 0 39
6 62 0 0 62
7 81 28 0 109
8 115 38 0 153
9 131 61 0 192
10 152 78 0 230
11 141 114 25 280
12 126 123 24 273
13 108 138 27 273
14 108 136 32 276
15 95 99 54 248
16 86 75 35 196
17 69 63 33 165
18 46 41 23 110
Total 1,389 994 253 2,636
Note: CHNS sample of families with children from 1997 to 2004.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics by the non-state sector and the state sector.
Non-State Sector State Sector
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
BMI Z-score -0.57 1.06 -5.00 4.20 -0.37 1.16 -3.81 3.34
Weight-for-age Z-score -1.18 1.05 -4.83 2.23 -0.67 1.10 -4.81 1.99
Waist-to-height ratio 0.43 0.04 0.31 0.74 0.43 0.04 0.30 0.60
FinancialLoss*LayoﬀRate 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.12
LayoﬀRate 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.15
FinancialLoss 0.80 0.05 0.69 0.88 0.80 0.05 0.69 0.88
Equivalent Income 7534 6419 0 69402 10807 8006 0 83905
Number of children 2.12 0.84 1 6 1.38 0.54 1 3
Number of extra hh members 2.66 0.97 1 7 2.48 0.87 1 6
Prov GDP per capita 6879.70 3424.23 2736.92 22969.12 7177.78 3495.32 2736.917 22969.12
Number of observations 2292 344
Source: CHNS sample from 1997 to 2004. Note: Equivalent income is household income after tax and transfer adjusted by
square root of household size (the Luxembourg Income Study Equivalent Scale).
Number of extra household members are deﬁned as household size minus number of parents minus number of children.
54
Table 3.4: Continuous Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Estimates with Individual Fixed Eﬀects. Full Sample.
BMI Z-score Weight-for-age Z-score Waist-to-height ratio
Boy Girl Boy Girl Boy Girl
Speciﬁcation 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate*State 13.15** 14.52 8.955** 3.061 0.495* 0.62
[3.953] [9.679] [2.713] [8.673] [0.221] [0.353]
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate -4.453** -3.780** -0.456 0.211 -0.18 -0.125
[1.300] [1.593] [0.525] [1.450] [0.121] [0.176]
Log eq hh income 0.0264 -0.0658 0.00358 -0.0295 0.00176 -0.00655*
[0.0373] [0.0496] [0.0317] [0.0463] [0.00177] [0.00296]
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,505 1,244 1,545 1,283 1,473 1,231
R-squared 0.043 0.035 0.015 0.058 0.069 0.051
Number of IDind 954 826 972 845 948 825
Speciﬁcation 2
FinancialLoss*State -1.542 -1.479 3.093** 0.431 -0.0222 0.0343
[3.054] [2.762] [1.189] [3.969] [0.102] [0.115]
Layoﬀ*State 9.140* 9.985 8.016*** 1.816 0.359** 0.474
[3.901] [6.958] [1.872] [6.402] [0.150] [0.267]
Financial Loss -0.0329 0.171 -0.222 -2.493* 0.123 0.164*
[1.419] [1.095] [2.089] [1.139] [0.0660] [0.0834]
Layoﬀ Rate -3.282** -2.667 -0.213 -0.963 -0.0682 -0.00596
[1.385] [1.488] [1.089] [0.943] [0.0731] [0.161]
Log eq hh income 0.0276 -0.0707 0.00139 -0.0353 0.00187 -0.00626*
[0.0371] [0.0517] [0.0307] [0.0431] [0.00168] [0.00296]
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,505 1,244 1,545 1,283 1,473 1,231
R-squared 0.043 0.036 0.018 0.066 0.078 0.062
Number of IDind 954 826 972 845 948 825
Note: Robust standard errors clustered in provincial level in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Layoﬀ rate and
ﬁnancial loss are recent 3-year average at provincial level. Other controls include number of children in households, number
of extra household members and GDP per capita in province. A constant is included. The sample consists of families with
children in the state sector and non-state sector from 1997 to 2004 for 7 provinces in CHNS dataset.
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Table 3.5: Continuous Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Estimates with Individual Fixed Eﬀects. Never lose job sample.
BMI Z-score Weight-for-age Z-score Waist-to-height ratio
Boy Girl Boy Girl Boy Girl
Speciﬁcation 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate*State 6.137* 7.776 9.952 2.357 -0.174 0.680**
[3.155] [9.754] [6.076] [11.59] [0.101] [0.217]
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate -4.334** -2.111 -0.428 0.746 -0.320** -0.203
[1.248] [1.139] [2.040] [1.761] [0.112] [0.145]
Log eq hh income 0.0803** 0.0425 0.026 0.0337 0.00299 -0.00174
[0.0312] [0.0743] [0.0276] [0.0437] [0.00197] [0.00123]
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,024 860 1,050 878 1,003 849
R-squared 0.052 0.023 0.034 0.077 0.122 0.026
Number of IDind 679 596 690 605 673 596
Speciﬁcation 2
FinancialLoss*State 7.768*** -2.291 1.823 -0.0621 0.310* 0.0129
[1.562] [4.584] [2.260] [5.081] [0.152] [0.0867]
Layoﬀ*State 10.60*** 4.689 8.71 0.619 0.039 0.519**
[2.346] [6.764] [4.874] [8.657] [0.193] [0.165]
Financial Loss -1.948 -0.486 -1.676 -2.505*** 0.137 0.0654
[1.267] [1.388] [2.299] [0.647] [0.0816] [0.0638]
Layoﬀ Rate -4.258** -1.762 -1.095 -0.778 -0.151* -0.103
[1.280] [1.291] [2.190] [0.795] [0.0682] [0.141]
Log eq hh income 0.0795** 0.042 0.029 0.0366 0.00259 -0.00189
[0.0265] [0.0730] [0.0262] [0.0425] [0.00193] [0.00128]
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,024 860 1,050 878 1,003 849
R-squared 0.059 0.025 0.04 0.088 0.146 0.028
Number of IDind 679 596 690 605 673 596
Note: Robust standard errors clustered in provincial level in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Layoﬀ rate and
ﬁnancial loss are recent 3-year average at provincial level. Other controls include number of children in households, number
of extra household members (number of household members-number of children-number of parents), and CPI adjusted GDP
per capita in province. A constant is included. The sample consists of families never lost or changed job with children in
the state sector and non-state sector with the exclusion of collective sector from 1997 to 2004 for 7 provinces in CHNS
dataset.
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Table 3.6: Quantile regressions using pooled CHNS sample. Boys sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Q=0.05 Q=0.1 Q=0.2 Q=0.5 Q=0.8 Q=0.9 Q=0.95
BMI Z-score
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate*State -4.948 5.127 4.977 4.729 11.17*** 5.912 3.663
[6.187] [6.962] [4.431] [3.252] [4.190] [5.577] [5.923]
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate -11.31** -3.031 -0.902 0.968 0.187 5.489 2.86
[4.859] [5.467] [3.479] [2.553] [3.290] [4.380] [4.651]
State -0.323 -0.338 -0.194 -0.276 -0.219 0.13 0.233
[0.357] [0.402] [0.256] [0.188] [0.242] [0.322] [0.342]
Weight-for-age Z-score
FinancialLoss*LayoﬀRate*State 3.872 7.313 5.286 3.625 5.872 5.859 5.231
[4.487] [4.998] [4.140] [3.158] [3.705] [4.119] [4.448]
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate 1.42 1.265 0.903 -0.932 -0.482 3.094 4.023
[3.528] [3.929] [3.255] [2.482] [2.913] [3.238] [3.497]
State -0.0789 -0.162 0.00796 0.179 0.126 0.219 0.273
[0.261] [0.291] [0.241] [0.184] [0.215] [0.239] [0.259]
Waist-to-height ratio
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate*State 0.154 0.177 0.162 0.203* 0.399** 0.412 0.586**
[0.187] [0.162] [0.117] [0.113] [0.189] [0.269] [0.280]
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate 0.161 0.0358 -0.0456 -0.0566 0.0372 -0.12 0.0571
[0.152] [0.132] [0.0951] [0.0922] [0.154] [0.218] [0.227]
State -0.0134 -0.0210** -0.0202*** -0.0106 -0.0151 -0.0136 0.00415
[0.0110] [0.00949] [0.00684] [0.00663] [0.0110] [0.0157] [0.0163]
Note: Robust standard errors clustered in provincial level in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Layoﬀ rate and
ﬁnancial loss are recent 3-year-average at provincial level. Other controls include number of children in households, number
of extra household members (number of household members-number of children-number of parents), and CPI adjusted GDP
per capita in province. A constant is included. The sample consists of pooled cross-sectional families with boys in the state
sector and non-state sector with the exclusion of collective sector from 1997 to 2004 for 7 provinces in CHNS dataset.
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Table 3.7: Quantile regressions using pooled CHNS sample. Girls sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Q=0.05 Q=0.1 Q=0.2 Q=0.5 Q=0.8 Q=0.9 Q=0.95
BMI Z-score
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate*State -5.34 -3.073 2.146 -3.581 -5.501* -1.007 5.787
[7.302] [5.554] [4.013] [3.000] [3.275] [5.150] [5.920]
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate -3.116 -6.216 -7.145** -2.939 -0.323 -1.969 -3.442
[6.197] [4.713] [3.405] [2.545] [2.779] [4.371] [5.024]
State 0.113 -0.142 -0.3 0.109 0.434** 0.451 0.0565
[0.444] [0.338] [0.244] [0.183] [0.199] [0.313] [0.360]
Weight-for-age Z-score
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate*State -7.056 -4.545 -6.375 -3.807 0.151 -0.112 -2.846
[7.979] [5.895] [4.383] [3.105] [3.695] [3.960] [5.281]
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate -2.51 0.62 -2.762 -3.734 1.003 0.578 2.669
[6.771] [5.002] [3.719] [2.635] [3.135] [3.360] [4.481]
State 0.0782 0.101 0.331 0.231 0.274 0.309 0.382
[0.489] [0.361] [0.268] [0.190] [0.226] [0.243] [0.323]
Waist-to-height ratio
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate*State 0.0276 0.0551 0.138 -0.0639 0.118 -0.142 -0.0924
[0.185] [0.175] [0.158] [0.132] [0.161] [0.243] [0.435]
FinancialLoss*Layoﬀ rate -0.0112 0.0183 0.0926 0.0383 -0.218 0.0446 -0.203
[0.162] [0.153] [0.138] [0.115] [0.141] [0.213] [0.380]
State 0.00412 -2.60E-06 -0.0155 -0.00757 -0.0104 0.00721 0.0014
[0.0113] [0.0107] [0.00968] [0.00808] [0.00987] [0.0149] [0.0266]
Note: Robust standard errors clustered in provincial level in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Layoﬀ rate and
ﬁnancial loss are recent 3-year-average at provincial level. Other controls include number of children in households, number
of extra household members (number of household members-number of children-number of parents), and CPI adjusted GDP
per capita in province. A constant is included. The sample consists of pooled cross-sectional families with girls in the state
sector and non-state sector with the exclusion of collective sector from 1997 to 2004 for 7 provinces in CHNS dataset.
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Table 3.8: Continuous Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Estimates with Individual Fixed
Eﬀects. Urban and rural sample.
Urban
VARIABLES BMI Z-score Weight-for-age Z-score Waist-to-height ratio
Boy Girl Boy Girl Boy Girl
FinancialLoss*LayoﬀRate*State 11.54 8.460 2.047 -4.515 0.0901 0.692*
[11.56] [10.29] [3.992] [10.29] [0.726] [0.308]
FinancialLoss*LayoﬀRate -8.800 -9.536 0.122 -2.563* -0.0525 -0.248
[6.500] [5.078] [4.400] [1.297] [0.363] [0.668]
Log eq income 0.0730 0.118 -0.00263 -0.0480* 0.00957** 0.00263
[0.0692] [0.0717] [0.0347] [0.0233] [0.00353] [0.00753]
Number of extra hh members 0.201* 0.339 0.183*** 0.355** 0.00113 -0.000832
[0.102] [0.188] [0.0304] [0.105] [0.00294] [0.0143]
puberty -0.0511 0.256 0.0308 0.244* -0.00676 0.00643
[0.0508] [0.204] [0.124] [0.122] [0.00357] [0.00722]
Prov GDP per capita (in 2009) -9.13e-05*** -7.70e-05 -5.22e-05** -6.96e-06 -2.81e-06 -1.09e-06
[2.52e-05] [5.46e-05] [1.70e-05] [1.68e-05] [1.50e-06] [3.60e-06]
Constant -0.794 -1.639 -1.156** -1.112*** 0.367*** 0.412***
[0.508] [1.002] [0.358] [0.207] [0.0390] [0.0907]
Observations 327 277 328 280 324 276
R-squared 0.106 0.095 0.065 0.101 0.077 0.030
Number of IDind 197 180 198 182 199 181
Rural
VARIABLES BMI Z-score Weight-for-age Z-score Waist-to-height ratio
Boy Girl Boy Girl Boy Girl
FinancialLoss*LayoﬀRate*State 22.89** 27.05* 17.54** 21.20 1.127** 0.964
[8.304] [11.55] [6.408] [11.88] [0.414] [0.561]
FinancialLoss*LayoﬀRate -3.134 -5.314** 0.311 -1.778 -0.107 -0.195*
[1.986] [1.627] [1.159] [1.690] [0.119] [0.0908]
Log eq income 0.0193 -0.0993* -0.00679 -0.0147 0.00181 -0.00942**
[0.0499] [0.0482] [0.0451] [0.0338] [0.00162] [0.00303]
Number of extra hh members 0.186* 0.0774 0.109 0.0738 0.00383 0.00360
[0.0903] [0.0672] [0.0745] [0.0523] [0.00420] [0.00733]
puberty -0.0285 0.483*** -0.0709 0.329*** -0.00983 0.0126***
[0.165] [0.0727] [0.0760] [0.0463] [0.00683] [0.00162]
Prov GDP per capita (in 2009) -3.22e-05 -6.17e-05** 3.57e-05* 2.24e-05 -2.89e-06** -4.94e-06***
[3.75e-05] [2.39e-05] [1.70e-05] [1.78e-05] [8.38e-07] [1.23e-06]
Constant -0.856 0.405 -1.645** -1.554*** 0.438*** 0.540***
[0.574] [0.499] [0.593] [0.406] [0.0207] [0.0345]
Observations 1,123 899 1,139 907 1,074 865
R-squared 0.034 0.103 0.035 0.132 0.103 0.096
Number of IDind 722 604 728 606 702 589
Note: Robust standard errors clustered in provincial level in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Layoﬀ rate
and ﬁnancial loss are recent 3-year average at provincial level. Other controls include number of children in
households, number of extra household members (number of household members-number of children-number of
parents), and CPI adjusted GDP per capita in province. A constant is included. The sample consists of children in
the state sector and non-state sector with the exclusion of collective sector from 1997 to 2004 for 7 provinces in
CHNS dataset. Estimated for rural and urban sample separately.
Results are highly consistent after including time trend, secondary school enrolment rate, birth rate, employment
in non-state, population, and urban disposable income (in 2009 yuan)
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Figure 3.1: Child capacity as a function of parental economic insecurity for diﬀer-
ent levels of expected economic loss.
Note: Figure 1 presents the child’s human capital formation as a function of
parental economic insecurity. Group 1 is experience no change in economic inse-
curity. Group 2 experiences a mild increase in economic insecurity. Group 3 expe-
riences a high increase in economic insecurity.
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Figure 3.2: BMI growth charts for 5 to 19-year-olds from the World Health Orga-
nization.
Source: http://www.who.int/growthref/
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Figure 3.3: Density distribution of child outcomes in the CHNS sample.
Note: The sample consists of families with children in the state sector and
non-state sector with the exclusion of collective sector from 1997 to 2004 for 7
provinces in CHNS dataset. The blue lines in BMIZ-score, weight for height Z-
score, and waist to height ratio show kernel density plots.
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Figure 3.4: Expected economic loss by layoﬀ policy peak year in CHNS provinces.
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Data source: China Labour Statistics Yearbook.
Note: Expected economic loss in state sector is deﬁned as provincial layoﬀ rate
times average ﬁnancial loss from layoﬀs.
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Figure 3.5: Level of economic insecurity by province and year, decomposed.
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The layoﬀ rate is deﬁned as the number of state sector laid oﬀ workers at year end divided by
the number of state sector workers at the year end. Annual ﬁnancial loss is deﬁned as one minus
the oﬀ-post state sector worker living subsidy divided by average salary of on post state sector
workers at provincial level.
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Figure 3.6: Parallel trend in child outcomes: State sector V.S. Non-state sector.
Note: The sample consists of all families with 0 to 19-year-old children in the state
sector and non-state sector with the exclusion of collective sector from 1991 to
2006 for 7 provinces in CHNS dataset. The solid line represents the average of the
outcome in the state sector; the grey area represents its 95% CI. The dash repre-
sents non-state sector, and its shaded area indicates the 95% CI. For all four out-
comes, the state sector and the non-state sector present the same trend before the
reform. The trends diverge during the reform, and converge after the reform.
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Figure 3.7: The coeﬃcient of EconomicLoss · Layoff · state on children’s BMI
Z-score, Weight-for-age Z-score, Waist-to-height ratio over quantiles.
Note: The blue line indicates the coeﬃcient of EconomicLoss · Layoff · state on
the vertical axis with the corresponding quantile on the horizontal axis. The 95%
CI is shown in the shaded area. The coeﬃcient and 95% CI in OLS are shown as
the horizontal lines.
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Chapter 4
Gender Bias Within Chinese Families—Who Eats First in
Tough Times?
“Food consumption in particular has been shown to serve as a symbol or a code, de-
scribing certain human relationships, such as inclusion and exclusion, and intimacy
and distance. Eating may also tell us about ourselves for eating is a rutted habitua-
tion that is so close to the core of our memories, to the formation of our character
and the launching of our conscious experience, that its substances may be said to
become a part of us.”
—Bernadine Chee, 2000
4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the intra-household eﬀects of negative income shocks on
nutrition intakes of Chinese boys versus girls; mothers versus fathers; and chil-
dren versus parents. Speciﬁcally, when an income loss occurs, whose food intake
decreases most?
China has a long history of privileging male children. Parents treat the food their
sons eat as a reﬂection of their improved economic status of the family, and no
other mode of parent-child interaction communicates their love for their sons more
than food (Jing, 2000). Many families, especially in rural areas, still treat sons as
their own family members, while daughters will eventually be “married oﬀ”, and
leave the families. Therefore, it is common for parents to allocate income and re-
sources from the daughter to son, especially when under a negative income shock
when resources become scarce. Furthermore, sons are expected to support the par-
ents when parents enter old age, especially in rural China. According to the China
National Bureau of Statistics data in 2005, pensions cover 4.6% of elderly support
in the rural area, while family support accounts for 54.1% (Dorfman et al., 2013).
The majority of the old-age support is from private resources. Parents have the
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incentive to invest in sons, thus directly investing in their future pension. Son-
priority could also be explained by the gender imbalance and the high competition
faced by boys. The marriage rate of men in China is positively correlated with so-
cioeconomic status, and females are equally likely to get married regardless of their
socioeconomic status. Parents therefore are more likely to have higher expectations
on their sons’ performance and thus will allocate more food to their sons.
This chapter ﬁlls three areas that are understudied in the literature. First, it is
well-established that economic stress causes obesity (e.g. Smith, 2009; Oﬀer, Pechey,
& Ulijaszek, 2010; Rohde, Tang, & Osberg, 2017; Watson, Osberg, & Phipps, 2016)
but the channel of the weight-gain is unclear. This chapter examines the dietary
changes under economic stress, which contributes to the relationship between obe-
sity and economic conditions. Second, the existence of intra-household inequality
is acknowledged as a problem in all societies, but few studies have investigated it
due to the scarcity of data on resource allocation within households. This chap-
ter uses food intake, which is one of the most important kinds of resource in Chi-
nese culture (Chee, 2000), to infer the inequality between boys and girls, fathers
and mothers, and parents and children. Third, the eﬀects of economic anxiety on
health outcomes are mainly focused on adults, and little attention has been paid
to children (except for Kong & Phipps, 2016). I investigate the eﬀects of negative
income shock on not only adults but also on the children. The ﬁnding has strong
policy implications, as it suggests that families switch from the primary resource
(protein) to an inferior resource (carbohydrate), which could aﬀect children’s devel-
opment.
Novelties of this study include the following: 1) This chapter provides the rare ex-
amination, if not the ﬁrst, of full range of family dynamics in intra-household allo-
cation of a scarce resource. 2) It observes 32,44 groups of siblings of mixed-sex in
the same families as well as their parents in 12 provinces from 1991 to 2011 and
followed them up to 5 times. 3) Son and daughter pairs within the households
are compared to infer intra-household resource allocation. 4) The daily intakes
of macronutrients, summarized into protein, carbohydrates, fat and energy cate-
gories, are recorded respectively for both siblings and their parents. The categories
of nutrition intake shed light on not only the quantity but also the quality of the
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resource allocation. 5) The level of daily intake is adjusted for age- and gender-
speciﬁc international standards.
The main purpose of the study is to investigate the gender inequality within house-
holds using nutrition distribution. It enriches the literature that examines the
changes in nutrition intakes in response to a negative income shock within the
household, as well as documents the macronutrient intakes of Chinese children and
their parents, especially compared to international standards.
4.2 Related literature
The study of inequality often neglects inequality among household members (Bur-
ton, Phipps, & Woolley, 2007). Equal sharing of income, consumption, resource
and well-being within the household is commonly assumed. However, a growing
number of studies point out the importance of intra-household allocation. For ex-
ample, Phipps and Burton (1995) discover that individual well-being is sensitive
to income-sharing assumptions. Lise and Seitz (2011) estimates that the Gini co-
eﬃcient could increase by 30% after accounting for consumption inequality within
U.K. households.
Even if the existence of household inequality is recognized, the study of intra-household
inequality is largely restrained by the data availability as the income is usually col-
lected at household level (Osberg, 2000). Researchers have adopted diﬀerent di-
mensions such as time, consumption, health and satisfaction to estimate the in-
equality within the household. For example, Burton, Phipps, and Woolley (2007)
include home production in income inequality. Phipps, Burton, and Osberg (2001)
demonstrate the inequality of free time for self among dual-earner households,
and women are more likely stressed about weekly hours, despite the total hours of
labour supply. Osberg (2015b) uses self-reported food deprivation in Tanzania and
ﬁnds the elderly rural women are more likely to suﬀer from hunger. He highlights
the gendered intra-household inequality and the demonstrates the importance of
including such inequality into poverty measurements and pension designs.
Apart from inequality between spouses in the household, intra-household inequal-
ity also exists between parents and children, as well as sons and daughters. Lund-
berg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) shows an increase in children’s clothing expenditure
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if the family allowance is directly paid to mothers. Burton, Phipps, and Woolley
(2007) use the age diﬀerence between couples in the eligibility of receiving the Old
Age Security in Canada, and the result suggests that the increase in women’s in-
come leads to a larger expenditure on gifts (possibly to grandchildren). Haddad
and Hoddinott (1994) uses data from Cote D’Ivoire and discover that an increase
in women’s cash income leads to an increase in boys’ height-for-age relative to
girls’. Duﬂo (2000) uses the expansion of the Old Age Pension program in South
Africa and ﬁnds an improvement in girls’ health and nutrition. To my knowledge,
most research on intra-household inequality uses exogenous increases in income to
investigate the resource allocation. Few studies have been done using an income
fall.
I am particularly interested in food intake for three reasons. First, nutrition dur-
ing childhood has long-term eﬀects on the development of cognitive skills and the
productivity later in life (e.g. Dasgupta, 1995). Such eﬀects are particularly im-
portant in developing countries (Duﬂo, 2000). Second, Chinese culture is highly
food-oriented (Chang, 1977), and food serves as a symbolic value of love. The pro-
cess of deciding which foods to eat, who will eat them, and how much to eat pro-
vides a path to understanding their everyday lives, and draws a vital picture of
their relationship with other people. The food allocation shapes the family dynam-
ics between parents and children, sons and daughters, reﬂecting the pleasures and
pressure of family members (Chang, 1977),.
Third, people of diﬀerent cultures, geographies, and ethnicities eat diﬀerent food
and have diﬀerent ways to prepare and cook food. For example, southern Chinese
people tend to eat rice and favour sweet ﬂavours, while northern Chinese cuisine
features wheat and a salty ﬂavour. Western Chinese cuisine serves hot and spicy
meat based dishes. The diﬀerences in the food items, ﬂavour, and cooking methods
can all be measured in calories, carbohydrates, proteins, and fats. Such measures
make them comparable resource indicators across culture, ethnicity, and economic
status and over time1.
1In the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation, I examine the changes in macronutrient intakes are examined
within the same household. Energy, carbohydrate, protein, and fat intakes provide comparable
measures of resource allocation.
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Despite the emphasis on food in Chinese culture, only a few studies have exam-
ined food intake in China. For example, Jing (2000) adopts a sociology perspec-
tive and conducts case studies in municipalities such as Beijing and Xi’an to por-
tray the changes in food intake under the rapid socioeconomic development of
China. Chang (1977) examines the evolution of food culture over the history of
ﬁve thousand years. The only quantitative research has been done focused on child
food intake in contemporary China at a national level is Cui and Dibley (2012).
They present the trend of dietary intake of Chinese children aged 7 to 17 using the
China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data. They show a steady decline in
energy and carbohydrate intake, and a steady increase in fat intake from 1991 to
2009. The value of daily protein intake decreases, but the ratio of protein-energy
ratio increases slightly. However, Cui and Dibley (2012) mainly focus on the nutri-
tion transition to a fat diet, and do not examine the income changes, sibling dis-
parity, and parent-child interactions.
Past literature has linked stress with changes in eating behaviour. Smith (2009),
Oﬀer et al. (2010) and Köster and Mojet (2015), among other studies, describe
food that is high in fat and carbohydrates as comfort food, and is served as self-
medication; providing immediate relief from negative emotions. In other cases,
Macht (2008), Köster and Mojet (2015), and Staudigel (2016) discover that stress
could also reduce appetite and food intake. The bi-directional eﬀects of emotion
show that stress controls, suppresses, impairs, regulates, or harmonizes eating be-
haviour. On average, Macht (2008) shows that emotional stress induces 30% peo-
ple to increase while 48% people to decrease in food intake using survey data. Staudi-
gel (2016) uses Russian panel data and demonstrates economic insecurity reduces
women’s body weight. He also discovers a strong link between economic insecurity
and sugar consumption.
In the Chinese context, Liu et al. (2007) examines the relationship between types
of food consumed by college students in seven cities and their stress and depression
measures. They ﬁnd that the consumption of ready-to-go food (such as instant
noodles, frozen, canned or microwavable foods), snack foods (such as potato chips,
corn chips and tortilla chips) and fast food (such as McDonald’s, KFC, Pizza Hut)
is positively correlated with perceived stress level depression scores. They do not
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establish the causal relationship between stress and eating behaviour. No research
thus far examines the intergenerational dietary change resulted from economic
stress. This chapter is also the ﬁrst study in Chinese context to examine the di-
etary change of parents and children in response to an economic shock.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 The CHNS dietary intake data
The data of analysis are from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)
from 1991 to 2011 (eight cycles). The CHNS is the only large-scale longitudinal
data set (Popkin et al., 2010) conducted by the Carolina Population Center at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition
and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. It cov-
ers 12 provinces that vary in geography, demographics and socioeconomic develop-
ment (China Health and Nutrition Survey, 2017). Figure 4.1 presents the provinces
that are covered by the CHNS data. Within each province, the sample is strati-
ﬁed by one low-, two middle- and one high- per-capita income county or city. The
township capital and three villages in the county or the urban and suburban areas
in the city are randomly selected. Twenty households are then randomly selected
for the survey. All household members are interviewed. Children younger than 10
years old are assisted by parents. Community, household, and individual level data
are collected. The CHNS is representative of more than half of the population in
China. There are 12,944 households and 16,066 children in the 1991 cycle. In 2011,
there are 15,508 households and 22,977 children in the survey.
The CHNS hosts several features that make it particularly attractive for this study.
First, the longitudinal nature of the data enables me to observe families for up to
14 years 2 During the 14 years, the rapid economic development accompanied by
the economic reforms takes place and creates a rare opportunity to study negative
income shocks. In the data 11.6% of the sample, which amounts to 646 children,
experience large negative income shocks (deﬁned as 25% of income loss). Second,
the CHNS not only provides information on the household heads, but also every
2The CHNS panel runs from 1991 to 2011. The number of occurrences is also restrained by
the age of the child in the sample (2 to 17 years).
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household member, including fathers, mothers, sons and daughters. The ability to
identify the relationship of household members enables studies on intra-household
dynamics and inequality. Third, the wide range of survey sample of 12 provinces
with both urban and rural areas enables me to observe 3,244 families with children
of mixed-sex, which is a rare ﬁnd in China under the One Child Policy. Fourth,
the CHNS collects dietary intake information of all household members over the
course of three days. The collection of dietary intakes is on a 24-hour-recall basis,
and employs strict measures of changes in food stock, making the data quality ob-
jective and precise. The detailed information of dietary intake data collection and
calculation is the following:
Food intake is measured at the household level as well the individual level (i.e.
both children and parents) over three consecutive days of the survey. The three
survey days are randomly distributed across seven days of a week. The household
level of food intake is calculated by the change in food inventory from the begin-
ning to the end of each day. It is measured with a weighing and measuring tech-
nique using Chinese balance scale ranging from 20 grams (1 liang) to 15 kilograms
(30 jin). The nutritionists measure all the food items before the initiation of a 3-
day survey period (a0), all purchases and home production (a1) during the survey
period, and the food discarded and remaining food at the end of each day (a2).
The food consumption of household level is therefore deﬁned as a0 + a1 − a2.
Every household member reports all food consumed at home and away from home
on a 24-hour recall basis3. Mothers or caregivers who handle food preparation are
asked to recall the food consumption of children younger than 12 years old. Nu-
tritionists record the types of food and snacks, the method of cooking, as well as
the time and place of consumption. Mothers, or those who handle the food prepa-
rations, together with other household members provide information on shared
dishes to determine the amount of individual intake. More than 99% survey re-
spondents have reported full three days of data (China Health and Nutrition Sur-
vey, 2017).
3According to the CHNS, 12% breakfast, 11% lunch and 5% dinner are consumed away from
home. Home cooking accounts for 70% to 80% during the three-day survey period.
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To calculate the daily intake of macronutrients including carbohydrates, fat, pro-
tein, and energy, the 1991 Food Composition Table for China is used as an aver-
age amount on a dish-by-dish basis for survey cycles prior to 2004. The 2002 Food
Composition Table is used in the subsequent surveys cycles of 2004, 2006, 2009
and 2011.
The CHNS implements strict quality control procedures. It follows the Declaration
of Helsinki, and the survey protocols, instruments, and process are approved by the
institutional review committees of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
The written consent was obtained from all survey respondents. The food intake
at the household level is matched with the individual level data. If a signiﬁcant
discrepancy is found between the sum of individual level data and the household
data, the CHNS revisits the family to resolve the inconsistency. Field workers are
trained nutritionists who have post-secondary degrees and professional work ex-
perience in nutrition. The CHNS also provides three days of training on dietary
data collection to the ﬁeld workers before the survey (China Health and Nutrition
Survey, 2017).
4.3.2 Dietary Reference Intakes (DRIs)
I use the Dietary Reference Intakes (DRIs)4 to adjust for the nutrient needs ac-
cording to the growth of children and the gender- and age-speciﬁc requirements for
parents (see Table 4.1). The DRIs table is developed by the Institute of Medicine
at the National Academies of Sciences Engineering Medicine and is widely used in
many international studies including the U.S. Guidelines for Americans, National
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey and the Canadian Community Health
Survey. It provides guidelines in daily consumption of energy, carbohydrate, pro-
tein and fat intakes for 97% to 98% of healthy individuals to meet nutrient require-
ments. The values are based on the recommended Physical Activity Level (PLA)
of 1.6 to 1.7 in healthy individuals, which means the total energy consumption is
60% to 70% of the resting energy expenditure, and it is equivalent of 60 minutes
of daily physical activity (Trumbo et al., 2002). The DRIs also take into account
4There are other food intake standards, such as the adult equivalence scale of food energy
intake as adopted in Osberg (2015b). The advantage of the DRIs standards is that it provides
not only the overall calorie intakes but also the protein, carbohydrate, and fat intakes.
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pregnant and lactating women, as these special stages require higher levels of nu-
trition intake. The adjustments are used when the analysis is done for children’s
mothers in the later section.
The dependent variable is children or parents’ percentage deviation in macronutri-
ent intakes from the DRIs in the age- and gender-speciﬁc group5.
IntakeDevi = (Intakei −DRIs)/DRIs (4.1)
Table 4.2 shows summary statistics using the pooled sibling sample (with and
without negative income shocks). A high-carbohydrate and low-protein diet is
found in boys, girls, fathers and mothers. For example, the carbohydrate intake
is 152.9% for boys and 138.7% for girls relative to the DRIs standards, while the
protein intake is only 70.3% for boys and 59.7% for girls. This result is consistent
with previous ﬁndings of lower protein-energy ratios in developing countries (Mill-
ward & Jackson, 2003). The overall energy intake is 110.7% for boys and 99.8% for
girls. The fat intakes are 60.2% for boys and 51.5% for girls.
In all macronutrient categories, consistently lower intakes of girls are observed
compared to boys in the same families with gaps ranging from 9 to 15 percentage
points. Their parents’ nutrition intakes exhibit the similar patterns as the children.
On average, fathers of boys’ energy intake is 169.3% while mothers of boys’ intake
is 143.5%. The discrepancy highlights gender diﬀerences in dietary intakes among
parents.
Table 4.2 also validates the sample of selection for boys and girls. Statistically
identical results are shown between the parents of girls and the parents of boys.
For example, when comparing the energy intake for mothers of boys to mothers’ of
girls, the average is 143.5% for both. The result suggests that the girls and boys
are selected from the statistically identical sample.
4.3.3 Negative income shock and its reasons
Hacker et al. (2014) propose the “Economic Security Index” using the frequency of
a 25% decline in individual net CPI-adjusted income from one year to the next.
5The raw intakes are trimmed so that the observations above the top and below bottom 1%
are equal to the top and the bottom 1% respectively.
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I adopt this criterion of a “large” income shock and deﬁne the negative income
shocks as the equivalent income loss (from all sources) more than 25% of the av-
erage of most recent three income observed6.
NegShockit = 0 if
Yit − Y¯i
Y¯i
> −0.25;
NegShockit = 1 if
Yit − Y¯i
Y¯i
≤ −0.25 (4.2)
where Yit is equivalent income of current cycle (i.e. family income from all sources
divided by square root of household size); and Y¯i = (Yit + Yit−1 + Yit−2)/3. Data are
trimmed so that negative income is equal to zero. I ignore negative income because
many families who are in business, farming, gardening, ﬁshing, or raising livestock
report negative income. The nature of such business is to invest for a few years
and thus generating negative income, but a large return in the future is expected
(China Health and Nutrition Survey, 2017).
Types of economic risks
Osberg (1998) outlines four aspects of economic risks identiﬁed in the United Na-
tions’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights: unemployment, illness, family dis-
solution, and old age. In the CHNS data, the four risks can be identiﬁed by the
following questions:
• Unemployment: Changed or lost jobs since the last survey.
• Illness: Self-reported health of 1 or 2 on a 4-point scale, or self-reported hy-
pertension, diabetes, myocardial diseases, stroke or cancer.
• Family dissolution: Single, divorced, widowed or separated.
• Old age: male older than 60 and female older than 557
For simplicity, the child is coded in the category if either parent is in the category.
Table 4.3 shows the percentage of children associated with each economic risk by
6The 25% income fall from the recent three-year average may lead to a larger income shock
than from the previous year. I also examine the 25% income loss from the previous year and the
results are highly consistent.
7The average retirement age in China is 60 for men and 55 for women (Dorfman et al., 2013).
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families with or without a signiﬁcant negative income shock (25% of equivalent
income loss). For children who experience a negative income shock in the fam-
ily, 35% experience illness of parents, 17% have unemployment, 3% have family
breakups, and 0.3% have old aged parents. The families without negative income
shock have a lower economic risk in each category except for old age.
Dietary knowledge
The CHNS also asks respondents 12-year and older diet knowledge in the cycles
2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011. To infer the overall energy intake, fat, carbohydrates,
protein and body image, the ﬁve questions are selected: Do you strongly agree (5),
agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree (1) with the follow-
ing statements:
• Eating a large amount of sugar is good for health.
• Eating food high in fat is good for health.
• Eating a large amount of staple food is good for health.
• Eating a large amount of animal products (e.g. ﬁsh, poultry, eggs, and lean
pork) every day ia good for health.
• The heavier you are, the healthier you are.
Table 4.3 shows the mean and standard deviation of each question answered by
children in the families with and without negative income shock. Children experi-
encing a negative income shock rated higher for all questions compare to children
without a negative income shock.
4.3.4 Child sample
The sample of this study consists of children of 2 to 17-year-old8 in the survey
years of 1991 to 2011. The birth cohort of the children is from 1973 to 2009. In
8Children and infants who are younger than 2-year-old are likely breastfed and the dietary
intakes are thus incomparable.
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the CHNS children sample, 36% of the children are from only-child families and
3,357 children have had one or more siblings of the opposite sex9.
I limit the sample of analysis to families with one or more child of the opposite
sex for sibling ﬁxed eﬀects analyses. At least one girl and one boy are observed in
each family, and at least two children are observed in each family in each nutrition
survey year. The sample consists of 3,243 children and 1,364 households, with 20%
of children observed four times, 28% three times, and 34% twice in the longitudinal
sample.
There are 2,667 boys and 2,908 girls in the sample (see Table 4.2). The average
birth order for boys is 1.9 and for girls is 1.6. The diﬀerence is statistically sig-
niﬁcant, and it can be explained by the One Child Policy, which permits the sec-
ond birth in rural area if the ﬁrst child is a girl. Other demographic variables are
consistent across genders. In the sample, 11.4% of boys and 11.8% of girls experi-
ence negative income shock (25% income decline than the average in recent three
cycles). On average, the equivalent household income is 7325 CPI-adjusted-2006
Yuan. Rural children account for 81% of the sample. On average, there are 2.5
children and 2.5 extra household members in a family. In the sample of analysis.
33% of children have completed primary schooling, and 20% have completed mid-
dle schooling. 43% of the children reached the age of puberty.
4.3.5 Siblings under the One Child Policy
How does the sibling sample in this study compare with the only-child sample?
Even under the China One Child Policy, siblings are still commonly observed in
Chinese families. Culturally and historically, Chinese families are in favour for hav-
ing more children. Mao Zedong, the chairman of China from 1949 to 1976, advo-
cated “more people, more power” and believed a rising population is a major drive
for economic growth. After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping took power. Deng
believed in population control and promoted the growth in GDP per capita. The
Chinese government thus enacted the One Child Policy in 1979 (Peng, 1991).
9I also investigate if the ﬁrst borns are favoured in families with children of the same sex. No
signiﬁcant patterns are found
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The One Child Policy was resisted by Chinese families, especially in the rural ar-
eas. Starting in 1984 and 1985, the communist government relaxed the policy so
that rural families with one daughter could have a second child. The fertility rate,
therefore, rebounded from 1984 to 1986. Besides of the less stringent implemen-
tation in rural areas, the One Child Policy was also relatively relaxed in less de-
veloped provinces and ethnic minority groups. Figure4.2 shows the fertility rate
in the urban and rural area from 1973 to 2009. The fertility rates were 5 and 2.4
in the rural and urban area respectively in 1973, and the ﬁgures became 1.4 and
0.96 in 2009. Therefore, for the birth cohort of this study from 1973 to 2009, it is
common for Chinese families to have siblings.
Figure 4.3 presents mean and standard errors of percentage deviation of children’s
and parents’ macro-nutrient intake from the DRIs standards by gender and only-
child status. Protein intakes of Chinese children in all groups are signiﬁcantly lower
than the international standard. Boys have more protein than girls in both only
child and non-only-child families. On average, Chinese boys in non-only-child fam-
ilies have 79% of the protein, comparing to Chinese girls in non-only-child families
having 68% of the protein using DRIs standards. In only-child-families, the pro-
tein intake is higher for both genders—83% for boys and 76% for girls. Fat intake
shows the same pattern as the protein intake with a smaller gap from the DRIs
standards. On the contrary, carbohydrate intakes of Chinese children are relatively
high, especially in non-only-child families. Boys with siblings consume 130% and
girls with siblings consume 120% of carbohydrates intake standard. Carbohydrate
intakes are 107% and 76% of the DRIs standards for only-child boys and girls re-
spectively. The total energy intake is highest among boys with siblings, and lowest
among only-child girls.
The shortage of protein intake and excess of carbohydrate intake are even more
prominent among parents. Fathers’ protein intakes range from 36% to 41% of the
international standard, while father’s carbohydrate intake is 1.7 to 2.4 times of
the international standard. Mothers, on average, consume 48% of protein, and 1.7
times carbohydrates of the DRIs standards. Both mothers and fathers consume
smaller amounts of fat in non-only-child families than those in only-child families,
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but higher total energy intakes contributed by high carbohydrate intakes10.
4.4 Empirical framework
4.4.1 Sibling ﬁxed eﬀect model
In economic literature, most studies on children estimate child outcomes on a set
of observables of family and child characteristics. Two concerns are raised by this
approach, unobserved heterogeneity and income endogeneity (Dahl & Lochner,
2012). Mayer (1997), among others, suggests that the estimation omits unobserved
heterogeneities across households. For example, children’s outcomes could be driven
by factors (neighbourhood, family environment and child’s ability) other than in-
come. In the Chinese context, the One-Child Policy boosted gender selection prac-
tice using ultrasound technology since its introduction in the 1980s (Chen et al.,
2013). The availability of gender-selected abortions diﬀers across provinces, urban
or rural, economic status and family values, which contributes to the selection bias
of girls and boys families. It is possible that girls may be more likely from disad-
vantaged families because their families cannot aﬀord ultrasound scanning or abor-
tions.
To remove the permanent unobserved family and children characteristics, I use
sibling ﬁxed eﬀects as adopted by Blau (1999) and Levy & Duncan (2000).. I es-
timate the diﬀerences in dietary intakes between brothers and sisters within the
same households. Diﬀerences in family levels across siblings are removed when esti-
mating the impacts of negative income shocks on child outcomes. The ﬁxed eﬀects
model also enables me to compare the dietary intakes with and without negative
income shock, and thus estimating the changes in dietary intakes in response to
negative incomes. I employ three estimations on children, parents, and the combi-
nation of parent-children.
10I examine the intergenerational gender inequality among only-child families using propen-
sity score matching, and found that the gender inequality is only signiﬁcant among families with
children of mixed-sex.
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First, I estimate child dietary intakes with sibling ﬁxed eﬀects as follows:
IntakeDevijt = αj + β0NegShockjt ·Girlij + β1NegShockjt +Γ1Xjt +Γ2Wijt + ijt
(4.3)
where i indexes individuals (i.e. children in this equation), j indexes families, and
t indexes survey year. IntakeDev is percentage deviation of energy, carbohydrate,
fat and protein intake from the age- and gender-speciﬁc Dietary Reference Intake
standard. X is a vector of family-speciﬁc characteristics. W is a vector of observed
child-speciﬁc characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the family level.
The sibling ﬁxed eﬀects are captured by αj, which reﬂect unobserved permanent
family characteristics.The hypothesis is that β0 < 0, which suggests in response to
negative income shocks, girls reduce their macronutrient intakes more than boys in
the same families.
Second, I examine the parents’ dietary intakes using the same children’s sample.
IntakeDevijt = αj+β0NegShockjt ·Motherij+β1NegShockjt+Γ1Xjt+Γ2Wijt+ijt
(4.4)
where i indexes individuals (parent in this equation). IntakeDevijt is percentage
deviation of the father or the mother’s energy, carbohydrate, fat or protein intake
from the DRIs standards. NegShockjt estimates the overall eﬀects of negative in-
come shocks on both the father and the mother, and NegShockjt · Motherij cap-
tures the extra eﬀects on the mother in the same household.
Third, I combine the child sample and the parent sample estimated above, and
test if parents shield their children from dietary reductions when economic hard-
ships strike. By estimating the dietary intakes of two generations, I can investigate
the resource reallocation among fathers, mothers, sons and daughters in the same
households.
IntakeDevijt = αj+β0NegShockjt ·Girlij
+β1NegShockjt ·Motherij
+β2NegShockjt · Fatherij
+β3NegShockjt + Γ1Xjt + Γ2Wijt + ijt (4.5)
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where i indexes family members. The base of NegShock eﬀects is boys, and the
interaction terms of NegShock with girls, mothers and fathers capture the extra
eﬀects on each individual.
4.4.2 Other controls
For all sibling ﬁxed eﬀects estimation, I present 3 speciﬁcations. First speciﬁca-
tion controls the number of children in the families, if there is/are grandparent(s)
or relatives present. The second speciﬁcation adds if the child graduated from pri-
mary school or middle school, the birth order of the child, and if the child entered
puberty 11. The last speciﬁcation adds the log equivalent income of the current pe-
riod12.
Figure 4.4 shows the means and standard errors of independent variables by child
gender and only-child status. There are 10% of non-only-child families in the pooled
sample experiencing negative income shock, while only 6% of only-child families
had negative income shock. The only-child and non-only child families diﬀer in de-
mographic characteristics. According to Figure 4.4, only-child families have more
household members other than children and parents. There is a higher percentage
of only-children who completed middle school than non-only children. Equivalent
income is 7,738 for non-only-child families and 14,770 for only-child families. 80%
non-only child families and 59% of the only-child families are in rural area.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Boys and girls’ intakes
Table 4.4 shows the estimates of child nutrition intake using sibling ﬁxed eﬀects.
The hypothesis is that negative income shocks aﬀect boys’ intakes less than girls’,
i.e. sons are favoured during tough times. I examine three nutrition intakes, car-
bohydrates, fat and protein, as well as the overall energy intakes (the combina-
tion of the three nutrition). For each outcome, I use three speciﬁcations: the ﬁrst
11Girls entering puberty if the answer is "Yes" to the question "Have you ever menstruated?"
and boys entering puberty is deﬁned as at 11 to 18 (Zhu et al., 2013).
12Equivalent income is deﬁned as household income from all sources after tax and transfer in
2006 Yuan divided by the square root of household size (Luxembourg Income Study, 2017).
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one controls for time-variant household characteristics; the second one controls for
household characteristics and child-speciﬁc characteristics; and the third speciﬁca-
tion adds the current equivalent income as control. While the variables of interests
are negative income shock and its interaction(s), equivalent income in ﬁxed eﬀects
model also captures the changes in income. Therefore, the second speciﬁcation is
the preferred speciﬁcation. The income variable is added in the third speciﬁcation
to estimate the “extra” critical point eﬀects of 25% income fall.
Column 1 in Table 4.4 shows energy intake of children increases in response to
a negative income shock, controlling for family characteristics. A 25% of income
shock increases energy intake by 9.9 percentage points in terms of the DRIs stan-
dards. After accounting for household and child characteristics, the interaction of
negative shock and girl becomes signiﬁcant. Girls reduce their energy intake by 7
percentage points, while boys’ energy is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected.
Carbohydrate intake is also signiﬁcantly aﬀected by negative income shocks. Col-
umn 4 shows that carbohydrate intake increases by 21.3 percentage points for
boys, and by 13.9 (=0.213-0.074) percentage points for girls. After controlling for
child-speciﬁc characteristics, the estimation still shows a 12.4-percentage-point in-
crease in boys, but a 2.4-percentage-point decrease in girls. In the preferred speci-
ﬁcation in Column 6, a 14-percentage-point increase in boys, and a 0.5-percentage-
point decrease in girls is estimated after controlling for income.
The sibling ﬁxed eﬀects estimation shows that protein intake reduces for both girls
and boys when income falls 25% (see Columns 10-12, Table 4.4). With controls for
families observed and permanent unobserved characteristics, boys’ protein intakes
decrease by 15.2 percentage points, and girls’ protein intakes decrease by 24.9 per-
centage points. The magnitude of reductions is signiﬁcant considering the average
of protein intake is only 70.3% of DRIs standard for boys and 59.7% for girls. The
results persist even after controlling for income. There is a 16-percentage-point de-
crease for protein intake for all children. The interaction term of negative shock
and girl becomes insigniﬁcant.
On the contrary to the previous ﬁnding of a positive relationship between fat diet
and economic insecurity, no change in fat intake of children is found due to nega-
tive income shocks.
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Sample of adolescents
Adolescence is a critical transition period, and many biological, psychological and
social roles are formed during this life stage. It is the foundation of future devel-
opment (Sawyer et al., 2012). I limit the sample to adolescents and test if the gen-
der disparity is larger during this life period. The adolescent sample is deﬁned as
girls from menstruation to 17-year-old and boys from 11-year old until 17-year-old
(World Health Organization, 2017). There are 1,391 boys and 1,005 girls in the
adolescent sample, which accounts for 43% of the full sibling sample13.
Table 4.5 presents the sibling ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of dietary intakes on negative
income shocks. Columns 1 to 3 show that daily energy intake is signiﬁcantly re-
duced by 18.2 to 21.1 percentage points in the presence of negative income shocks
for girls, while no reduction of energy intakes for boys. This result is consistent
across three speciﬁcations. This result suggests a higher gender disparity among
adolescents than the previous estimate with full sibling sample.
Girls also experience a large decrease in carbohydrate intake. After controlling
for household and child-speciﬁc characteristics, the carbohydrate intake decreases
by 29.4 percentage points for girls. Boys, on the contrary, is estimated a 24.4-
percentage-point increase in carbohydrate intake in Column 6. After controlling
for income, girls still experience a 5-percentage-point of carbohydrate intake re-
duction, which is a 29.4-percentage-point diﬀerence between boys and girls. This
result suggests that the boys eat more and the girls reduce their carbohydrate in-
takes in response to a negative income shock.
Negative income shocks have negative eﬀects on the fat intake of adolescent girls.
Columns 7 to 9 in Table 4.5 show the fat intake reduces by 18.2 to 20.1 percent-
age points for girls. Boys fat intake show no signiﬁcant change. The average fat
intake for girls is only 51.5% of the DRIs standard, while for boys is 60.2% (see
Table 4.2). The reduction in fat intake due to the negative income shock puts ado-
lescent girls in a more disadvantaged diet than their boy counterparts.
The protein intake is estimated to be negatively aﬀected by income shock for both
13I also examine the early childhood sample of 2-to-5-year-olds, as Heckman (2011) outlines
the importance of invest in the early years. I do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant gender disparity in the
sample of early years.
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genders (see Column 10 in Table 4.5). Boys’ protein intake is estimated to be re-
duced by 11.0 percentage points, while girls are expected to reduce a further 8.5%
in protein intake, totalling 19.5-percentage-point reduction. The eﬀects on both
girls and boys become insigniﬁcant after controlling for income.
Overall, the estimates of the adolescent sample show a larger gender disparity be-
tween boys and girls within the household. In response to negative income shock,
girls in the adolescent sample intake 19.3 percentage points less of energy, 29.4 less
of carbohydrate, and 19.6 less of fat, compared to boys in the same households.
Considering girls have lower intakes than boys using the DRIs standards, the di-
etary reductions from the income loss is particularly problematic.
4.5.2 Fathers’ and mothers’ intakes
Table 4.6 presents the estimates of parents’ dietary intakes with family ﬁxed ef-
fects. The hypothesis is that mothers take a larger dietary cut than fathers in re-
sponse to negative income shocks. The diﬀerential eﬀects of negative income shock
between mothers and fathers are captured by NegShock ·Mother.
Columns 1 to 9 show negative coeﬃcients of NegShock · Mother, which means
mothers reduce energy, carbohydrate, and fat intakes signiﬁcantly more than fa-
thers. The estimates are highly consistent across three speciﬁcations. Compared
to fathers, mothers reduce 29 to 31 percentage points more in energy, 47 to 50
percentage points more in carbohydrates, and 25 to 27 percentage points more in
fat intakes in response to negative income shocks. The only exception is protein
intake. On average, a 6.02-percentage-point reduction is found in fathers protein
intake, while a 1.75 (=-0.0602+0.0427)-percentage-point reduction in mothers’ pro-
tein intake. There is no evidence of signiﬁcant reduction in father’s dietary intakes
except for protein intakes. On the contrary, an increase in carbohydrate intakes
of 12.6 to 19.1 percentage points is found in speciﬁcations 1 and 2 (see Columns 4
and 5 in Table 4.6)
4.5.3 Parents’ and children’s intakes
Table 4.7 presents the family ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of both parents and children
using the same sample of siblings of mixed-sex. The coeﬃcient of NegShock is the
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overall eﬀects of negative income shocks on the family, and the interactions are the
extra eﬀects on girls, mothers and fathers using boys as the base.
The results are mostly consistent across three speciﬁcations. For simplicity, I use
speciﬁcation 2 for result interpretations. Negative income shocks signiﬁcantly re-
duce energy, carbohydrate, and protein intakes of boys. Fathers experience in-
creases in energy, carbohydrate intakes. Girls reduce energy, carbohydrate, fat and
protein intakes more than boys in the same families. The gaps of the macronutri-
ent intakes between boys and girls are 11.3 percentage points in energy and 17.5
percentage points in carbohydrates, 7.63 percentage points in fat, and 6.01 per-
centage points in protein. Mothers in the same families reduce intakes the most.
On average, mothers reduce additional 14.0 percentage points in energy, 18.6 per-
centage points in carbohydrates, and 18.4 percentage points in protein intakes to
the sons’ dietary reduction.
Figure 4.5 presents the energy intake allocation with and without negative income
shock. I use the mean of the sample and the estimates from Column 2 in Table 4.7
to calculate the percentage deviations of energy intakes with and without negative
income shocks. The percentage deviation of energy intake from DRIs standard is
labelled. The energy intakes show a 3-percentage-point increase for fathers, a 7-
percentage-point decrease for sons, a 19-percentage-point decrease for daughters,
and a 22-percentage-point decrease for mothers.
To interpret the results more intuitively, I convert the percentage-point of energy
reduction into the rice consumption using the United States Department of Agri-
culture Food Composition Database. On average, a 22-percentage-point decrease
in energy intake for mothers means a 166.6-gram daily reduction in cooked rice. A
19-percentage-point decrease for daughters is equivalent to a 134.7-gram rice re-
duction. A 7-percentage-point decrease for sons reduces rice consumption by 49.9
grams.
The estimates of Table 4.7 highlight the order of resource redistribution in the
event of income shocks: macronutrients allocate to fathers ﬁrst, sons second, daugh-
ters third, and the mothers last. Fathers, as the main bread earners of families, are
likely to be supported ﬁrst to ensure future income. Although it is not oﬃcially
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documented by the CHNS, mothers or housewives are usually the main food han-
dlers in the family. The largest reduction in mothers are likely to be explained by
the altruistic sacriﬁce towards their children.
4.6 Robustness check
The speciﬁcations so far assume that the negative income shock takes eﬀects at a
25% threshold. However, Osberg (2015a) argues that the 25% cut is a rather ar-
bitrary threshold. I, therefore, test the income loss of 20% and 30%. The results
are consistent. I also test the estimation by using a continuous measure of income
loss. Instead of using a binary variable of negative income shock, the proportionate
income loss is used and it is deﬁned as the following:
IncomeFallit =
Yit − Yit−1
Yit−1
if Yit ≤ Yit−1;
IncomeFallit = 0 if Yit > Yit−1 (4.6)
Table 4.8 shows the sibling ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of dietary intake using the con-
tinuous measures. To be comparable with the previous estimation, it starts with
simple speciﬁcation and gradually adds more controls. Speciﬁcation 1 controls for
household characteristics. Speciﬁcation 2 adds child characteristics, and Speciﬁca-
tion 3 controls for all including log equivalent income. All speciﬁcations estimate
for percentage deviation of energy, carbohydrate, fat and protein intakes from the
DRIs standard.
Column 1 in Table 4.8 shows that when income falls by one percentage point, the
energy intake increases by 0.12 percentage points of the DRIs standard control-
ling for household characteristics. The girls’ daily intake of overall energy is 0.08
percentage points lower than boys. The eﬀects of income fall become stronger af-
ter controlling for child-speciﬁc characteristics and income. Column 3 shows that
one percentage point in income fall from the previous cycle, boys increases energy
intake by 0.23 percentage points. Alternatively, a one standard deviation increase
in income fall leads to a 9.2% of standard deviations increase in energy intake14.
14It is calculated using the coeﬃcient multiplied by the standard deviation of income fall, di-
vided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
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Girls’ energy intake is signiﬁcantly lower than boys. For one standard deviation of
income fall, girls energy intake increase by 2.9%.
Columns 3 to 12 in Table 4.8 break down the energy intake into types of macronu-
trient. The estimates of carbohydrate in three speciﬁcations show consistent posi-
tive eﬀects from income fall as shown in row 2. %IncomeFall is positive, meaning
the income fall increases carbohydrate intake, and %IncomeFall*Girl is negative,
meaning the eﬀects on carbohydrate intake is negative on girls compared to their
brothers. The preferred speciﬁcation of Column 6 shows that a 100% income fall
increases carbohydrate intake by 42.1 percentage points for boys, and 15.3 percent-
age points (=0.42.1-0.268) in girls. In other words, one standard deviation decrease
in income, increases carbohydrate intake by 11.3% standard deviations in boys,
and 4.1% standard deviations in girls. Fat intakes are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Protein intake is reduced in both genders, with a larger reduction in girls. A unit
of income fall leads to a reduction of protein intake by 0.255 units of for boys, and
by 0.378 (=-0.255-0.123) units for girls. If the income decreases by 1 standard de-
viation, the protein intake would decrease by 8.9% standard deviations for boys
and 13.2% standard deviations for girls.
Table 4.9 shows larger eﬀects of income fall using adolescents sample. For one unit
of income fall, energy intake increases by 0.386 percentage points in boys, and
0.052 percentage points in girls; carbohydrate intake increases by 0.727 percent-
age points in boys, and 0.194 percentage points in girls. In other words, one stan-
dard deviation in income fall increase energy intake by 14.2% standard deviations
in boys, and 1.9% standard deviations in girls, and increase carbohydrate intake by
19.0% in boys, and 5.0% in girls. Changes in fat and protein intake are insigniﬁ-
cant in the adolescent sample.
The estimates using the percentage income fall show that children’s food intake
and nutrition allocation is aﬀected by the level of income fall continuously. The
average eﬀects show that boys and girls increase the carbohydrate intake and de-
crease the protein intake in response to income losses. The increase in carbohy-
drate is less but the decrease in protein is more for girls.
I also test quadratic form of income loss. The quadratic term is not signiﬁcant.
Besides the sample of children with siblings of opposite sex, I examine the children
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with siblings of the same sex. I do not ﬁnd any dietary orders or patterns within
the families, such as the ﬁrst-born preference.
4.7 Conclusion
This study draws the following conclusions. First, protein and fat intakes of Chi-
nese children are signiﬁcantly lower, while carbohydrate and overall energy intakes
are higher, than the DRIs standard. In all four categories, girls have signiﬁcantly
lower intake levels than boys, suggesting a gender disparity before the negative in-
come shocks take place. Second, in response to negative income, Chinese families
tend to reduce their protein intake, the primary macronutrient, possibly due to
a higher price. Third, adolescent girls experience a larger dietary reduction than
boys in energy, carbohydrate, and fat intakes.
The most compelling ﬁnding is that when families experience negative income
shocks, the resource is allocated in the order of fathers, sons, daughters and moth-
ers. Gender inequality is heightened in the event of income loss. The prioritizing
fathers and sons, while neglecting daughters and mothers show an increase in gen-
der disparity in response to large income loss. It draws concerns that economic
losses are likely to impede the development of daughters and obstructs the well-
being of mothers.
Birch and Fisher (1998) documents that eating behaviour during childhood and
adolescence can have signiﬁcant inﬂuences on future food intake. Parental dietary
practices can alter dietary intake patterns, preferences for energy-dense foods, and
even the internal responsiveness to hunger and satiety in children and in future
adulthood. The phenomenon of “feeding the little emperor” in response to negative
income shocks in Chinese families is especially problematic for children’s future
development, and could contribute to unhealthy eating habits and adult obesity.
It is unclear that the diﬀerences in dietary intake are caused by parental control,
or if it stems from the children themselves. The gender diﬀerence could come from
the children themselves. Sons could be more expressive about their demands than
daughters. Girls, especially adolescent girls, may be more reserved about their re-
quests and “internalize” their demand. Also, sons may be more likely to demand
food, and girls may request resources other than food (e.g. clothing or beauty
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products). When dealing with children’s demands, parents may be more likely to
give in when they are under economic stress.
One of the limitations is that I focus on families with sex-mixed children. It is also
interesting to examine if father or mother would reduce more intakes in only child
families. Given the presence of grandparents and their involvements in child care
in China, the dietary intakes of grandparents could also be examined.
I only examine macronutrient intakes but not micronutrient intakes. Micronutri-
ents, such as vitamins and minerals, play an important role in the healthy devel-
opment of children. For future research, other dietary intakes could be examined
when such data are available.
Another direction of future research is to include the price of food in the analy-
sis. The CHNS provides detailed information on the price of rice, bread, meat, and
oil in the local market. It would be interesting to examine if the negative income
shock makes families opt out from expensive protein and opt in for cheap carbohy-
drate.
Apart from dietary intakes, it would be interesting to also examine time and con-
sumption allocation within the household. For obesity research, for example, time
spent in physical activity, TV and video games could be investigated and gender
diﬀerences could be explored. The consumption patterns, such as pocket money
(Ling Hua Qian) distribution and the frequency of western fast food restaurant
visits, are also worthy of attention.
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Table 4.1: Dietary Reference Intakes (DRIs): Recommended Dietary Allowances
and Adequate Macronutrients Intakes
Carbohydrate Fat Protein Energy
Group (g/d) (g/d) (g/d) calorie
Infants
0 to 6 mo 60 31 9 555.4
6 to 12 mo 95 30 11 694
Children 0
1-3y 130 30 13 842
4-8y 130 30 19 866
Males 30 270
9-13y 130 30 34 926
14-18y 130 30 52 998
19-30y 130 30 56 1014
31-50y 130 30 56 1014
51-70y 130 30 56 1014
>70y 130 30 56 1014
Females 30 270
9-13y 130 30 34 926
14-18y 130 30 46 974
19-30y 130 30 46 974
31-50y 130 30 46 974
51-70y 130 30 46 974
>70y 130 30 46 974
Pregnancy 30 270
14-18y 175 30 71 1254
19-30y 175 30 71 1254
31-50y 175 30 71 1254
Lactation 30 270
14-18y 210 30 71 1394
19-30y 210 30 71 1394
31-50y 210 30 71 1394
Source: Dietary Reference Intakes for Energy, Carbohydrate, Fiber, Fat, Fatty Acids, Cholesterol, Protein, and
Amino Acids (2002/2005) and Dietary Reference Intakes for Water, Potassium, Sodium, Chloride, and Sulfate
(2005). The report may be accessed via www.nap.edu.
Fat intake of 1 to 70-year-old is from Dietary Reference Intakes (DRIs): Acceptable Macronutrient Distribution
Ranges. The average of the range is used. Energy intake is calculated by the author using
Energy(calorie)=9xFat(g)+4xCarb(g)+4xProtein(g). Energy from alcohol intake is ignored from the calculation
because of lack of data. It is not likely to aﬀect the estimation as the subject of the study is children of 2 to
17-year-old who are not likely to consume alcohol.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics of sibling sample of analysis
Boy Girl
VARIABLES N Mean SD N Mean SD
Energy % dev 2,667 1.107 0.643 2,908 0.998 0.608
Carb % dev 2,667 1.529 0.919 2,908 1.387 0.848
Fat % dev 2,667 0.602 0.953 2,908 0.515 0.910
Protein % dev 2,667 0.703 0.725 2,908 0.597 0.655
Father Energy % deviation 2,488 1.693 0.726 2,699 1.696 0.736
Father Carb % deviation 2,488 2.466 1.120 2,699 2.466 1.136
Father Fat % deviation 2,488 1.088 1.162 2,699 1.102 1.197
Father Protein % deviation 2,488 0.405 0.435 2,699 0.411 0.438
Mother Energy % deviation 2,618 1.435 0.659 2,855 1.435 0.669
Mother Carb % deviation 2,618 2.070 0.988 2,855 2.063 0.996
Mother Fat % deviation 2,618 0.832 1.021 2,855 0.844 1.053
Mother Protein % deviation 2,618 0.482 0.464 2,855 0.490 0.469
%IncomeFall*Girl 2,362 0 0 2,563 0.124 0.240
%IncomeFall 2,362 0.122 0.238 2,563 0.124 0.240
NegativeShock*Girl 2,667 0 0 2,908 0.118 0.322
NegativeShock 2,667 0.114 0.318 2,908 0.118 0.322
Loss30 2,667 0.164 0.370 2,908 0.166 0.373
Loss20 2,667 0.190 0.393 2,908 0.192 0.394
Number of children 2,667 2.485 0.649 2,908 2.577 0.758
Number of extra hh members 2,667 2.453 0.813 2,908 2.461 0.846
Primary Schooling 2,667 0.313 0.464 2,908 0.338 0.473
Middle Schooling 2,667 0.175 0.380 2,908 0.220 0.414
Child at the age of puberty 2,667 0.522 0.500 2,908 0.346 0.476
Birth order 2,667 1.915 0.845 2,908 1.600 0.771
Equivalent Income 2,667 7,221 8,581 2,908 7,423 9,119
Rural residents 2,667 0.814 0.389 2,908 0.813 0.390
Number of families 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312
Source: CHNS 1991 to 2011. Children 2 to 17 year old. Sample of children with siblings of opposite sex. At least
two children in one family are surveyed in one cycle.
Note: % dev of energy, carb, fat and protein is the percentage deviation of macronutrient intake from the age- and
gender-speciﬁc DRIs standards. Equivalent income is deﬁned as household income after tax and transfer divided
by square root of household size. NegShock is deﬁned as 1 if the equivalent income falls more than 25% from the
average of previous 3 cycles, 0 otherwise. Loss30, Loss25, Loss20 are deﬁned as the income loss of 30, 25 and 20
percent from the previous cycle
92
Table 4.3: Reasons for negative income shock
No negshock With neg shock
VARIABLES N Mean Sd Max Min N Mean Sd Max Min
Reasons for negative income shock
Illness 2,323 0.313 0.464 1 0 272 0.346 0.476 1 0
Unemployment 5,956 0.153 0.360 1 0 688 0.173 0.378 1 0
Family dissolution 5,935 0.0136 0.116 1 0 682 0.0323 0.177 1 0
Old age 6,014 0.00449 0.0669 1 0 695 0.00288 0.0536 1 0
Channels: dietary attitu de
Diet knowledge: lot of sugar is good (1-5) 374 2.214 0.673 5 1 40 2.625 0.952 5 2
Diet knowledge: diet high in fat (1-5) 359 2.228 0.768 5 1 40 2.325 0.829 5 1
Diet knowledge: lot of staple food (1-5) 352 2.861 0.958 5 1 41 3.195 0.901 4 2
Diet knowledge: lot of animal products (1-5) 379 2.879 1.032 5 1 41 3.073 1.058 5 1
Diet knowledge: heavier body (1-5) 380 1.939 0.661 5 1 40 2.100 0.871 5 1
Number of families 1,358 1,358 1,358 1,358 1,358 1,358 1,358 1,358 1,358 1,358
Note: CHNS 1991 to 2011.
Unemployment=1 if either parent changed or lost jobs since the last survey. Illness=1 if either parent has self-reported health of 1 or 2 on a 4-point scale, or self-reported
hypertension, diabetes, myocardial diseases, stroke or cancer. Family dissolution=1 if either parent reports single, divorced, widowed or separated. Old age=1 if father is
older than 60 or mother is older than 55.
Diet knowledge is asked for children 12 and older in cycles 2004 to 2011. 5 represents strongly agree and 1 is strongly disagree.
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Table 4.4: Estimates of child intake with sibling ﬁxed eﬀects, children with siblings of opposite sex.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Energy % dev Energy % dev Energy % dev Carb % dev Carb % dev Carb % dev Fat % dev Fat % dev Fat % dev Protein % dev Protein % dev Protein % dev
NegativeShock*Girl -0.0468 -0.0814** -0.0754** -0.0742* -0.148*** -0.145*** -0.0165 -0.0108 -0.0113 -0.0967** -0.0592 -0.0400
(0.0319) (0.0320) (0.0315) (0.0448) (0.0411) (0.0413) (0.0344) (0.0390) (0.0393) (0.0382) (0.0384) (0.0382)
NegativeShock 0.0992*** 0.0335 0.0537 0.213*** 0.124*** 0.140*** 0.0268 -0.0663 0.0304 -0.152*** -0.0608 -0.160***
(0.0370) (0.0383) (0.0411) (0.0456) (0.0460) (0.0503) (0.0554) (0.0596) (0.0667) (0.0432) (0.0439) (0.0507)
Log eq income 0.0264 0.0269 0.0864*** -0.0827***
(0.0193) (0.0230) (0.0314) (0.0229)
Observations 6,930 5,645 5,575 6,930 5,645 5,575 6,930 5,645 5,575 6,930 5,645 5,575
R-squared 0.008 0.072 0.074 0.013 0.134 0.136 0.009 0.052 0.057 0.014 0.136 0.141
Number of ﬁxedm 1,380 1,320 1,312 1,380 1,320 1,312 1,380 1,320 1,312 1,380 1,320 1,312
HH characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sibling ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: CHNS 1991 to 2011. Children 2 to 17 year old. Sample of children with siblings of opposite sex. At least two children in one family are surveyed in one cycle.
Note: Standard errors clustered by families in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.
The dependent variable is the percentage deviation of macronutrient intake from the age- and gender-speciﬁc DRIs standards. HH characteristics include number of
children in the household and number of other relative and non-relatives in the household. Child characteristics include if the child has graduated from primary school or
middle school, puberty onset and birth order. Log equivalent income is deﬁned as household income after tax and transfer divided by square root of household size.
Constant is included in the estimation. NegShock is deﬁned as 1 if the equivalent income falls more than 25% from the average of previous 3 cycles, 0 otherwise.
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Table 4.5: Estimates of child intake with sibling ﬁxed eﬀects, children of sex mix adolescent sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Energy % dev Energy % dev Energy % dev Carb % dev Carb % dev Carb % dev Fat % dev Fat % dev Fat % dev Protein % dev Protein % dev Protein % dev
NegativeShock*Girl -0.182*** -0.211*** -0.193*** -0.239*** -0.312*** -0.294*** -0.182** -0.201*** -0.196** -0.0849* -0.0188 0.000327
(0.0601) (0.0624) (0.0604) (0.0833) (0.0839) (0.0846) (0.0717) (0.0772) (0.0774) (0.0504) (0.0525) (0.0516)
NegativeShock 0.0111 0.0344 0.0924 0.135 0.160* 0.244** -0.0835 -0.0658 0.0198 -0.110** -0.0897* -0.0982
(0.0664) (0.0661) (0.0742) (0.0859) (0.0862) (0.0963) (0.0980) (0.0970) (0.114) (0.0554) (0.0543) (0.0616)
Log eq income 0.0506 0.0785* 0.0555 -0.00129
(0.0343) (0.0447) (0.0495) (0.0300)
Observations 2,468 2,421 2,396 2,468 2,421 2,396 2,468 2,421 2,396 2,468 2,421 2,396
R-squared 0.021 0.029 0.030 0.026 0.049 0.051 0.018 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.101 0.098
Number of ﬁxedm 1,076 1,060 1,052 1,076 1,060 1,052 1,076 1,060 1,052 1,076 1,060 1,052
HH characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sibling ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: CHNS 1991 to 2011. Children 2 to 17 year old. Sample of children with siblings of opposite sex. At least two children in one family are surveyed in one cycle.
Note: Standard errors clustered by families in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.
The dependent variable is the percentage deviation of macronutrient intake from the age- and gender-speciﬁc DRIs standards. HH characteristics include number of
children in the household and number of other relative and non-relatives in the household. Child characteristics include if the child has graduated from primary school or
middle school, puberty onset and birth order. Log equivalent income is deﬁned as household income after tax and transfer divided by square root of household size.
Constant is included in the estimation. NegShock is deﬁned as 1 if the equivalent income falls more than 25% from the average of previous 3 cycles, 0 otherwise.
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Table 4.6: Estimates of parents’ intakes with family ﬁxed eﬀects, parents with children of sex mix sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Energy % dev Energy % dev Energy % dev Carb % dev Carb % dev Carb % dev Fat % dev Fat % dev Fat % dev Protein % dev Protein % dev Protein % dev
NegativeShock*Mother -0.289*** -0.305*** -0.285*** -0.471*** -0.498*** -0.463*** -0.270*** -0.246*** -0.246*** 0.0593*** 0.0332* 0.0427***
(0.0275) (0.0280) (0.0272) (0.0403) (0.0405) (0.0395) (0.0307) (0.0318) (0.0327) (0.0163) (0.0170) (0.0164)
NegativeShock 0.0402 0.0756* 0.00915 0.126** 0.191*** 0.0478 0.0427 0.00945 0.0367 -0.0921*** -0.0562** -0.0602**
(0.0436) (0.0425) (0.0484) (0.0598) (0.0566) (0.0648) (0.0674) (0.0686) (0.0787) (0.0262) (0.0259) (0.0295)
Log eq income -0.0447** -0.102*** 0.0230 0.00253
(0.0204) (0.0272) (0.0343) (0.0134)
Constant 1.318*** 2.207*** 2.527*** 1.830*** 3.418*** 4.131*** 1.164*** 0.614* 0.488 0.238** 0.960*** 0.948***
(0.199) (0.232) (0.269) (0.271) (0.318) (0.368) (0.347) (0.353) (0.442) (0.115) (0.140) (0.166)
Observations 13,235 13,141 12,961 13,235 13,141 12,961 13,235 13,141 12,961 13,235 13,141 12,961
R-squared 0.025 0.047 0.047 0.029 0.064 0.067 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.036 0.036
Number of ﬁxedm 1,373 1,368 1,360 1,373 1,368 1,360 1,373 1,368 1,360 1,373 1,368 1,360
HH characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Family ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: CHNS 1991 to 2011. Children 2 to 17 year old. Sample of children with siblings of opposite sex. At least two children in one family are surveyed in one cycle.
Note: Standard errors clustered by families in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.
The dependent variable is the percentage deviation of macronutrient intake from the age- and gender-speciﬁc DRIs standards. HH characteristics include number of
children in the household and number of other relative and non-relatives in the household. Individual characteristics include levels of education. Log equivalent income is
deﬁned as household income after tax and transfer divided by square root of household size. Constant is included in the estimation. NegShock is deﬁned as 1 if the
equivalent income falls more than 25% from the average of previous 3 cycles, 0 otherwise.
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Table 4.7: Estimates of parents’ and children’s intakes with family ﬁxed eﬀects, families with children of sex mix sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Energy % dev Energy % dev Energy % dev Carb % dev Carb % dev Carb % dev Fat % dev Fat % dev Fat % dev Protein % dev Protein % dev Protein % dev
NegativeShock*Girl -0.0814** -0.113*** -0.0963*** -0.123*** -0.175*** -0.155*** -0.0395 -0.0763** -0.0684* -0.103*** -0.0601* -0.0448
(0.0326) (0.0320) (0.0317) (0.0471) (0.0449) (0.0456) (0.0366) (0.0381) (0.0388) (0.0373) (0.0361) (0.0354)
NegativeShock*Mother 0.341*** -0.140*** -0.134*** 0.568*** -0.186*** -0.184*** 0.242*** -0.184*** -0.173*** -0.224*** 0.0441 0.0544
(0.0355) (0.0368) (0.0371) (0.0524) (0.0537) (0.0549) (0.0355) (0.0402) (0.0411) (0.0334) (0.0342) (0.0338)
NegativeShock*Father 0.633*** 0.107*** 0.0976** 1.043*** 0.213*** 0.188*** 0.514*** 0.0455 0.0550 -0.282*** 0.0306 0.0307
(0.0401) (0.0404) (0.0418) (0.0619) (0.0607) (0.0629) (0.0433) (0.0466) (0.0485) (0.0346) (0.0351) (0.0352)
NegativeShock -0.349*** -0.0765** -0.175*** -0.519*** -0.0912* -0.273*** -0.296*** -0.0420 -0.0116 0.0737* -0.0893** -0.137***
(0.0374) (0.0388) (0.0425) (0.0491) (0.0510) (0.0565) (0.0569) (0.0587) (0.0664) (0.0408) (0.0407) (0.0425)
Log eq income -0.0928*** -0.179*** 0.0362 -0.0420***
(0.0185) (0.0243) (0.0308) (0.0138)
Constant 1.312*** 0.590*** 1.484*** 1.754*** 0.603** 2.311*** 1.230*** 0.654** 0.330 0.279** 0.648*** 1.052***
(0.166) (0.193) (0.261) (0.214) (0.267) (0.357) (0.306) (0.318) (0.408) (0.128) (0.120) (0.176)
Observations 20,165 18,786 18,536 20,165 18,786 18,536 20,165 18,786 18,536 20,165 18,786 18,536
R-squared 0.030 0.186 0.193 0.038 0.228 0.242 0.010 0.071 0.071 0.013 0.097 0.100
Number of ﬁxedm 1,380 1,372 1,364 1,380 1,372 1,364 1,380 1,372 1,364 1,380 1,372 1,364
HH characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Family ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: CHNS 1991 to 2011. Children 2 to 17 year old. Sample of children with siblings of opposite sex. At least two children in one family are surveyed in one cycle.
Note: Standard errors clustered by families in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.
The dependent variable is the percentage deviation of macronutrient intake from the age- and gender-speciﬁc DRIs standards. HH characteristics include number of
children in the household and number of other relative and non-relatives in the household. Individual characteristics include levels of education. Log equivalent income is
deﬁned as household income after tax and transfer divided by square root of household size. Constant is included in the estimation. NegShock is deﬁned as 1 if the
equivalent income falls more than 25% from the average of previous 3 cycles, 0 otherwise.
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Table 4.8: Sibling ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of dietary intake on percentage income fall (continuous measure). Child with the
opposite sex sibling sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Energy % dev Energy % dev Energy % dev Carb % dev Carb % dev Carb % dev Fat % dev Fat % dev Fat % dev Protein % dev Protein % dev Protein % dev
%IncomeFall*Girl -0.0797** -0.136*** -0.159*** -0.0937* -0.227*** -0.261*** -0.0436 -0.0294 -0.0527 -0.232*** -0.136** -0.122**
(0.0396) (0.0387) (0.0399) (0.0564) (0.0514) (0.0533) (0.0422) (0.0489) (0.0510) (0.0543) (0.0532) (0.0540)
%IncomeFall 0.120** 0.0847 0.233*** 0.256*** 0.225*** 0.413*** 0.0100 -0.0871 0.181 -0.124* -0.0412 -0.258***
(0.0561) (0.0584) (0.0774) (0.0708) (0.0716) (0.0971) (0.0789) (0.0856) (0.117) (0.0665) (0.0662) (0.0936)
Log eq income 0.0752*** 0.0963*** 0.132*** -0.101***
(0.0252) (0.0307) (0.0416) (0.0313)
Observations 5,705 4,982 4,925 5,705 4,982 4,925 5,705 4,982 4,925 5,705 4,982 4,925
R-squared 0.008 0.074 0.079 0.011 0.135 0.141 0.008 0.052 0.059 0.017 0.140 0.146
Number of ﬁxedm 1,207 1,172 1,166 1,207 1,172 1,166 1,207 1,172 1,166 1,207 1,172 1,166
HH characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sibling ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: CHNS 1991 to 2011. Children 2 to 17 year old. Sample of children with siblings of opposite sex. At least two children in one family are surveyed in one cycle.
Note: Standard errors clustered by families in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.
The dependent variable is the percentage deviation of macronutrient intake from the age- and gender-speciﬁc DRIs standards. HH characteristics include number of
children in the household and number of other relative and non-relatives in the household. Child characteristics include if the child has graduated from primary school or
middle school, puberty onset and birth order. Log equivalent income is deﬁned as household income after tax and transfer divided by square root of household size.
Constant is included in the estimation. The %IncomeFall is deﬁned as the percentage income fall from previous cycle using CPI adjusted household equivalent disposable
income.
98
Table 4.9: Sibling ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of dietary intake on percentage income fall (continuous measure). Adolescents with
the opposite sex sibling sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Energy % dev Energy % dev Energy % dev Carb % dev Carb % dev Carb % dev Fat % dev Fat % dev Fat % dev Protein % dev Protein % dev Protein % dev
%IncomeFall*Girl -0.279*** -0.321*** -0.330*** -0.384*** -0.507*** -0.527*** -0.193** -0.219** -0.239** -0.208*** -0.0690 -0.0495
(0.0710) (0.0756) (0.0791) (0.101) (0.105) (0.110) (0.0859) (0.0932) (0.0979) (0.0738) (0.0758) (0.0775)
%IncomeFall 0.0769 0.0954 0.382*** 0.263** 0.288** 0.720*** -0.118 -0.110 0.130 -0.0736 -0.0674 -0.0493
(0.0934) (0.0937) (0.134) (0.124) (0.125) (0.169) (0.136) (0.137) (0.206) (0.0811) (0.0772) (0.108)
Log eq income 0.132*** 0.199*** 0.109 0.0122
(0.0463) (0.0582) (0.0720) (0.0399)
Observations 2,223 2,188 2,170 2,223 2,188 2,170 2,223 2,188 2,170 2,223 2,188 2,170
R-squared 0.020 0.030 0.040 0.028 0.055 0.068 0.017 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.106 0.103
Number of ﬁxedm 962 951 946 962 951 946 962 951 946 962 951 946
HH characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sibling ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: CHNS 1991 to 2011. Children 2 to 17 year old. Sample of children with siblings of opposite sex. At least two children in one family are surveyed in one cycle.
Note: Standard errors clustered by families in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.
The dependent variable is the percentage deviation of macronutrient intake from the age- and gender-speciﬁc DRIs standards. HH characteristics include number of
children in the household and number of other relative and non-relatives in the household. Child characteristics include if the child has graduated from primary school or
middle school, puberty onset and birth order. Log equivalent income is deﬁned as household income after tax and transfer divided by square root of household size.
Constant is included in the estimation. The %IncomeFall is deﬁned as the percentage income fall from previous cycle using CPI adjusted household equivalent disposable
income.
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Figure 4.1: Map of China with CHNS provinces
Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey website:
www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china
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Figure 4.2: Fertility Rate for Rural and Urban China (1973-2010)
Source: The ﬁgure is reproduced based on data from Zhang (2017). It is originally
compiled from Peng and Guo (2017) for 1973-1992 data; the 2001 National Fertil-
ity and Reproductive Health Survey for 1993-1999; Juan and Qiu (2011) for 2001-
2009 data; and the national population censuses for 2000 and 2010 data.
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Figure 4.3: Outcome variables by gender and single child status
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Note: CHNS 1991 to 2011. Children 2 to 17 year old. Sibling sample and single child sample. %Dev is deﬁned as the per-
centage deviation of macronutrient intakes from the age- and gender-speciﬁc DRIs standards.
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Figure 4.4: Independent variables by gender and single child status
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Note: CHNS 1991 to 2011. Children 2 to 17 year old. Sibling sample and single child sample. NegShock is deﬁned as 1 if
the equivalent income falls more than 25% from the average of previous 3 cycles, 0 otherwise. Number of extra hh members
is deﬁned as household size minus two parents minus number of children (e.g. number of grandparents, relatives, and non-
relatives). Equivalent income is deﬁned as household income after tax and transfer divided by square root of household size.
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Figure 4.5: Energy distribution with and without negative income shock
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Source: Author’s calculation. Note: The without income shock is used from the mean energy intakes of the sample. The
with income shock is calculated using the estimates from Table 4.7 Speciﬁcation 2. The percentage deviation of energy in-
take from DRIs standard is labelled.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation, I examine the links between parental economic insecurity and
child development. Economic insecurity does not have a uniﬁed measure (Osberg,
2015a). Therefore, I examine three diﬀerent measures of economic insecurity in my
three essays. First, I use subjective measure, where parents are directly asked if
they worry about having enough money to support their families. The second es-
say uses objective measures of layoﬀ rates and ﬁnancial loss in the event of layoﬀs
at the provincial and year level. In the third essay, a 25% income loss from pre-
vious years is used. Economic insecurity examined in this dissertation combines
subjective and objective measures at the individual, household, and provincial
level. By engaging diﬀerent measures, I provide a multidimensional overview of
the prevalence and the severity of economic insecurity.
To draw causal conclusions, I use two methods in the three essays. The second es-
say uses continuous diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology. The third essay adopts
sibling ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the family. By em-
ploying the three econometric techniques, I hope to provide strong evidence to
infer the causal relationship of parental economic insecurity and the adversity of
child outcomes.
In the dissertation, I investigate the parental economic insecurity and child devel-
opment in both China and Canada. The two countries vary in economic develop-
ment, welfare state, constitutions, cultures, population size, and political attitudes.
I adopt the concept and methodology of economic insecurity and bring them to
Chinese studies. China’s pension, social assistance programs, and employment
insurances are severely underdeveloped, which contributes to a high level of eco-
nomic insecurity. However, economic insecurity is highly understudied in China.
I adapt my focus of the study to the country-speciﬁc environment. I provide evi-
dence to China-speciﬁc issues (e.g. layoﬀs and son-favoritism). By doing so, I hope
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to bridge the studies of two cultures and draw attention to the insecurity in both
countries.
106
References
Abraham, S., Collins, G., & Nordsieck, M. (1971). Relationship of childhood
weight status to morbidity in adults. HSMHA health reports, 86 (3), 273.
Almond, D., Edlund, L., & Milligan, K. (2013). Son preference and the persis-
tence of culture: Evidence from south and East Asian immigrants to canada.
Population and Development Review , 39 (1), 75–95.
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiri-
cist’s companion. Princeton university press.
Bezirganian, S., & Cohen, P. (1992). Sex diﬀerences in the interaction between
temperament and parenting. Journal of the American Academy of Child &
Adolescent Psychiatry , 31 (5), 790–801.
Birch, L. L., & Fisher, J. O. (1998). Development of eating behaviors among
children and adolescents. Pediatrics , 101 (Supplement 2), 539–549. Re-
trieved from http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/101/
Supplement_2/539
Blanchﬂower, D. G., & Oswald, A. J. (1999). Well-being, insecurity and the decline
of american job satisfaction. NBER working paper , 7487 .
Blau, D. M. (1999). The eﬀect of income on child development. Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 81 (2), 261–276.
Brooks-Gunn, J., & Duncan, G. J. (1997). The eﬀects of poverty on children. The
future of children, 55–71.
Burkhauser, R. V., & Cawley, J. (2008). Beyond bmi: The value of more accurate
measures of fatness and obesity in social science research. Journal of health
economics, 27 (2), 519–529.
Burton, P., & Phipps, S. (2009). Economic costs of caring for children with disabil-
ities in canada. Canadian Public Policy , 35 (3), 269–290.
Burton, P., Phipps, S., & Woolley, F. (2007). Inequality within the household
reconsidered. In S. Jenkins & J. Micklewright (Eds.), Inequality and poverty
reexamined (p. 103-125). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cai, H., Li, H., Park, A., & Zhou, L.-A. (2013). Family ties and organizational
design: Evidence from chinese private ﬁrms. Review of Economics and Statis-
tics , 95 (3), 850–867.
Cartwright-Hatton, S., McNicol, K., & Doubleday, E. (2006). Anxiety in a ne-
glected population: Prevalence of anxiety disorders in pre-adolescent chil-
dren. Clinical psychology review , 26 (7), 817–833.
Chang, K.-c. (1977). Food in chinese culture: Anthropological and historical per-
spectives. Yale University Press.
Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). The chameleon eﬀect: the perception–
behavior link and social interaction. Journal of personality and social psy-
chology , 76 (6), 893.
107
Chee, B. W. (2000). Eating snacks and biting pressure: only children in beijing.
Feeding China’s little emperors: food, children, and social change, 48–70.
Chen, K., Fortin, N., & Phipps, S. (2015). Young in class: implications for inatten-
tive/hyperactive behaviour of canadian boys and girls. Canadian Journal of
Economics/Revue canadienne d’économique, 48 (5), 1601–1634.
Chen, Y., Li, H., & Meng, L. (2013). Prenatal sex selection and missing girls in
China: Evidence from the diﬀusion of diagnostic ultrasound. Journal of Hu-
man Resources , 48 (1), 36–70.
China Health and Nutrition Survey. (2017). Retrieved from http://www.cpc.unc
.edu/projects/china (Accessed: April 16, 2017)
Clark, A., & Grey, A. (1997). Is job insecurity on the increase in oecd countries.
DEELSA, OECD, mimeografado, Março.
Cole, T. J., Bellizzi, M. C., Flegal, K. M., & Dietz, W. H. (2000). Establishing a
standard deﬁnition for child overweight and obesity worldwide: International
survey. Bmj , 320 (7244), 1240.
Cole, T. J., & Green, P. J. (1992). Smoothing reference centile curves: The lms
method and penalized likelihood. Statistics in medicine, 11 (10), 1305–1319.
Cui, Z., & Dibley, M. J. (2012). Trends in dietary energy, fat, carbohydrate and
protein intake in chinese children and adolescents from 1991 to 2009. British
Journal of Nutrition, 108 (7), 1292–1299. doi: 10.1017/S0007114511006891
Cunha, F., & Heckman, J. J. (2010). Investing in our young people (Tech. Rep.).
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dahl, G. B., & Lochner, L. (2012). The impact of family income on child achieve-
ment: Evidence from the earned income tax credit. The American Economic
Review , 102 (5), 1927–1956.
Dallman, M. F., Pecoraro, N., Akana, S. F., La Fleur, S. E., Gomez, F., Housh-
yar, H., . . . Manalo, S. (2003). Chronic stress and obesity: A new view of
“comfort food”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100 (20),
11696–11701.
Das Gupta, M., Ebenstein, A. Y., & Sharygin, E. J. (2010). China’s marriage
market and upcoming challenges for elderly men.
Dasgupta, P. (1995). An inquiry into well-being and destitution. Oxford University
Press on Demand.
Dawson, D. A. (1991). Family structure and children’s health and well-being: Data
from the 1988 national health interview survey on child health. Journal of
Marriage and the Family , 573–584.
Demarest, J., & Allen, R. (2000). Body image: Gender, ethnic, and age diﬀerences.
The Journal of social psychology , 140 (4), 465–472.
Deurenberg, P., Deurenberg-Yap, M., & Guricci, S. (2002). Asians are diﬀerent
from caucasians and from each other in their body mass index/body fat per
cent relationship. Obesity reviews, 3 (3), 141–146.
Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R. J., & Oswald, A. J. (2001). Preferences over inﬂa-
tion and unemployment: Evidence from surveys of happiness. The American
economic review , 91 (1), 335–341.
108
Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R. J., & Oswald, A. J. (2003). The macroeconomics of
happiness. Review of Economics and Statistics, 85 (4), 809–827.
Dorfman, M. C., Holzmann, R., O’keefe, P., Wang, D., Sin, Y., & Hinz, R. (2013).
China’s pension system: A vision. World Bank Publications.
Duﬂo, E. (2000). Child health and household resources in south africa: evidence
from the old age pension program. The American Economic Review , 90 (2),
393–398.
Ebenstein, A. (2010). The “missing girls” of China and the unintended conse-
quences of the one child policy. Journal of Human Resources, 45 (1), 87–115.
Essex, M. J., Klein, M. H., Cho, E., & Kraemer, H. C. (2003). Exposure to ma-
ternal depression and marital conﬂict: Gender diﬀerences in children’s later
mental health symptoms. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Ado-
lescent Psychiatry , 42 (6), 728–737.
Friedman, M. A., & Brownell, K. D. (1995). Psychological correlates of obesity:
Moving to the next research generation. Psychological bulletin, 117 (1), 3.
Furnham, A., Badmin, N., & Sneade, I. (2002). Body image dissatisfaction: Gen-
der diﬀerences in eating attitudes, self-esteem, and reasons for exercise. The
Journal of psychology , 136 (6), 581–596.
Gershoﬀ, E. T., Aber, J. L., Raver, C. C., & Lennon, M. C. (2007). Income is not
enough: Incorporating material hardship into models of income associations
with parenting and child development. Child development , 78 (1), 70–95.
Giles, J., Park, A., & Cai, F. (2006). How has economic restructuring aﬀected
China’s urban workers? The China Quarterly , 185 , 61–95.
Greeno, C. G., & Wing, R. R. (1994). Stress-induced eating. Psychological bulletin,
115 (3), 444.
Guo, S. S., Roche, A. F., Chumlea, W. C., Gardner, J. D., & Siervogel, R. M.
(1994). The predictive value of childhood body mass index values for over-
weight at age 35 y. The American journal of clinical nutrition, 59 (4), 810–
819.
Hacker, J. S., Huber, G. A., Nichols, A., Rehm, P., Schlesinger, M., Valletta, R., &
Craig, S. (2014). The economic security index: A new measure for research
and policy analysis. Review of Income and Wealth, 60 , S5–S32. Retrieved
from http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12053 doi: 10.1111/roiw.12053
Hacker, J. S., Huber, G. A., Rehm, P., Schlesinger, M., & Valletta, R. (2010). Eco-
nomic security at risk. The Rockefeller Foundation.
Haddad, L., & Hoddinott, J. (1994). Women’s income and boy-girl anthropo-
metric status in the côte d’ivoire. World Development , 22 (4), 543 - 553.
Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
0305750X94901104 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(94)90110-4
Hanushek, E. A. (1992). The trade-oﬀ between child quantity and quality. Journal
of political economy , 100 (1), 84–117.
Heckman, J. J. (2000). Policies to foster human capital. Research in economics,
54 (1), 3–56.
Heckman, J. J. (2007). The economics, technology, and neuroscience of human
109
capability formation. Proceedings of the national Academy of Sciences,
104 (33), 13250–13255.
Heckman, J. J. (2011). The economics of inequality: The value of early childhood
education. American Educator , 35 (1), 31.
Helliwell, J. F., & Huang, H. (2014). New measures of the costs of unemployment:
Evidence from the subjective well-being of 3.3 million americans. Economic
Inquiry , 52 (4), 1485–1502.
Hesketh, T., Lu, L., & Xing, Z. W. (2005). The eﬀect of China’s one-child family
policy after 25 years. Mass Medical Soc.
Jing, J. (2000). Feeding China’s little emperors: Food, children, and social change.
Stanford University Press.
Johansson, S., & Nygren, O. (1991). The missing girls of China: A new demo-
graphic account. The Population and Development Review , 35–51.
Juan, H., & Qiu, C. (2011). A comparative analysis of the fertility of the urban
and rural areas in China since 2000. South China Population, 5 , 27–33.
Kavey, R.-E. W., Daniels, S. R., Lauer, R. M., Atkins, D. L., Hayman, L. L., &
Taubert, K. (2003). American heart association guidelines for primary pre-
vention of atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease beginning in childhood. Cir-
culation, 107 (11), 1562–1566.
Ko, G. T., Chan, J. C., Cockram, C. S., & Woo, J. (1999). Prediction of hyper-
tension, diabetes, dyslipidaemia or albuminuria using simple anthropometric
indexes in hong kong chinese. International journal of obesity , 23 (11), 1136–
1142.
Kong, W., & Phipps, S. (2016). Parental economic insecurity and children’s non-
cognitive skills: A panel study of 2 to 5 year-olds in canada.. (Paper pre-
pared for the 34th IARIW General Conference Dresden, Germany, August
21-27, 2016)
Kuczmarski, R. J., Ogden, C. L., Grummer-Strawn, L. M., Flegal, K. M., Guo,
S. S., Wei, R., . . . Johnson, C. L. (2000). Cdc growth charts: United states.
Advance data(314), 1–27.
Köster, E. P., & Mojet, J. (2015). From mood to food and from food to mood:
A psychological perspective on the measurement of food-related emotions
in consumer research. Food Research International , 76 , 180 - 191. Re-
trieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S096399691500157X (Food, emotions and food choice)
Larson, J. H., Wilson, S. M., & Beley, R. (1994). The impact of job insecurity on
marital and family relationships. Family Relations , 138–143.
Lee, H. Y. (2000). Xiagang, the chinese style of laying oﬀ workers. Asian Survey ,
40 (6), 914–937.
Lefebvre, P., Merrigan, P., & Verstraete, M. (2006). Impact of early childhood care
and education on children’s preschool cognitive development: Canadian results
from a large quasi-experiment (Tech. Rep.). CIRPEE.
Levy, D. M., & Duncan, G. (2000, April). Using Sibling Samples to Assess the
Eﬀect of Childhood Family Income on Completed Schooling (JCPR Working
110
Papers No. 168). Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Cen-
ter for Poverty Research. Retrieved from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wop/
jopovw/168.html
Lin, J. Y., Cai, F., & Li, Z. (1998). Competition, policy burdens, and state-owned
enterprise reform. The American Economic Review , 88 (2), 422–427.
Lise, J., & Seitz, S. (2011). Consumption inequality and intra-household alloca-
tions. The Review of Economic Studies, 78 (1), 328–355.
Liu, C., Xie, B., Chou, C.-P., Koprowski, C., Zhou, D., Palmer, P., . . . others
(2007). Perceived stress, depression and food consumption frequency in the
college students of China seven cities. Physiology & behavior , 92 (4), 748–
754.
Lundberg, S. J., Pollak, R. A., & Wales, T. J. (1997). Do husbands and wives pool
their resources? evidence from the united kingdom child beneﬁt. Journal of
Human resources , 463–480.
Lupien, S. J., McEwen, B. S., Gunnar, M. R., & Heim, C. (2009). Eﬀects of stress
throughout the lifespan on the brain, behaviour and cognition. Nature re-
views. Neuroscience, 10 (6), 434.
Luxembourg Income Study. (2017). Retrieved from http://www.lisdatacenter
.org (Accessed: April 16, 2017)
Macht, M. (2008). How emotions aﬀect eating: A ﬁve-way model. Appetite, 50 (1),
1 - 11. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0195666307003236 doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2007.07.002
Mayer, S. E. (1997). What money can’t buy: Family income and children’s life
chances. Harvard University Press.
Millward, D. J., & Jackson, A. A. (2003). Protein/energy ratios of current diets
in developed and developing countries compared with a safe protein/energy
ratio: implications for recommended protein and amino acid intakes. Public
health nutrition, 7 (03), 387–405.
Mokha, J. S., Srinivasan, S. R., DasMahapatra, P., Fernandez, C., Chen, W., Xu,
J., & Berenson, G. S. (2010). Utility of waist-to-height ratio in assessing the
status of central obesity and related cardiometabolic risk proﬁle among nor-
mal weight and overweight/obese children: The bogalusa heart study. BMC
pediatrics , 10 (1), 73.
Oﬀer, A., Pechey, R., & Ulijaszek, S. (2010). Obesity under aﬄuence varies by
welfare regimes: The eﬀect of fast food, insecurity, and inequality. Eco-
nomics & Human Biology , 8 (3), 297 - 308. Retrieved from http://www
.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1570677X10000663 doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ehb.2010.07.002
Onis, M. (2006). Who child growth standards based on length/height, weight and
age. Acta paediatrica, 95 (S450), 76–85.
Onis, M. d., Onyango, A. W., Borghi, E., Siyam, A., Nishida, C., & Siekmann, J.
(2007a). Development of a who growth reference for school-aged children and
adolescents. Bulletin of the World health Organization, 85 (9), 660–667.
Onis, M. d., Onyango, A. W., Borghi, E., Siyam, A., Nishida, C., & Siekmann, J.
111
(2007b). Development of a who growth reference for school-aged children and
adolescents. Bulletin of the World health Organization, 85 (9), 660–667.
Oreopoulos, P., Page, M. E., & Stevens, A. H. (2006). The intergenerational eﬀects
of compulsory schooling. Journal of Labor Economics , 24 (4), 729–760.
Osberg, L. (1998, October). Economic Insecurity. SPRC Discussion Paper, So-
cial Policy Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Aus-
tralia(No. 88).
Osberg, L. (2000). Poverty in canada and the united states: Measurement, trends,
and implications. The Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne
d’Economique, 33 (4), 847–877.
Osberg, L. (2015a). How should one measure economic insecurity? OECD Statis-
tics Working Papers , 2015 (1), 0_1.
Osberg, L. (2015b). The hunger of old women in rural tanzania: Can subjective
data improve poverty measurement? Review of Income and Wealth, 61 (4),
723–738.
Osberg, L., & Sharpe, A. (2009a). Measuring economic security in insecure times:
New perspectives, new events, and the index of economic well-being (Tech.
Rep.). Centre for the Study of Living Standards Ottawa.
Osberg, L., & Sharpe, A. (2009b). New estimates of the index of economic well-
being for selected oecd countries, 1980-2007. Centre for the Study of Living
Standards.
Peng, X. (1991). Demographic transition in China: fertility trends since the 1950s.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Peng, X., & Guo, Z. (2000). The changing population of China. Blackwell Publish-
ers.
Phipps, S., & Burton, P. (1995). Sharing within families: implications for the
measurement of poverty among individuals in canada. Canadian Journal of
Economics , 177–204.
Phipps, S., Burton, P., & Osberg, L. (2001). Time as a source of inequality within
marriage: are husbands more satisﬁed with time for themselves than wives?
Feminist Economics, 7 (2), 1–21.
Popkin, B. M., Du, S., Zhai, F., & Zhang, B. (2010). Cohort proﬁle: The China
Health and Nutrition Survey—monitoring and understanding socio-economic
and health change in china, 1989–2011. International journal of epidemiol-
ogy , 39 (6), 1435–1440.
Popkin, B. M., Lu, B., & Zhai, F. (2002). Understanding the nutrition transition:
measuring rapid dietary changes in transitional countries. Public health nutri-
tion, 5 (6a), 947–953.
Qvortrup, J., Bardy, M., Sgritta, G., & Wintersberger, H. (1994). Childhood mat-
ters: Social theory, practice and politics. Avebury.
Rohde, N., Tang, K., & Osberg, L. (2017). The self-reinforcing dynamics of eco-
nomic insecurity and obesity. Applied Economics, 49 (17), 1668–1678.
Rohde, N., Tang, K. K., Osberg, L., & Rao, P. (2016). The eﬀect of economic inse-
curity on mental health: Recent evidence from australian panel data. Social
112
Science & Medicine, 151 , 250–258.
Sawyer, S. M., Aﬁﬁ, R. A., Bearinger, L. H., Blakemore, S.-J., Dick, B., Ezeh,
A. C., & Patton, G. C. (2012). Adolescence: a foundation for future health.
The Lancet , 379 (9826), 1630–1640.
Schneider, H. J., Friedrich, N., Klotsche, J., Pieper, L., Nauck, M., John, U., . . .
others (2010). The predictive value of diﬀerent measures of obesity for inci-
dent cardiovascular events and mortality. The Journal of Clinical Endocrinol-
ogy & Metabolism, 95 (4), 1777–1785.
Smith, T. G. (2009). Reconciling psychology with economics: Obesity, behavioral
biology, and rational overeating. Journal of Bioeconomics, 11 (3), 249–282.
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10818-009-9067-8 doi:
10.1007/s10818-009-9067-8
Smith, T. G., Stoddard, C., & Barnes, M. G. (2009). Why the poor get fat:
weight gain and economic insecurity. In Forum for health economics & pol-
icy (Vol. 12).
Sørensen, T. L., & Sonne-Holm, S. (1988). Risk in childhood of development of se-
vere adult obesity: Retrospective, population-based case-cohort study. Amer-
ican journal of epidemiology , 127 (1), 104–113.
Staudigel, M. (2016). A soft pillow for hard times? economic insecurity, food in-
take and body weight in russia. Journal of Health Economics, 50 , 198 - 212.
Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0167629616301928 doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.09.001
Trumbo, P., Schlicker, S., Yates, A. A., & Poos, M. (2002). Dietary reference in-
takes for energy, carbohydrate, ﬁber, fat, fatty acids, cholesterol, protein and
amino acids. Journal of the American Dietetic Association, 102 (11), 1621–
1630.
Tsutsumi, A., Kayaba, K., Theorell, T., & Siegrist, J. (2001). Association between
job stress and depression among japanese employees threatened by job loss in
a comparison between two complementary job-stress models. Scandinavian
journal of work, environment & health, 146–153.
Watson, B., Osberg, L., & Phipps, S. (2016). Economic insecurity and the weight
gain of canadian adults: A natural experiment approach. Canadian Pub-
lic Policy , 42 (2), 115-131. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.3138/
cpp.2015-064 doi: 10.3138/cpp.2015-064
World Health Organization. (2000). The Asia-Paciﬁc perspective: redeﬁning obesity
and its treatment. Sydney: Health Communications Australia.
World Health Organization. (2006). Who child growth standards: length/height for
age, weight-for-age, weight-for-length, weight-for-height and body mass index-
for-age, methods and development. World Health Organization.
World Health Organization. (2017). Retrieved from http://www.who.int/
maternal_child_adolescent/topics/adolescence/dev/en/ (Accessed:
April 16, 2017)
Yan, S., Li, J., Li, S., Zhang, B., Du, S., Gordon-Larsen, P., . . . Popkin, B. (2012).
The expanding burden of cardiometabolic risk in China: The China health
113
and nutrition survey. Obesity Reviews, 13 (9), 810–821.
Yan, W., Bingxian, H., Hua, Y., Jianghong, D., Jun, C., Dongliang, G., . . . others
(2007). Waist-to-height ratio is an accurate and easier index for evaluating
obesity in children and adolescents. Obesity , 15 (3), 748–752.
Zhang, J. (2017). The evolution of China’s one-child policy and its eﬀects on fam-
ily outcomes. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31 (1).
Zhou, W. (2014). Brothers, household ﬁnancial markets and savings rate in China.
Journal of Development Economics, 111 , 34–47.
Zhu, M., J, F., L, L., C, G., F, X., G, L., . . . S., C. (2013). Epidemiologic study on
current pubertal development in chinese school-aged children. Zhejiang Da
Xue Xue Bao Yi Xue Ban, 4 (42), 396-402.
114
Appendix
Children’s well-being outcomes The three indices for children’s well-being
outcomes are derived from multiple questions answered by PMKs. The questions
and answers follow the same format: “Using the answers never or not true, some-
times or somewhat true, or often or very true, how often would you say that this
child. . . ” For all of the questions, never or not true is assigned 0, sometimes or
somewhat true is 1, and often or very true is 2. Then the score from each ques-
tion is combined under the same index. Here is the list of questions asked for hy-
peractivity/inattention score, emotional disorder/anxiety score and conduct disor-
der/physical aggression score:
Hyperactivity - Inattention score (12-point scale) is derived from the following six
questions:
1. . . . can’t sit still or is restless?
2. . . . is easily distracted, has trouble sticking to any activity?
3. . . . can’t concentrate, can’t pay attention for long?
4. . . . cannot settle on anything for more than a few moments?
5. . . . has diﬃculty waiting for his turn in games or groups?
6. . . . is inattentive?
Emotional Disorder-Anxiety Score (12-point scale) is derived from the following six
questions:
1. . . . seems to be unhappy or sad?
2. . . . is not as happy as other children?
3. . . . is too fearful or nervous?
4. . . . is worried?
5. . . . is nervous, high strung or tense?
6. . . . has trouble enjoying him/herself?
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Parenting style
Consistent parenting style score (20-point scale) is derived from the questions be-
low. The answers to these questions ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (all the time).
The values of last three questions are reversed for the calculation.
1. When you give this child a command or order to do something, what propor-
tion of the time do you make sure that he does it?
2. If you tell this child he will get punished if he doesn’t stop doing something,
and he keeps doing it, how often will you punish him?
3. How often does this child get away with things for which you feel he should
have been punished?
4. How often is this child able to get out of a punishment when he really sets
his mind to it?
5. How often when you discipline this child, does he ignore the punishment?
Positive interaction score (20-point scale) are derived from the questions below.
These questions take the value 0 if never, 1 if about once a week or less, 2 if a few
times a week, 3 one or two times a day, and 4 many times each day.
1. 1. How often do you praise this child, by saying something like ’Good for
you!’ or ’What a nice thing you did!’ or ’That’s good going!’?
2. How often do you and this child talk or play with each other, focusing atten-
tion on each other for ﬁve minutes or more, just for fun?
3. How often do you and this child laugh together?
4. How often do you do something special with this child that he enjoys?
5. How often do you play sports, hobbies or games with this child?
Ineﬀective parenting style score ranges from 0 to 28. It is derived from the follow-
ing seven questions with the same calculation as above.
1. How often do you get annoyed with this child for saying or doing something
he is not supposed to?
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2. Of all the times that you talk to this child about his behaviour, what propor-
tion is praise? (reversed)
3. Of all the times that you talk to this child about his behaviour, what propor-
tion is disapproval?
4. How often do you get angry when you punish this child?
5. How often do you think that the kind of punishment you give this child de-
pends on your mood?
6. How often do you feel you are having problems managing this child in gen-
eral?
7. How often do you have to discipline this child repeatedly for the same thing?
Irrational parenting style score is on 16-point scale. Parents are asked to answer
the questions from 0 “Never” to 4 “Always”. The four questions are asked as fol-
lowing: “Please tell me how often you, as his parent, do each of the following when
this child breaks the rules or does things that he is not supposed to:”
1. ...raise your voice, scold or yell at him?
2. ...calmly discuss the problem? (reversed)
3. ...use physical punishment?
4. ...describe alternative ways of behaving that are acceptable? (reversed)
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State-owned units: various enterprises, institutions, and government administra-
tive organizations at various levels, social organizations, etc., with state ownership
of production means.
Urban collective owned units: various enterprises and institutions with collec-
tive ownership of production means, including various rural economic organizations
engaging in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and ﬁshery, enterprises, and
institutions run by townships and villages. Or run by cities, countries, towns, and
neighbourhood committees.
Other Ownership Units:: jointly owned units, share-holding units, foreign-
funded units, overseas Chinese from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan-funded units,
etc.
Laid-oﬀ workers: due to the production or operational diﬃculties of the state-
sector enterprises, employees leave the job involuntarily, and do not work for other
jobs in the same enterprise. They still remain the labour relation with the original
enterprises (National Bureau of Labour & National Bureau of Statistics of China,
1997)
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